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The Transformation of American Political Parties
Katherine Krimmel
Why have group-party alliances become more common since the mid-twentieth
century? This dissertation employs both qualitative and statistical tools to address the
puzzle of contemporary special interest partisanship. After tracing partisanship across
several measures, I develop a continuum of group-party relationships, running from
fluid, unstructured interactions (akin to political pluralism) to highly institutionalized
alliances (as we might see in a firm). Drawing on pluralist scholarship and theories of
firm formation and evolution, I explore the costs and benefits of different arrangements,
and explain why we might expect to see movement along the continuum over time. On
the one hand, pluralism offers flexibility to parties and groups, and alliances have little
value when parties are too weak to discipline their members in Congress. On the other,
institutionalized alliances offer significant efficiency gains, which are especially valuable
during periods of growth. I argue that changes in group-party relations stem from the
growth of national party organizations over the second half of the twentieth century,
which increased the value of group resources and intensified parties’ need for efficiency.
Until this period, parties were weak on the national level and strong on the state and
local levels, and patronage was the primary currency of politics, leaving little room for
issues in political competition. The New Deal’s historic expansion of federal power
disrupted this balance, temporarily strengthening local parties by offering new sources
of patronage, while also sparking gradual, interconnected processes that would
ultimately undermine machine power—most notably, the growth of groups and the rise
of issue politics as a site of electoral competition. Realizing the economies of scale
necessary to build strong national parties required movement away from pluralism into
more structured, long-term relationships. Moreover, in order for the new site of
competition to help Republicans build a coalition to compete with the long-dominant
New Deal Democrats, distinct issue positions were necessary. The result of this
party-building process is a pattern of group-party alliances quite unlike the bipartisan
relations Key, Truman, and others observed in the mid-twentieth century.
Table of Contents
I Dissertation Chapters 1
1 Introduction 2
1.1 Conceptualizing Group-Party Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2 A Mixed-Method Analysis of Party Nationalization and the Growth of Spe-
cial Interest Partisanship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 A New Perspective on Polarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4 Chapter Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2 The Growth of Special Interest Partisanship 22
2.1 Measuring Special Interest Partisanship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.2 Data and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4 Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4.1 Roll-Call Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4.2 Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.5 Agendas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.5.1 Congressional Hearings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.5.2 State of the Union Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.6 Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.6.1 Campaign Donations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.6.2 Endorsements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.7 Contours of the Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3 Efficiencies and Pathologies of Special Interest Partisanship 73
i
3.1 Group-Party Relations at the Individual Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.2 The Range of Group-Party Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.2.1 Pluralism: A Free Market of Group-Party Relations . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2.2 Institutionalization of Group-Party Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2.3 The Full Continuum of Group-Party Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4 Party Nationalization and Polarization 99
4.1 Decentralized Parties and Issue Position Convergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.2 Testing the Link Between Patronage and Polarization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.3 Measuring Party Centralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.4 The Process of Party Nationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.4.1 National Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.4.2 State and Local Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.5 The Development of Issue Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.5.1 Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.5.2 Programmatic Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5 Party-Building Through Groups 138
5.1 The Nixon Administration, 1969-1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
5.2 The Ford Administration, 1974-1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.3 The Carter Administration, 1977-1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.4 The Reagan Administration, 1981-1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
6 Conclusion 185
II Bibliography 193
6.1 Archival Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194





2.1 Standard Deviation of Partisanship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.2 Special Interest Partisanship in the Electorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3 Perceived Difference Between Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.4 Perceived Party Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.5 Likeness, Cohesion, and Special Interest Partisanship in the House and
Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.6 Changes in Special Interest Partisanship in the House and Senate Over Time 42
2.7 Sample Size and Significance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.8 Special Interest Partisanship in the House Over Time, by Group . . . . . . . 44
2.9 Special Interest Partisanship in the Senate Over Time, by Group . . . . . . . 45
2.10 Testimony by Environmental Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.11 Testimony by Abortion/Pro-Choice Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.12 Testimony by Abortion/Pro-Life Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.13 Testimony by Health Insurance Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.14 Marginal Effect of Democratic Control on Attention to Abortion . . . . . . . 52
2.15 Marginal Effect of Democratic Control on Attention to Tobacco Issues . . . . 53
2.16 Marginal Effect of President’s Party on Attention to the Environment . . . . 57
2.17 Marginal Effect of President’s Party on Attention to Commercial Banking . 58
2.18 Partisan Breakdown of Campaign Contributions, 1932-1944 . . . . . . . . . 60
2.19 Aggregate Special Interest Partisanship in Campaign Finance . . . . . . . . 63
2.20 Special Interest Partisanship in Campaign Finance by Group, 1980-2010 . . 66
4.1 DNC and RNC Paid Staff, 1935-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.2 The Growth of National Party-Related Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
iv
4.3 Party Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.4 Party Platform Length, 1840-2008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.1 The Office of Public Liaison’s Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.2 The Office of Public Liaison’s Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
v
List of Tables
2.1 Special Interest Partisanship in Campaign Finance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.1 Traditional Party Organization and State-Level Polarization . . . . . . . . . 106
4.2 List of National Party-Related Organizations (Part 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.3 List of National Party-Related Organizations (Part 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
A.1 Case Selection (Part 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
A.2 Case Selection (Part 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
A.3 Case Selection (Part 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
A.4 Case Selection (Part 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
A.5 Special Interest Partisanship in the Electorate, by Group . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
A.6 Basic Party Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
A.7 Perceived Party Ideologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
A.8 Perceived Party Positions on Issues (Part 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
A.9 Perceived Party Positions on Issues (Part 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
A.10 Perceived Party Positions on Issues (Part 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
A.11 Perceived Presidential Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 1) . . . . . . . . . 216
A.12 Perceived Presidential Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 2) . . . . . . . . . 217
A.13 Perceived Presidential Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 3) . . . . . . . . . 218
A.14 Perceived Presidential Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 4) . . . . . . . . . 219
A.15 Perceived House Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 1) . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
A.16 Perceived House Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 2) . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
A.17 Aggregate Likeness and Cohesion in the House . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
A.18 Aggregate Likeness and Cohesion in the Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
vi
A.19 Special Interest Partisanship in the House and Senate . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
A.20 Special Interest Partisanship in the House, by Group (Part 1) . . . . . . . . . 225
A.21 Special Interest Partisanship in the House, by Group (Part 2) . . . . . . . . . 226
A.22 Special Interest Partisanship in the Senate, by Group (Part 1) . . . . . . . . . 227
A.23 Special Interest Partisanship in the Senate, by Group (Part 2) . . . . . . . . . 228
A.24 Attention to Issues in State of the Union Addresses (Part 1) . . . . . . . . . . 229
A.25 Attention to Issues in State of the Union Addresses (Part 2) . . . . . . . . . . 230
A.26 Attention to Issues in State of the Union Addresses (Part 3) . . . . . . . . . . 231
A.27 RNC and DNC Staff Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
vii
Acknowledgements
During my freshman orientation at Northwestern, a professor from my department
stood up and proclaimed, “Welcome, amateurs!” Before we had time to take offense, she
explained that amateurs are people who do things out of passion. Over the ensuing four
years, she promised, the faculty would help us develop this passion into professional
expertise. And they did. While we got a slightly different speech upon our entrance to
graduate school, I have also had this experience at Columbia (albeit over the course of,
let’s say, a touch more than four years).
I came into the program with an interest in social movements—a topic outside the
mainstream American politics literature. I was intrigued by movements’ experiences
with government—when and why were they sometimes successful in gaining
concessions from elected officials, and sometimes not? Not once was I ever discouraged
from following this inquiry. Instead, I was taught, by many different people in this
intellectually diverse and generous department, how to ground my analysis in political
science. It is a pleasure and an honor to be able to thank the many people who helped
me reach this point today. No one writes a dissertation alone.
It is only fitting to begin with Charles Tilly, under whose guidance I started to feel
like maybe I belonged here. He was uncommonly skilled at helping people find their
unique contribution to scholarship. I emailed him nervously in my first year to ask if he
could recommend someone with whom I could do an independent study on social
movements. In hindsight, this is a little embarrassing, as I certainly did not mean to
overlook him! But, I was truly shocked when he offered himself as a mentor—I never
imagined that someone of his stature would have time for a first-year graduate student.
During my semester working with him on the question mentioned above (regarding the
viii
conditions under which movements gain concessions from the government), I
discovered that movements’ relationship to parties had changed drastically over the
twentieth century. Instead of viewing this as a problem (I came in one day, concerned
that I would not be able to find enough variation on a key independent variable), he
encouraged me to think of it as a finding. Today, it is a dissertation, for which I owe him
a great debt of gratitude. I also owe many thanks to his wonderful network of colleagues
and former students from the contentious politics world—especially Susan Woodward,
Vince Boudreau, James Jasper, and John Krinsky—who helped me finish what Professor
Tilly helped me start.
I have been very lucky to have a terrific dissertation committee to guide me
through these past five years. Robert Lieberman is the person I always felt completely
comfortable going to with tangled ideas. Rob always listened patiently, and helped me
separate the distractions from the core of the analysis. When first and second year
graduate students ask me about choosing a committee, I always encourage them to pick
at least one person with whom they feel comfortable discussing incomplete ideas and
problems (and, of course, who is great at handling them). His guidance was invaluable,
especially at the beginning of this process. Gregory Wawro has helped me tremendously,
both in the mechanics of the dissertation and also as a role model for mixed-method
research. In a discipline that has been fairly divided between qualitative and
quantitative methods, Greg has carved out his own path, using combinations of
methods that made sense for the questions he wished to address. I have tried very hard
to emulate him in this way, and it turns out this is pretty difficult! But, it is considerably
easier when you have someone providing you with extremely detailed, thoughtful
comments on everything you give him. As a latecomer to quantitative methods, I
benefitted greatly from his patient guidance. Last, but certainly—as anyone who knows
ix
anything about social science will tell you—not least, the chair of my committee. Ira
Katznelson is a role model in work and life. Big think, precise practice. I learned this
goal from him, and it will guide me through the rest of my career. His work has shown
me that it’s possible. I don’t think I’ve ever actually told him this, but When Affirmative
Action Was White is the most inspiring book I’ve ever read. His careful guidance has
helped me get a lot closer to the goal than I was seven years ago. When I went on the job
market, I knew there was no deep, devastating question that anyone could ask me that
he had not already raised, and helped me navigate. Without his guidance, I’m not sure I
would have had the courage for this project. I probably would have gotten a lot less grief
for being from New Jersey, though.
So many other friends, colleagues, and professors have helped not only get me
through this process, but also made it fun. Many thanks to my running buddies, who
helped me think through many arguments over the years: Adriana Lins de
Albuquerque, Simon Collard-Wexler, Tom Ogorzalek (I’m pretty sure Tom and I
resolved most of the important and long-standing political science debates while
running the Central Park loop—too bad we never remembered to bring a pen), Jennifer
Place, Grant Porter, and Dorian Warren. For helpful conversations, guidance, and
support with my dissertation and the job market, many thanks to Alan Brinkley, Robert
Erikson, Paul Frymer, Daniel Galvin, Guy Grossman, Fredrick Harris, Shigeo Hirano,
Jeffrey Lenowitz, Kimuli Kasara, Debra Minkoff, Quinn Mulroy, Laura Paler, Virginia
Oliveros, Kelly Rader, Robert Shapiro, Alissa Stollwerk, Mike Ting, and Milan Vaishnav.
Special thanks to Jeffrey Lax and Justin Phillips, who have taught me so much about
addressing questions rigorously. And, of course, I cannot forget Nicola Beisel, without
whom I don’t think I would have applied to graduate school. When I was an
undergraduate, she included me in her work with incredible generosity, and supported
x
me through the application process and the first difficult year of graduate school.
Without her, I would probably be a lawyer right now. Double thanks to Nicki.
This dissertation would not have been possible without generous support from
the Miller Center at the University of Virginia, both financially and intellectually. I am so
happy to have been introduced to this rich environment, and hope to participate therein
for the rest of my career. Special thanks to Brian Balogh, Sidney Milkis, and Jeffrey
Jenkins for their support. And, of course, thanks to Nolan McCarty, who generously
agreed to be my mentor for this fellowship, and whose work I have drawn from heavily
throughout this project. Thanks also to William McAllister and my Interdisciplinary
Graduate Fellow colleagues at the Interdisciplinary Center for Innovative Theory and
Empirics for their helpful comments on my job market paper. I also must thank the
wonderful archivists at the presidential libraries I visited, especially William McNitt at
the Ford Library and Albert Nason at the Carter Library, who patiently guided me
through my first two trips, when I had no idea what I looking for (though I did have all
the right equipment and a great system for processing documents, thanks to Quinn
Mulroy)!
Finally, I could never have gotten to this point without the unconditional love and
support of my family. Jonquil Goode and Beth Wolf, my sisters (if not from birth), have
always been there for me with the right thing to say or, if there was no right thing to say,
a bowl of macaroni and cheese. My little brothers, Jeffrey and Mark Krimmel, inspire me
more and more as they grow into amazing grown up people. How lucky am I to have
two great friends who have become sisters and two brothers who have become great
friends. My mom and dad, Lorraine and David Krimmel, somehow managed to push
me without ever creating any expectations about who I should be or what I should do,
who would have supported me whether I wanted to be a corporate lawyer, an academic,
xi
an actress, or a Zamboni driver. I am sure of this path because you gave me the freedom
to choose it for myself. I will strive, however I can, to be a parent to my child like you
were to me. And my husband, Mitchell Schwartz—the person who has literally lived
with me through this—has been a constant source of support, both emotionally and
intellectually. The ideas and arguments in this dissertation are stronger and clearer, after
having talked through them with you. Not everyone gets a former University of Chicago
Law Review Executive Editor to sharpen her thoughts or proofread her job market paper
(including the archival citations—now that’s love). And to our baby, whose sonogram
photo, sitting framed on my desk, has gotten me through these last few tough weeks: I
can’t wait to learn who you are.
xii
To my mom and dad,




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 2
Chapter 1
Introduction
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
Tales of polarization in contemporary American politics range from political tragedy to
farce. The parties’ inability to negotiate a timely solution to the debt ceiling crisis led to a
historic downgrade of the nation’s credit in 2011. Their more recent failure to reach a
budget deal has triggered sequestration, a dramatic wave of automatic cuts—the threat
of which was intended to promote compromise—and further undermined public
confidence in government. In other news, Republicans and Democrats, apparently
unable to share goldfish crackers and ginger ale, had separate break rooms during recent
redistricting meetings in New Jersey.1 Needless to say, the steep growth of elite
polarization since the early 1970s has been one of the most remarkable trends in
contemporary American politics. It is almost hard to believe that only sixty-three years
ago, the American Political Science Association (APSA) published a report criticizing the
parties for excessive similarity. Today, Democrats and Republicans seem to have clear
and opposite stances on most issues, and political discourse has become increasingly
aggressive and unyielding.
Scholars have, unsurprisingly, taken great interest in the origins of this trend. One
common claim is that activists caused polarization (Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 2006,
inter alia).2 The conventional wisdom here is that activists are more extreme than
legislators, they have become even more extreme over time, and changes to the
Democratic Party’s nomination system in 1968 and 1972 opened the process and allowed
activists to pull elites away from the median voter. Scholars, journalists, and citizens
1Rosenthal, Alan. Interview with Justin Phillips and Alissa Stollwerk. New Brunswick, NJ. 15 November
2011.
2Though not everyone uses the term “activist” to mean special interest activist, ideological pressure on
parties still drives this explanation. Moreover, even a vague “party activist” is likely to have off-median
preferences in at least one special interest issue area. Even if they do not explicitly refer to special interest
groups, then, these studies imply that special interest activists are driving polarization (Aldrich 1995; King
1997, 2003; Jacobson 2000; Aldrich and Rohde 2001; Shafer 2003; Saunders and Abramowitz 2004; Fiorina
et al. 2005; Layman, Carsey and Horowitz 2006).
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have also noticed a troubling increase in revolving doors, iron triangles, and other
seemingly unscrupulous dealings between political leaders and special interest groups.
This argument makes sense. These days, it seems like both parties have armies of
special interest groups lined up at their sides. In the 2012 election cycle, women’s groups
directed 97% of their $20.9 million in federal campaign contributions to Democrats (The
Center for Responsive Politics). On the other side of the aisle, Republicans received 98%
of the $3.4 million from pro-life groups and 96% of the $4.4 million from gun rights
groups. This trend extends beyond ideological and single-issue organizations, as 85% of
donations from the building materials and equipment industry went to Republicans,
while Democrats received 70% of the contributions from lawyers and law firms. In this
light, it is not difficult to envision a narrative in which groups choose partisan allies, and
then pressure them to take extreme policy positions and uncompromising attitudes.
Yet, if we look back at work by V.O. Key and others on group-party relations in
the mid-twentieth century, this explanation for polarization becomes more puzzling.
According to these scholars, special interest groups typically avoided party
alliances—with good reason (Key 1942; Truman 1951; Blaisdell 1957; Holtzman 1966;
Greenstone 1969).3 Key remarked, for example, that “often it is unwise to back either
party . . . it is better to have friends in both camps, for the group must promote its
objectives whatever party is in power” (Key 1942: 212). Avoiding partisan alliance was
part of a broader strategy to evade bright lights in the political arena, according to
Truman. While “interest groups rather generally participate in elections, they are usually
timid about admitting it,” he notes in the early 1950s, with “most, in fact, plac[ing] a
high premium on what is known as ‘keeping out of politics’ ”(Truman 1951: 295).
3Greenstone wrote about the alliance between the Democratic Party and organized labor. However, he
also noted that this was an exceptional case. For the most part, he notes that groups were not closely aligned
with parties at this time.
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Associating with a party could alienate groups’ members, who might have different
party preferences.
From this perspective, what has been offered as an explanation for polarization
actually sounds more like another side of the puzzle. For their own reasons, it appears
neither parties nor groups wanted to “pick sides” in the middle of the twentieth century.
Today, this reticence seems to have vanished, or at least eroded. Are these common
impressions accurate? Have group-party relations really changed so dramatically over
the post-war period? If so, why, and to what effect? And what does this mean for our
understanding of polarization? These are my dissertation’s central questions.
Former APSA president E.E. Schattscheider famously feared the power of special
interests, believing group and party strength to be inversely related. He even goes so far
as to say “pressure groups thrive on the weaknesses of the parties” (Schattschneider
1948: 18). Since parties must mobilize broad majorities, while groups guard
unrepresentative minorities and “[sing] with a strong upper-class accent,” group power
ultimately hurts the populace (Schattschneider 1960: 34-5). Lowi (1969) echoes
Schattschneider’s concerns, expressing deep worry over the expansion of “interest
group liberalism” in American government. As its power and responsibility swelled
during the New Deal, he argues, the federal government delegated more and more
authority to interest groups, perverting representation and undermining effective
governance. Even in the absence of widespread party affiliations, Lowi argues groups’
expanded involvement in government degrades democracy.
It is difficult to gauge whether these problems have increasingly infected
contemporary American politics as group-party relations have changed without a
precise picture of these changes. Political science has not paid much attention to
group-party relations since the pluralism debates of the mid-twentieth century. In a
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recent Annual Review of Political Science article, Tichenor and Harris (2005) call the dearth
of scholarship on contemporary group-party relations “one of the most glaring lacunae
of the discipline” (Tichenor and Harris 2005: 266). Attention to interest groups began to
rise in the 1980s as “several scholars lamented that interest group research had
essentially lain fallow for more than a decade and noted the irony that political scientists
were looking away from organized interests precisely when they were becoming more
significant in American politics.”4 Still, few scholars answered Key and Truman’s calls to
study groups’ relationship to parties.
This is beginning to change, however. Cohen, Karol, Noel and Zaller (2008)
recently asserted a provocative new theory of parties placing special interests in the
center of political action. Razing the wall between insiders and outsiders, these authors
argue that activists do not pressure political parties—they are political parties. That is,
they fall within the traditional party umbrella and “will be permitted large roles in party
decisions” (Cohen et al. 2008: 15). This has major implications for policy, as the authors
argue: “Parties try, via the candidates they nominate and elect, to pull policy toward
what their interest and activist groups want, even if that is not what most voters want.
Thus, our claim about how parties work is also a claim about how democracy works”
(Cohen et al. 2008: 6-7).
Though they never cite Frymer (1999), Cohen et al.’s argument can be placed on
one end of a spectrum, opposite Frymer, representing the potential range of overlap
between parties and special interests. According to Frymer, these entities are not only
separate, their relationships can be unbalanced and strained—even when they are
“allies.” When a group commits to one party, and has also been rejected by the opposing
party, that group is “captured” within its “ally” party (Frymer 1999: 8). The group
4Tichenor and Harris 2005: 252, citing Wilson 1981, Arnold 1982.
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cannot credibly threaten to defect from the alliance because it has no alternative
coalitional home. Consequently, the party lacks strong incentives to act on the group’s
behalf. Certainly, not all groups will have this relationship to parties; nevertheless,
Frymer’s argument suggests there is an opposite extreme to Cohen et al.’s
characterization of group-party fusion, even for ideologically like-minded entities.
Moreover, even if the group is not in the extreme position of “electoral capture,”
McCarty and Rothenberg (2002) have shown that groups and politicians have
independent interests that may impede successful cooperation. All in all, there is a range
of possible relationships between complete fusion and separation that scholars have not
yet explored in depth.
My dissertation addresses this range by developing a continuum of group-party
relationships, running from fluid, unstructured interactions (akin to political pluralism)
to highly institutionalized alliances (as we might see in a firm). Drawing on pluralist
scholarship and theories of firm formation and evolution, I explore the costs and benefits
of different arrangements, and explain why we might expect to see movement along the
continuum over time. On the one hand, pluralism offers flexibility to parties and groups,
and alliances have little value when parties are too weak to discipline their members in
Congress. On the other, institutionalized alliances offer significant efficiency gains,
which are especially valuable during periods of growth. Using a mix of quantitative and
qualitative methods, I show that group-party relations have in fact moved away from
pluralism over time; in other words, special interest partisanship has increased. These
changes, I argue, stem from the growth of national party organizations since the New
Deal. Before discussing these claims in detail, however, it is important to step back and
clarify exactly what we mean by parties, special interest groups, and special interest
partisanship.
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1.1 Conceptualizing Group-Party Relations
A fuller understanding of group-party relations necessarily begins with precise
definitions. What makes an interest special, and how are special interest groups different
from other entities like pressure groups, social movements, and political parties?
Schattschneider defines special interests in contrast to common interests, as the former
are “shared by only a few people or a fraction of the community; they exclude others
and may be adverse to them” (Schattschneider 1960: 23). Though some scholars may
take issue with the terms few and fraction—indeed, James Madison fretted the prospect
of majority factions in Federalist 10—this definition is relatively uncontroversial.
Disagreement rises when we move from a discussion of what constitutes a special
interest to what constitutes a special interest group. Different scholars employ different
terms, like special interest groups, pressure groups, social movements, professional
associations, and political parties, to name a few. Sometimes they use different terms to
describe the same concept—it seems, for example, that special interest group represents a
modern rebranding of the more traditional pressure group—and sometimes they are
describing different kinds of special interest organizations.
Grossman and Helpman (2002) offer a broad and useful definition that can
encompass different kinds of organizations: “An interest group may be considered
‘special’ if its members covet policies that would not be considered desirable by the
average citizen. Thus, any minority group of citizens that shares identifiable
characteristics and similar concerns on some set of issues might be termed a [special
interest group]” (Grossman and Helpman 2002: 75). Given the high workload faced by
today’s government, we might expand this definition to include groups coveting policies
that the average citizen would not especially value. These policies need not be
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undesirable, but the average citizen would not afford them scarce resources like agenda
space. By this definition, special interest group can serve as an umbrella concept for social
movements, professional associations, and industry groups. Diversity need not weaken
the definition; indeed, all special interests are not the same, just as all democracies are
not the same. It is often useful to distinguish between groups based on levels and
features of organization, activity, and membership. Yet, despite their differences, they
collectively constitute a distinct and important part of American political life because
they are all private and extra-constitutional.
Political parties are not special interest groups because they are, in practice, only
quasi-private. Despite their private financing, parties perform critical functions in
American government. Should the Democratic and Republican parties spontaneously
evaporate, American government would be left in a state of chaos. If an entity is so
tightly integrated into government so as to render the government incapable of
functioning in its absence, it cannot be considered truly private. Political parties are
quasi-private organizations, occupying a gray area between government and traditional
special interest groups.
Parties and groups also have different goals, according to Key and
Schattschneider, as parties are primarily concerned with winning elections, while groups
care more about policy. Goal divergence propels parties and groups onto different paths,
in terms of strategy and organization. Electoral concerns encourage parties to mobilize
majorities, aggregating many interests, which in turn leads to moderateness—parties
“aim at inclusiveness, are hospitable and catholic” (Schattschneider 1948: 17). Because
they are not attempting to win elections, groups lack incentives to unify large numbers
of people through broad, moderate appeals. Instead, they “promote the interests of
relatively narrowly defined minorities and are so closely and exclusively identified with
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these minorities that they could never in the nature of things become majorities”
(Schattschneider 1948: 18).
These claims may sound dated to the modern ear, as differences between parties
and groups appear to have softened over time. As groups become increasingly involved
in electoral politics, the distinction between party and group goals fades, or at least
becomes more complex. But what does this mean? Have groups become more like
parties, have parties become more like groups, or have they both changed in unexpected
ways? To address these questions, we need to rethink the boundaries between parties
and groups, and investigate their interaction over time.
Key provides a useful framework for this kind of analysis, enriching the standard
definition of parties by breaking the monolith into three distinct, but interconnected
pieces: parties in government, parties as organizations, and parties in the electorate.
Parties are not one-dimensional entities whose operations we can observe on one plane;
to fully understand them, we need to analyze all three dimensions. Aldrich (1995)
develops this tripartite framework further in his classic study of parties, arguing that we
can get very different pictures of party strength depending on which sphere we examine.
Scholars’ overemphasis on parties in the electorate led to mistaken conclusions about
party decline, he claims. I argue we can also draw distorted inferences about special
interest groups and their relationship to parties by focusing too much on one area.
Like parties, special interest groups operate as organizations, in government, and
in the electorate. Studying special interest groups as organizations involves examining
their infrastructures and general operations. Today, for example, most major
organizations have full-time staffs and many have established political action
committees (PACs) to represent their interests in the electoral arena. These are
organizational choices and developments. Assessing the status of special interest groups
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in the electorate involves looking at the relationship between special interest groups and
the population. Do people identify with the group? Do they support its positions? This
is a way of looking at special interest group strength that is distinct from its
infrastructure and role in government. To analyze the last category, we would consider
the behavior of elected officials on special interest issues. Breaking special interest
groups into these three categories will help us measure their relationship to parties with
more precision.
As a concept, special interest partisanship captures the relationship between parties
and groups within and between these three spheres. To what extent do party and issue
coalitions overlap in government? Do members of Congress vote along party lines on
special interest issues? Are certain issues associated with one party or the other? By
answering these two questions, we can get a sense of parties’ issue positions as well as
their priorities. Looking between spheres, we can analyze the relationship between
special interests as organizations and parties in government, for example. To what extent
do government processes involve special interest organizations?
In sum, because parties and special interest groups are multidimensional entities,
there are numerous ways to measure special interest partisanship. These measures may
not be consistent, even within a special interest group. The question of whether special
interest partisanship has increased over time is therefore highly complex. By looking
across multiple groups and measures, however, we can get a broad sense of the strength
of special interest partisanship in the American political system over time.
Understanding why changes occur requires different sets of tools, drawn from both
rational choice and historical institutional traditions in political science.
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1.2 A Mixed-Method Analysis of Party Nationalization
and the Growth of Special Interest Partisanship
I argue that we can better understand changes in group-party relations by
thinking about the party as a firm. New institutional economists have endeavored to
explain how and why organizations change, and their insights can get us quite far in
understanding the relationship between parties and groups over time. Firms—and I
argue parties as well—arise and evolve in order to reduce transaction costs and
capitalize on economies of scale. This allows them to maximize efficiency and,
ultimately, profits (or in the case of parties, votes).
Significantly, and perhaps controversially, this approach encourages us to explain
changes in group-party relations—including polarization, or special interest
partisanship in Congress at the highest level of aggregation—without focusing on
changes in ideology. In this story, group-party relations do not change because elite
preferences change. Rather, their cost-benefit environment changes. This influences their
incentives with respect to groups. This is not to say that there have been no changes in
party ideology. We know, for example, that parties are more internally homogenous and
externally differentiated in roll-call voting today than they were a few decades ago
(Poole and Rosenthal 2007). We also know there are more clear differences between
party platforms today than there were at the time of APSA’s 1950 Report on Political
Parties. Yet, neither of these changes necessarily mean that politicians’ beliefs have
evolved; simply that their choices—what they perceive to be the best strategic
decisions—have changed.
As Mayhew (1974) and others have argued, politicians’ goals are very consistent
over time. The best strategy for achieving those goals can change quite dramatically in
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response to changes in historical and institutional context, however. This is why Aldrich
predicts the party system will continue to evolve over time. In the mid-twentieth
century, presumably balanced relationships between parties and groups were thought to
be the best arrangement for goal achievement. Today, the assessment appears to be
different. To understand contemporary group-party relations, then, we need to ask why
perceptions about the ideal group-party arrangement changed. This requires attention to
the incentives facing politicians, as well as the historical and institutional forces shaping
these incentives. At any one moment, incentives may be relatively fixed; over time,
however, contextual changes will alter them.
A historical-behavioral approach is well suited to this kind of analysis.
Combining the logic of rational choice with historical institutionalism is not a unique
approach, though its application to this subject matter is new. Gamm and Shepsle argue
that macro and micro-level approaches are “two sides of the same coin,” serving as
“complements rather than substitutes” (Gamm and Shepsle 1989: 62). Aldrich (1995)
draws on both traditions for his classic work on parties, and Katznelson (1998)
encourages their dual deployment in puzzles of American political development.
Using qualitative and quantitative methods, I argue that changes in group-party
relations stem from the growth of national party organizations over the second half of
the twentieth century, which intensified parties’ need for efficiency and altered the
nature of electoral competition. Until this period, parties were weak on the national level
and strong on the state and local levels, and patronage was the primary currency of
politics, leaving little room for issues in electoral competition (Schattschneider 1942;
Mayhew 1986). The New Deal’s historic expansion of federal power disrupted this
balance, temporarily strengthening local parties by offering new sources of patronage,
while also sparking gradual, interconnected processes that would ultimately undermine
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machine power—most notably, the growth of national party organizations and the rise
of issue politics as a site of electoral competition. As national issues became more salient,
parties paid more attention to them; and when material incentives (i.e., patronage)
finally dissolved by the late 1960s, purposive incentives (i.e., issues) gained new value as
tools for appealing to voters. This encouraged party organizations to take clearer
stances, just as Schattschneider suspected it could. Moreover, as the the Republican and
Democratic National Committees grew stronger and more stable, they were better
equipped to handle the research and intra-party negotiations necessary to develop
strong issue positions.
In sum, Schattschneider was quite right about the connection between party
decentralization and weak issue politics; as parties nationalized, issue competition
intensified. His claim that the national committees needed stronger infrastructure to
develop issue positions also proved prescient. Yet, he appears to have underestimated
groups’ ability to aid national party-building. Party and group strength are not inverse;
groups provided invaluable assistance to national parties as they grew from the “ghost
parties” (as Schattschneider termed them) of the early and mid-twentieth century, which
did little and disbanded between elections, to the professionalized organizations we see
today. Realizing the economies of scale necessary to build strong national parties
required movement away from fluid, pluralist relations into more structured, long-term
relationships. The result of this party-building process is a pattern of group-party
alliances quite unlike the bipartisan relations Key, Truman, and others observed in the
mid-twentieth century. This argument has implications for our understanding of
group-party relations, as well as polarization.
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1.3 A New Perspective on Polarization
Polarization is typically treated as an ideological phenomenon beginning in the
1970s, with roots in the previous decade’s party reforms and historic civil rights
extensions, which encouraged broad party realignment in the south. I aim to expand this
traditional characterization of polarization and our understanding of its origins. While
polarization may present ideological symptoms, I argue it is largely an organizational
phenomenon. And when we examine the organizational changes leading to
polarization—specifically, the nationalization of the Democratic and Republican
parties—we can see that its roots lie in the New Deal era, well before the 1970s.
I cast polarization as a process of developing issue programs and
positions—something parties were not doing, at least not successfully, even as late as the
mid-twentieth century. This perspective is supported by a disaggregated study of
polarization in chapter two. Studies of mass polarization often look issue by issue; but,
curiously, elite polarization is almost always analyzed at a higher level of aggregation.
For example, scholars often look at the difference between mean party NOMINATE
scores in the House and Senate, which take into account members’ entire voting records.
While there is undoubtedly great value in analyzing elite polarization in this way, for it
illuminates broad trends, I argue there is also value in disaggregation. From this, we can
see that parties gradually took positions on different issues throughout this period—not
all at the same time, or to the same degree. In other words, this was not simply one big
trend; it developed in pieces. This perspective on polarization is also supported by
evidence showing that parties developed their own issue priorities over this period.
What we are seeing, essentially, is the development and maturation of issue politics.
To be clear, this analysis does not contradict all previous explanations for
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polarization. Rather, by examining the trend’s historical roots, this analysis broadens our
view and provides a unifying narrative for several existing explanations. To clarify how
my analysis fits into the large literature on polarization, I will review this literature and
explain in more detail what is and is not new about my perspective. Some of the
explanations offered over the past two decades, like redistricting, have been undermined
by subsequent research. Indeed, it seems unlikely that redistricting caused polarization,
since we see polarization in the Senate as well as the House (McCarty, Poole and
Rosenthal 2006). Reforms redirecting power from committees to the majority party
caucus are unsatisfying for similar reasons. Since committees are much less powerful in
the Senate than in the House, this explanation cannot account for the growth of
polarization in the upper chamber. There are, however, a few explanations that have
received significant support from scholars, namely southern realignment, income
inequality and immigration, and, as discussed earlier, activist pressure.
Shortly after Key (1949) documented the Democratic Party’s dominance in the
south, the region began a long-term realignment. Republican seat share began to rise in
Congress in the 1950s, though it did not crack thirty percent until the early 1970s, and
did not reach fifty percent until the 1994 “Republican Revolution.” Still, this was a
monumental change in American politics. Because conservative Democrats became
conservative Republicans, the parties were ideologically “sorted” more neatly, leading to
greater intra-party homogeneity and inter-party heterogeneity (Rohde 1991, Hood et al.
1999, Jacobson 2000, Roberts and Smith 2003, Polsby 2005). This is a compelling, though
not complete, explanation for polarization. For one, we see a large increase in
polarization in the last few decades of the twentieth century even if we exclude southern
members of Congress (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2006: 49). More specifically,
southern realignment cannot account for the decline of non-southern liberal
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Republicans.
After reviewing and dismissing several explanations for polarization, McCarty,
Poole and Rosenthal (2006) introduce two new factors into the debate. They show a
striking correlation between inequality, immigration and polarization over time. After
falling and then leveling out in the early to mid-twentieth century, the Gini index
(measuring income inequality) began to rise dramatically in the 1970s. We see a similar
pattern in immigration, with the percent of the population that is foreign born falling
from the turn of the century until the early 1970s, when it starts to climb. These trends
demand attention, as polarization also began its steep ascent in the early 1970s.
My dissertation does not challenge these explanations so much as it provides
additional context. In fact, it suggests some critics may have been a bit too quick to reject
southern realignment. Tracing the development of issue positions, we can see that what
we often think of as southern realignment in response to the civil rights revolution was
not just a southern phenomenon. Archival research illuminates the Republican Party’s
observation that civil rights issues also loosened Democratic ties amongst white,
working class voters in northern cities. This offered Republicans a key opportunity to
recruit a large bloc of new voters, and chip away at the New Deal Democratic leviathan.
Chapters four and five will show that Republicans viewed issues like school busing,
abortion, and school prayer as tools to recruit these voters, who were not satisfied with
the Democratic Party’s position on those issues. While there was no sweeping party
realignment in the north akin to the one in the south—indeed, this would have been
impossible, as the north had not been as politically homogenous—it is important to note
that some of the stimuli for southern realignment also affected the north. This helps to
explain polarization’s universality. Instead of focusing specifically on southern
realignment as a cause of polarization, we can point to the causes of southern
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realignment, which influenced both southern and non-southern legislators.
My analysis also offers a new perspective on why immigration would encourage
polarization. Over the mid-to-late twentieth century, the electorate became increasingly
complex, as African-Americans gained full voting rights and immigration brought new
voters into the fold. Of course, many immigrants are not citizens and cannot vote; still,
as immigration rates rise, more and more immigrants do enter the electorate over time.
This diversification made electioneering more difficult, since the parties did not always
know how to appeal to different groups of voters. As Chapters three and five will argue,
this increased the value of group resources and intensified parties’ need for efficiency.
Groups were very helpful in providing information about different types of voters, like
what kinds of positions might induce them to support the party, and communicating
parties’ messages to those voters. And as the need for efficiency rose, parties had
incentives to move away from fluid, pluralistic interactions into more structured
relationships with groups. Through both of these channels, issue positions solidified and
the parties became more distinct.
In sum, a historical-behavioral approach to polarization helps weave together
different explanations for this extraordinary trend in American politics. It also
undermines the common claim that activists caused polarization. My analysis shows
that parties had their own reasons for wanting to encourage the rise of special interest
partisanship. This is not to say that activists do not pressure parties to take more extreme
positions than the median voter would prefer. Yet, activists are not responsible for
systematic changes to the system. This was, I argue, an endogenous transformation of
the American party system.
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1.4 Chapter Outline
Following this introduction, chapter two measures special interest partisanship
over time across forty groups, ranging from pro-life organizations to the pharmaceutical
industry, in four arenas: legislation, agendas, money, and attitudes. While there is
considerable variation across measures and groups, I show that special interest
partisanship has in fact risen over the post-war period. This analysis exposes some long,
gradual changes, as well as critical moments requiring explanation.
Chapter three develops a theory explaining why group-party relations evolve. I
begin by analyzing individual elite-level party members’ incentives to work with special
interest groups, detailing the resources groups can offer politicians to help them achieve
their electoral and policymaking goals, and considering how changes in political and
electoral contexts might alter these incentives over time. We should expect parties to
build closer relationships with groups when their need for group resources increases,
and/or their existing supply of those resources declines. Subsequent chapters will argue
that both circumstances arose in the post-war period. This tells us little about the form of
group-party relations, however.
Proceeding to the organizational level, I develop a continuum of relationships
between groups and parties, ranging from fluid, unstructured relations, as we would see
in a purely pluralist system, to highly institutionalized, exclusive partnerships, akin to
the organization of a firm. Drawing on classic pluralist scholarship and the new
institutional economics literature on firm formation and evolution, I discuss the benefits
and costs of different arrangements, and the circumstances under which we might
expect to see movement along the continuum. In short, a federal system with weak
national parties encourages pluralistic relations, as a group has little to gain from an
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alliance if its partisan partner cannot discipline its members. Parties also benefit from
this arrangement, under which they face less pressure to take positions that could
alienate moderate voters. Moving away from pluralistic bipartisanship carries
significant efficiency benefits, however. Institutionalization allows parties to achieve
economies of scale in group liaison, and internalization (i.e., long-term partnerships,
mimicking a business merger or acquisition) obviates the need to build a new coalition
de novo for each election cycle or legislative effort, and aligns incentives, making groups
more reliable coalition partners. Growth can intensify the need for efficiency, stimulating
changes in organizational form in firms and, I argue, in parties as well.
Chapters four and five use history analytically to explain changes in special
interest partisanship over time, with careful attention to the patterns discussed in
chapter two, and the incentives discussed in chapter three. Chapter four traces the
growth of national party organizations following the New Deal, and shows how this
provided both the incentives and infrastructure necessary for parties to develop issue
programs. Chapter five looks in depth at how parties drew on groups to help them build
national organizations. This demonstrates how and why the growth of polarization was
driven by parties’ organizational concerns, rather than activists or ideological changes. It
also shows how and why party and group strength are not necessarily inverse. This is
not a zero-sum game. While there may be legitimate reasons for concern about the
influence of special interest groups in politics, this does not erase the fact that groups
were of great assistance in the critical process of national party-building. Indeed, they
played a key role in the development of a more competitive two-party system.
It is crucial that we gain a better understanding of group-party relations, since
groups have become such an integral part of American democracy. Just as Aldrich notes
democracy is unworkable save in terms of parties, so too have parties become
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unworkable save in terms of special interest groups (Aldrich 1995: 3). This project aims
to begin an academic dialogue about how to measure this change, why it occurred, and
what it means for American democracy.
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Chapter 2
The Growth of Special Interest
Partisanship
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This chapter traces special interest partisanship in government, organizations, and the
electorate over time with three central aims. One goal is simply to characterize group
partisanship, as many scholars have explained the contours of individual- and
macro-level partisanship. How strong is group partisanship? How stable? What kinds
of changes, if any, do we observe at the group level? How much variation do we see
between groups? Do we observe significant differences between different groups’
behavior and Congressional treatment of issues relevant to different groups, for
example? Of course, we may get different answers to these questions depending on
which sphere we examine. To get a sense of this variation, the second task is to examine
different measures for the same group. Finally, looking across multiple measures and
groups over time allows me to map out the puzzle of special interest partisanship
systematically, detailing what subsequent chapters will need to explain.
I find that special interest partisanship did increase over time in several important
ways. The parties have become more distinct in the eyes of citizens, in their voting
behavior, and in their prioritization of issues. Importantly, however, the parties did not
become more distinct across the board at once; they were neither intent on broad
disagreement, nor acquiescing to stronger party discipline on all issues. Rather, they
developed distinct positions on different issues over time. This supports a view of
polarization as the development of issue politics. This perspective is also supported by
data showing that Democrats and Republicans increasingly focused on different issues
over this period.
Changes in the electorate, in contrast, have been quite minor over this period.
Groups in the population have generally not become more partisan. To be sure,
partisanship has increased amongst some groups, but most have remained relatively
stable. And, overall, their level of partisanship is relatively small. In other words, I find a
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gap between special interest partisanship at the mass level (i.e., in the electorate) and the
elite level (i.e., in organizations and government), consistent with the disjuncture
observed by Fiorina (2005) and other scholars of polarization. The changes we see in
government do not appear to have resulted from a widespread growth of special interest
partisanship in the electorate.
We cannot easily attribute the growth of special interest partisanship in
government to activist organizations either. Examining campaign finance patterns, we
can see that groups have not distributed their money more unevenly over time. They do,
however, change their behavior quite dramatically in response to changes in party
control of government. In other words, it appears groups are responding to parties,
not—or at least in addition to—the other way around. Moreover, a brief overview of
political endorsements shows that groups began endorsing candidates after polarization
began to rise.
2.1 Measuring Special Interest Partisanship
Before delving into specific measures, it makes sense to consider what group
partisanship means. There are well-developed literatures in political science on
individual partisanship and macropartisanship, but little on mid-levels of aggregation.
To define partisanship at the group level, we can look to see how scholars have
measured it at higher and lower levels of aggregation.
Campbell et al. (1960) view partisanship as a psychological attachment to a party,
which forms in childhood and remains stable over time. Only realignment changes
partisanship, according to this view. While Key (1966) agrees that some people
(“standpatters”) maintain long-term party attachments, others (“switchers”) swing
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between parties. These oscillations are not random, but rational responses to party
behavior. Fiorina (1981) builds on Key, arguing that voters keep a “running tally” of
party triumphs and foibles, and vote accordingly. The debate on partisan stability
remains today, with Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (1998, 2002) arguing that
macropartisanship constantly adjusts at the margins, while Green, Palmquist and
Schickler (1998, 2002) claim partisanship is a long-term, psychological attachment,
changes to which are extremely gradual at both individual and aggregate levels.
Despite their disagreements, all of these scholars view partisanship as a type of
identification with a party. Some argue this identification is deeply rooted in one’s
psyche, while others argue it is more rational. Those in the first camp also view it as a
long-term attachment, while those in the second view it as a short-term attachment that
may be renewed or reversed. Whether partisanship is rational or psychological,
short-term or long-term—these are empirical, not definitional questions. I will treat
them similarly at the group level. To study special interest partisanship is, quite simply,
to study the relationship between groups and parties.
There are two main ways to measure partisanship at the individual level. First, we
can look at individual self-identification. Many surveys ask people if they consider
themselves strong Republicans, weak Republicans, Republican leaners, independents,
Democratic leaners, weak Democrats, or strong Democrats. Second, we can look at
political behavior. Who did they vote for in the last presidential election? Did they vote
straight down the ticket, or did they split it? Answers to all of these questions provide
insight into an individual’s party identification. We can employ similar measures at the
group level, aggregating responses to the same survey questions by group to measure
special interest partisanship in the electorate. We can also consider additional measures
like campaign contributions to gauge the partisan leanings of special interest
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organizations. Just as an individual might vote straight down the ticket, so might an
organization donate all of its money to one party in a particular election cycle.
Studying alliances between parties and groups, we should consider both the
strength and stability of partisanship. Groups may support the same party election after
election, behaving like Key’s “standpatters,” or they may oscillate between parties,
behaving more like “switchers.” Even if a group does not switch parties, however, the
strength of its partisanship may vary over time. There is a difference between a 51-49%
margin and a 99-1% margin. The former is a case of weak partisanship, while the latter is
a case of strong partisanship. While we might expect increases in strength and stability
to occur in tandem, this need not be the case. It is possible, for example, that some
groups routinely offer strong support for the incumbent party. Here, we would see
strong but not stable partisanship over time.
There are additional complexities involved in measuring group partisanship that
are not present in measuring individual partisanship. Reaching the highest level of
group partisanship requires cooperation between groups and parties. Individuals can
join one of the two major parties simply by registering. There is no application process,
formal or informal—the party does not reject individuals. And because parties have
such large memberships, people do not generally expect individual validation or
attention from the party. This becomes more complex with groups because, as Frymer
(1999) notes, parties can reject groups from their camps. They may use strict means, by
making public statements against the groups or their goals, or soft means, by simply
refusing support. This can lead to conflicting measures of partisanship. For example, a
group may donate all of its campaign funds to the Democratic Party, but the party may
refuse to add a supportive provision to its platform or even acknowledge the group as
part of its coalition.
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Group partisanship also differs from individual partisanship in its division
between two distinct levels: the leaders and the people they claim to represent. While
leaders may believe it is best for the group to affiliate with one of the parties, and may
make decisions on behalf of the group to that end, group members will not necessarily
change their partisanship or voting behavior. This is a second way in which we may see
conflicting measures of partisanship. Parties control some measures of partisanship,
special interest group leaders control others, and some are beyond the control of both
parties and special interest group leaders, lying—like elections—in the hands of citizens.
Both parties and special interest groups can influence special interest partisanship, but
neither can control it unilaterally. In evaluating special interest partisanship, then, it is
important to consider a variety of measures.
We can sort measures of partisanship into four categories. First, we can examine
attitudes to see how much issue and party coalitions overlap in the electorate. We can
also look to see how people in the electorate evaluate parties. That is, do they think the
parties are taking increasingly opposite positions on issues? The second category is
legislation. Here, we can examine the final stage of lawmaking in Congress (i.e., roll-call
voting) to see how much party and issue coalitions overlap, and intermediate stages
(e.g., congressional hearings) to see if and how groups shape the substance of policy. The
third category involves agendas. Difference will not always mean opposition. If priorities
diverge, we will observe uneven levels of attention to issues across the two parties. In
the fourth category, campaigns, we can look at groups’ contribution and endorsement
behaviors. This gives us a clearer picture of the group side of special interest
partisanship.
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2.2 Data and Methods
To measure special interest partisanship in these different ways, I draw primarily
on data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), Baumgartner, Jones and
Wilkerson’s Policy Agendas Project (PAP), the American National Election Studies
(ANES), and the ProQuest Congressional hearings database. CRP organizes campaign
finance records from the Federal Election Commission from 1980 to the present by group
“industry.” These range from traditional economic industries, like railroads, to more
ideological industries, like human rights. PAP maintains data on a wide range of
political topics from the late 1940s through the mid-2000s, using the same master topics
coding scheme on all datasets. I use their data on roll-call votes, congressional hearings,
and State of the Union Addresses to study legislative and presidential treatment of
different special interest issues. ProQuest Congressional maintains a searchable database
of hearings from 1824 to the present. The ANES, a major national survey, tracks
demographics, public opinion, partisanship, and political behavior from 1948 to the
present.
Because the universe of groups is enormous, I focus on 40 groups for which I
could acquire data from at least two of my three main sources (PAP, CRP, and ANES).1
This allows me to compare at least two measures of partisanship for all groups in my
analysis. The groups are: abortion; active military; air transportation; alcohol; cars and
trucks; commercial banks; computers and internet; education; electric utilities;
entertainment; environment; ethnic and racial minorities; farming and ranching; food
processing and sales; guns; health insurance; hospitals and nursing homes; human
rights; immigrants; insurance; labor; lawyers and law firms; lesbian, gay, bisexual and
1Details on how I matched categories from different datasets are available in the appendix (see TABLES
A.1, A.2, A.3, AND A.4).
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transgendered people (LGBT); low-income people; mining; oil and gas; older people;
people with disabilities; pharmaceuticals; railroads; rural; sea transport; securities and
investments; small business owners; telecommunications; tobacco; tourism; urban;
veterans; and women.
Some of these groups may appear incomparable. Indeed, in many ways, they may
be. However, they all compete for attention from parties and government. A busy
legislature cannot consider legislation in all areas in every session, so groups must
contend with each other for agenda space. They also compete for political capital. Even
the most liberal government can only produce so much liberal policy in one session;
thus, groups compete not only with opposing groups, but also ideologically like-minded
groups. The extent to which there are critical differences between different types of
groups is more usefully treated as an empirical question than an ex ante judgment. One
goal of this analysis is to uncover patterns of behavior across groups, which may or may
not break on economic/social lines.
When possible, I analyze all 40 groups in my sample. However, data is not
available for all groups on all measures. For example, State of the Union data is only
available for 35 of the 40 groups between 1946 and 2005. Some group issues were never
discussed in State of the Union Addresses over this period. Survey data is only available
for 18 of the 40 groups. Some, like electric utilities, do not match easily to slices of the
electorate. For other measures, like hearings and endorsements, I narrowed the selection
of groups for practical reasons.2 The remainder of this chapter will present and discuss
the results of my analysis of attitudes, legislation, agendas, and campaigns.
2Because endorsement data is not readily available, finding information on group endorsements requires
more investigation. So, for this section, I chose a smaller handful of groups. I also chose a smaller selection
for hearings, since this analysis required searching a database for individual organizations’ names.
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2.3 Attitudes
I used the ANES to identify groups in the electorate and analyze their
partisanship. Of the 40 groups in my case universe, I was able to match 18 to ANES
categories with more than 100 observations over the whole time period. Eight are
demographic groups: ethnic and racial minorities (defined as all who do not identify as
white); immigrants (defined broadly, as those with at least one parent born outside the
United States); low-income people (defined as the lowest third of the income
distribution); older people (defined as those aged 65 and over); people with disabilities;
rural; urban; and women. Six are occupational groups, comprised of people living in
union households, as well as those employed in the following industries: cars and
trucks; computers and internet; education; entertainment; and farming and ranching.
The remaining four represent groups defined by policy positions: environmentalists;
pro-life people; pro-choice people; and people supporting LGBT rights (since the ANES
does not ask about sexual orientation). These categorizations are not exclusive (i.e., one
person can be in multiple groups).
Within the 18 categories listed above, I calculated the percent of people
identifying themselves as Democrats and Republicans in each year. To measure relative
partisanship, I subtracted the percent Republican from the percent Democrat. We can
examine partisan stability by looking at the standard deviation of this measure, which
shows how much each group’s partisanship deviates from the mean over time. A low
standard deviation indicates stability. FIGURE 2.1 shows that, by this measure, the most
consistent partisans are pro-choice people, women, immigrants, and low-income people,
while the three most variable groups are employees of the computer and internet and
cars and trucks industries, and people with disabilities.
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Standard Deviation of Partisanship
Figure 2.1: Standard Deviation of Partisanship. This graph shows the standard devia-
tion of each group’s partisanship for the entire period, telling us how much each group’s
partisanship deviates from the mean over time. A low standard deviation indicates par-
tisan stability. Source: NES data
Of course, this does not mean these groups are the most reliable partisans. A high
standard deviation could result from partisan fluctuation (i.e., groups switch parties
often) or intensification (i.e., groups become much more strongly partisan over time). To
separate these possibilities, FIGURE 2.2 plots relative partisanship (represented by the
solid line), as well as its absolute value (represented by the dotted line), over time. For
most groups, these two lines overlap completely, meaning party identification did not
change. Indeed, the only groups to cross the partisan threshold over this period were
pro-life, cars and trucks, computers and internet, farmers and ranchers, and older people
(though only slightly). This is a much smaller percentage of switchers than we will see in
the money analysis (29% versus 63%). The curves in most of these graphs are quite flat,
suggesting that variation in partisanship is not normally dramatic.
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Figure 2.2: Special Interest Partisanship in the Electorate. This graph plots relative par-
tisanship (represented by the solid line), as well as its absolute value (represented by the
dotted line), over time. For most groups, these two lines overlap completely, meaning
party identification did not change. Source: NES data
Overall, partisanship in attitudes has decreased slightly over time. Bivariate OLS
regressions of special interest partisanship on year indicate that three groups have
become stronger partisans (statistically significant at the 90% level or greater):
pro-choice people, environmentalists, and older people.3 In contrast, we see weakened
partisanship amongst 6 groups: pro-life people, farmers and ranchers, immigrants,
members of union households, people with disabilities, and people living in rural areas.
These effects are small—the gap between the percentage of people in each group
identifying with Republicans and Democrats (|%D −%R|) has only shrunk by a fraction
3Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLE A.5).
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of a percent per year. Nevertheless, this stands in stark contrast to the increases we will
see in legislation and agendas. These results are consistent with findings in the
polarization literature that—in contrast to elites—the electorate has polarized little, if at
all, over the past 40 years.
Surveys indicate that people are aware of this elite-mass gap. That is, they know
the parties have become more distinct. In many survey years between 1952 and 2008, the
ANES asked: “Do you think there are any important differences in what the Republicans
and Democrats stand for?” FIGURE 2.3 graphs the percent of respondents each year who
answer this question affirmatively. A simple bivariate logistic regression indicates that,
over time, people have become significantly more likely to report seeing differences
between the parties. Taking midterms into account strengthens this relationship.4
Adding dummies for party identification shows that independents see less
difference between the parties than do party identifiers, controlling for age, religion,
church attendance, urbanism, education, race, gender, income, whether or not the
respondent voted in the previous election, participation in politics, and basic political
knowledge (measured by correct identification of House majority). Respondents with
higher levels of education, political knowledge, and political participation were much
more likely to report important differences between the parties. These effects are both
statistically significant and substantively large.5
We get a similar answer if we look at where people position each party on the 7
point ideology scale, with 1 being the most liberal and 7 being the most conservative.
FIGURE 2.4 shows that the mean difference between respondents’ placement of the two
parties has grown by approximately 1 point on the 7 point scale since 1972. We can gain
4Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLE A.6).
5See TABLE A.6 in the appendix.
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Figure 2.3: Perceived Difference Between Parties. This graph displays the percentage of
people in each survey year who answered affirmatively the following question: “Do you
think there are any important differences in what the Republicans and Democrats stand
for?” Source: NES data
more insight into this change by running separate models for each party’s ideology with
the same control variables used in previous models. The only difference is that these
models use a 7 point scale for respondents’ party identification, rather than dummy
variables. The scale runs from 1 (strong Democrat) to 7 (strong Republican). OLS
regressions confirm that people see a greater difference in the parties’ ideologies over
time.6 Interestingly, this difference comes not from a more liberal placement for
Democrats and a more conservative placement for Republicans; rather, people think both
parties have become more conservative. Consistent with previous models, people see
6The Democratic and Republican Party ideology variables are based on questions in the survey. I cre-
ated the difference variable by taking the absolute value of the respondent’s placement of the Democratic
Party minus his or her placement of the Republican Party. Detailed regression results are available in the
appendix (see TABLE A.7).
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less of a difference between the parties’ ideologies during midterm years, and education,




















Figure 2.4: Perceived Party Ideology. This graph displays the mean assessment of Demo-
cratic and Republican Party ideology, and the mean difference between each respondent’s
placement of the two parties. Source: NES data
These models also show that, unsurprisingly, party identification influences
perceptions of ideology. In comparison to more conservative voters, more liberal voters
view the Democratic Party as being more liberal. And in comparison to liberal voters,
more conservative voters view the Republican Party as being more conservative. In
other words, people seem to see what they want to see. All in all, people see a greater
difference between the two parties over time, though these differences appear smaller
during midterm elections, and more conservative voters see a greater difference than
more liberal voters.
Though public opinion findings often change when we examine more specific
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questions, these do not. In addition to asking general questions about ideology, the
survey also asks people to estimate the parties’ positions on various issues using a 7
point scale. Specifically, they ask where the parties stand on government provision of
health insurance, guarantees of employment and a good standard of living, aid to
minorities, defense spending, general spending and service provision, and equal roles
for women. For each issue, I ran separate regressions analyzing people’s assessment of
the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, and the absolute difference between the two
parties.7 Overall, people report greater differences over time between the parties’
positions on all issues except the traditional left-right issues of general government
spending and service provision, and guarantees of employment and a good standard of
living. On these two issues, they think the parties have actually grown more similar over
time. This suggests that, at least in the eyes of the public, not all conflict collapses on a
traditional left-right redistribution continuum.
Where are these differences coming from? On the issues of defense spending and
government service provision, people think the parties have moved in opposite
directions, with Republicans becoming more conservative and Democrats becoming
more liberal. On all other issues, people think both parties have become more
conservative, but that Republicans have outpaced Democrats in this rightward move. As
in previous models, respondents with higher levels of education, political participation,
and political knowledge see greater differences between the parties.
We can also look to see if these differences hold up when people are asked about
candidates, rather than parties generally. In sum, OLS regression analysis indicates that
people make very similar observations about presidential candidates as they do about
parties, seeing a greater difference between Republican and Democratic presidential
7Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLES A.8, A.9, AND A.10).
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candidates’ general ideologies, as well as their positions on health insurance, aid to
minorities, and equal roles for women, and less difference between the parties on
general government spending and service provision, and guaranteed jobs and minimum
standard of living.8 The only major difference is that people do not see any significant
change on defense spending. Again, this suggests that issue positions have not simply
collapsed onto a left-right redistribution scale. People see differences between parties’
views on redistribution and their views on other issues. Though party identification
performs inconsistently, education, knowledge, and participation are positive and
significant in most models.
Assessments of candidates for seats in the House of Representatives produce
similar findings.9 Over time, people see greater differences between candidates of
opposing parties in terms of their general ideology, as well as their positions on aid to
minorities, equal roles for women, and guaranteed jobs. As with presidential candidates,
they see no increasing divide on general spending and service provision. In sum,
whether they are asked general questions about the parties or specific questions about
policies or opposing candidates, people report seeing greater differences between the
parties over time. These differences span general ideology as well as many different
issues over time. So, while group partisanship in the electorate may not have become
extreme over time, people do think the parties have become more distinct. Examining
special interest partisanship in legislation over time, we can see that these perceptions
reflect reality.
8Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLES A.11, A.12, A.13, AND A.14).
9Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLES A.15 AND A.16).
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2.4 Legislation
At the broadest level, we know special interest partisanship has increased in
Congress since the early 1970s. Polarization represents special interest partisanship at
the highest level of aggregation. If parties take sides on all issues before Congress, we
will see perfect polarization. However, there is only so much we can learn from this level
of aggregation. Is polarization happening in all issue areas, or only some? Do we see the
same long, steady pattern of change across issues? To answer the questions posed above,
we will need a way to measure party voting on different issues over time. McCarty,
Poole and Rosenthal’s (2006) industry standard measure of polarization—the difference
between the parties on the first dimension of DW-NOMINATE—cannot be
disaggregated by issue because DW-NOMINATE scores are calculated using a
legislator’s entire voting history. We might also want to know what happens before the
voting stage. To what extent do groups contribute information to policy debates under
different partisan regimes? We can gain insight into this question by examining group
testimony in Congressional hearings.
2.4.1 Roll-Call Voting
We can begin analyzing special interest partisanship in legislation by calculating
Rice likeness and cohesion scores for every vote in Congress from 1946 to 2004, using
PAP data. To calculate intra-party cohesion, I take the absolute difference between the
percentage of yay and nay votes cast by a party (Rice 1925, 1928). If half vote yay, while
half vote nay, cohesion will be 0. If the whole party votes unanimously, cohesion will be
100. To calculate inter-party likeness, I subtract from 100 the absolute difference between
CHAPTER 2. THE GROWTH OF SPECIAL INTEREST PARTISANSHIP 39
the percentage of yeas cast by Republicans and Democrats (Rice 1925, 1928).10 High
likeness scores can be driven by high chamber cohesion (i.e., unanimous or
near-unanimous votes) or low party cohesion (i.e., both parties split down the middle).
If all Republicans vote in favor of something, while all Democrats vote against it, we will
get a likeness score of 0.
The top and bottom left-hand graphs in FIGURE 2.5 display mean cohesion and
likeness in the House and Senate, respectively, for all non-private, non-commemorative
bills. Likeness increased in the House and Senate before beginning its modern decline
around 1970 (though in the House, it reached a nadir in the mid-1990s, and then started
to rebound). Cohesion is similar across chambers, showing relative stability between
1947 and 1970, and then rising over the ensuing decades. Bivariate OLS regressions
confirm that likeness has decreased, on average, by approximately one point on the 100
point scale in each session in the House; in the Senate, the decrease was slightly less (at
0.78), but still large. In both chambers, Democratic and Republican party cohesion have
increased by a little more than one point, on average, in each session since 1947.
Controlling for Democratic majorities, and whether or not the vote occurred in an
election year, we still find significantly increased cohesion and decreased likeness over
time. Substituting Democratic seat share for Democratic control of the chamber does not
change these results.11
Of course, special interest partisanship is more than likeness or cohesion
alone—high partisanship requires high cohesion and low likeness. To capture this
complexity, I combined likeness and cohesion into one variable.12 First, I rescaled
10I determined the percent of each party voting yay and nay by dividing the number of Democratic
(Republican) yays and nays by the total number of seats in the chamber held by Democrats (Republicans).
11Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLES A.17 AND A.18).
12This is only necessary to analyze low levels of special interest partisanship. To identify high levels,
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Figure 2.5: Likeness, Cohesion, and Special Interest Partisanship in the House and
Senate. The top and bottom left-hand graphs display mean likeness and cohesion for
all non-private, non-commemorative bills in the House and Senate, respectively, from
1947-2004. The two right-hand graphs display mean special interest partisanship from
1947-2004. Source: Policy Agendas Project data
cohesion and likeness to range from 0 to 1, rather than 0 to 100. Then, I subtracted the
likeness score for each roll call vote from 1, and multiplied the result by the average
party cohesion score for each vote. The following equation summarizes this calculation





we can simply look at party likeness, as it is impossible to get low levels of likeness without high party
cohesion. However, as explained above, high likeness can exist alongside high or low levels of party cohe-
sion. If we want to differentiate between high chamber cohesion and bipartisan voting, the special interest
partisanship metric identified here will be more useful than likeness.
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The top and bottom right-hand graphs in FIGURE 2.5 show a decline in mean special
interest partisanship between 1947 and 1970 in the House and Senate, followed by a
long, gradual increase. To confirm the significance of this trend, I regressed mean special
interest partisanship scores, calculated for each group in each session of Congress, on the
Congress number and Democratic seat share in each chamber. As expected, special
interest partisanship has increased by approximately 0.008 points on the 0 to 1 scale in
each Congress in both chambers.13 Overall, these results are consistent with well-known
patterns of polarization.
Though strong, this trend is not universal. FIGURE 2.6 plots the coefficients from
bivariate regressions of special interest partisanship on session of Congress, by chamber
and group.14 That is, I separated the votes in each chamber by subject matter, so we can
analyze behavior on different special interest issues. In the House, partisanship has
increased significantly for 29 of the 40 groups, and declined significantly for 4. In the
Senate, partisanship increased significantly for 29 groups, and declined significantly for
5. Comparing significance is tricky because the number of votes is not even across
issues. As FIGURE 2.7 demonstrates, there is a relationship between sample size and
significance in both chambers; however, many groups with small sample sizes have
statistically significant coefficients. Overall, read with caution, FIGURE 2.6 provides a
general sense of change across issues.
These results confirm the presence of a broad increase in special interest
partisanship in Congress over the post-war period. However, regression results and
aggregate trends mask meaningful variation in patterns of change. FIGURES 2.8 and 2.9
graph changes over time in the House and Senate in two ways. The blue lines are lowess
13Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLE A.19).
14Detailed regression results are available in the appendix (see TABLES A.20, A.21, A.22, AND A.23).
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Figure 2.6: Changes in Special Interest Partisanship in the House and Senate Over
Time. This graph displays the coefficients from bivariate regressions of special interest
partisanship on Congress session, by chamber. Solid points to the right of the reference
line (located at zero) indicate a statistically significant increase in special interest partisan-
ship over time, while solid points to the left of this line indicate a statistically significant
decrease. Source: Policy Agendas Project data
curves, showing locally weighted trends. Because these curves do not assume a linear
relationship between variables, they provide a more nuanced picture of special interest
partisanship over time than OLS regression. Yet, their smoothing function illustrates
general patterns that may be more difficult to see by looking at the more volatile means.
The gray lines represent mean special interest partisanship for each session of Congress,
which can expose key moments that smoothed lines may hide. While sharp change
sometimes reflects noise or outlying observations, at other times, it may mark a “critical
moment.”
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Figure 2.7: Sample Size and Significance. This graph is based on a series of bivariate
regressions of special interest partisanship on session of Congress for each group, plotting
the t-value against the sample size (i.e., number of roll-call votes relating to each group
issue) for each regression. Each point represents one group in one chamber, so every
group (except for tourism, which has no observations in the Senate) appears twice. The
references lines mark the 10% significance thresholds (-1.645 and 1.645). Source: Policy
Agendas Project data
In this case, both perspectives are useful. Looking across groups, a few patterns
emerge. The lowess curves show that special interest partisanship has increased a great
deal over time on some issues, like health insurance. On others, like securities and
investments, there has been very little change. In other words, parties have taken sides
on many—but certainly not all—issues. This much we could see from the regression
results. The lowess curves provide additional insight by showing differences in the
timing of change. On some issues, like air transportation, special interest partisanship
declined before it rose. On others, like oil and gas, the increase was more linear. Finally,
looking at the mean, we can see fairly linear upward trends for some issues (e.g.,
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Special Interest Partisanship in the House, by Group
Figure 2.8: Special Interest Partisanship in the House Over Time, by Group. Each graph
plots mean special interest partisanship for each group by Congress, as well as a lowess
curve. The latter represents a locally weighted regression, providing a sense of the trend
over time without assuming a linear relationship. Source: Policy Agendas Project data
abortion), while other issues (e.g., health insurance) change abruptly. Indeed, for many
groups, it appears the Republican Revolution of 1994 (resulting in a change of party
control in the 104th Congress) was a critical moment.
Breaking down roll-call votes into these categories reveals a great deal of variation
within the broad and well-known polarization trend. This suggests that the parties are
not simply determined to disagree about everything. Rather, they developed clear,
alternative positions on some issues, but not others. It is not especially surprising that
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Special Interest Partisanship in the Senate, by Group
Figure 2.9: Special Interest Partisanship in the Senate Over Time, by Group. Each graph
plots mean special interest partisanship for each group by Congress, as well as a lowess
curve. The latter represents a locally weighted regression, providing a sense of the trend
over time without assuming a linear relationship. Source: Policy Agendas Project data
parties would not diverge strongly on votes relating to commercial banking, for
example, given the volume of this industry’s campaign contributions. Issue polarization
must be consensual; one party could attempt to stake out a distinct position, but the
other party could always follow. The variation shown here, both across groups and over
time, supports the notion that polarization is not just a broad trend affecting all of elite
party politics. Rather, it reflects the parties’ development of alternative positions on a
large range of issues over this period.
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2.4.2 Information
Another way to check for special interest partisanship in Congress is to track
groups’ participation in Congressional hearings over time, to see if party control of
government influences their level of participation. Do some groups testify more often
under Democratic or Republican control of government, or is their participation in
hearings unaffected by changes in party control? These questions have significant
implications for our understanding of information-gathering in Congress. In this
context, a strong relationship between party control and testimony volume indicates
strong special interest partisanship.
It is not easy to analyze these party effects, however. The Democrats’ dominance
over Congress in the mid-to-late twentieth century leaves us with little variation in party
control. Moreover, group participation in hearings was very spotty until the mid-1960s,
at least for the groups in my sample. Consistent, strong participation did not really begin
until the 1970s. The most meaningful variation in terms of party control comes in 1994,
when Republicans displaced the Democratic leviathan, and 2006, when Democrats
regained control of Congress. While it would be difficult to gauge the effect of changes
in party control of Congress over a long time period, we can look to see whether groups’
participation changes before and after the 1994 Republican Revolution, and 2006
Democratic takeover. This, at the very least, will give us a sense of whether special
interest partisanship extends past roll-call votes into other parts of the policy process.
Since this analysis focuses on specific organizations, I chose a few cases from the
larger sample. I searched the Proquest Congressional hearings database for the names of
the top three organizations in each group, in terms of the amount of money they spent
on lobbying in 2012, and counted the number of times each organization testified in each
Congress. This is not a comprehensive analysis of group involvement in hearings, by
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any means; however, it can give us a preliminary sense of whether or not group
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Congressional Hearing Testimony: Environment
Figure 2.10: Testimony by Environmental Organizations. This figure includes graphs
for the top three organizations in this industry, based on 2012 spending on lobbying. The
y-axis measures the number of times each group served as a witness in a Congressional
hearing in each year. Source: data from ProQuest Congressional hearings database
FIGURE 2.10 graphs participation by the top three environmental lobbying groups
in Congressional hearings since 1970. As the BlueGreen Alliance graph shows, not all
lobbying groups participate in hearings. This is true in other issue areas as well, as
subsequent figures will demonstrate. Many other lobbying organizations do participate
in hearings, though their contributions vary quite significantly under different partisan
majorities. The gray dotted reference lines mark the first Congress after the Republican
Revolution and the year Democrats regained control of Congress. It is quite clear from
this figure that the Environmental Defense Fund’s involvement in the formal
information gathering process depends very much on party control of Congress. Other
CHAPTER 2. THE GROWTH OF SPECIAL INTEREST PARTISANSHIP 48
notable environmental organizations, like Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, and the Natural
Resources Defense Council, demonstrate patterns very similar to the Environmental
Defense Fund’s. In contrast, the Nature Conservancy’s participation in hearings is more
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Congressional Hearing Testimony: Abortion/Pro-Choice
Figure 2.11: Testimony by Abortion/Pro-Choice Organizations. This figure includes
graphs for the top three organizations in this industry, based on 2012 spending on lob-
bying. The y-axis measures the number of times each group served as a witness in a Con-
gressional hearing in each year. Source: data from ProQuest Congressional hearings database
In the abortion/pro-choice category, Planned Parenthood displays a pattern
similar to the Environmental Defense Fund’s (see FIGURE 2.11). When Republicans
controlled Congress from 1995 to 2006, this organization hardly testified at all, after
being quite active over the previous 25 years. While the other top lobbying organizations
were never very involved in Congressional hearings, other large organizations interested
in abortion rights also dropped out of Congressional hearings after the Republican
takeover. The National Organization for Women, for example, testified very little after
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1994; and, as with Planned Parenthood, their participation in hearings did not rebound
once Democrats regained control of Congress. Curiously, we see a similar pattern for
Right to Life, as shown in FIGURE 2.12. Without data on the number of organizations
participating in hearings over time, it is difficult to tell whether this reflects a reduction
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Congressional Hearing Testiony: Abortion/Pro-Life
Figure 2.12: Testimony by Abortion/Pro-Life Organizations. This figure includes graphs
for the top three organizations in this industry, based on 2012 spending on lobbying. The
y-axis measures the number of times each group served as a witness in a Congressional
hearing in each year. Source: data from ProQuest Congressional hearings database
Finally, I examine health insurance organizations, since this is an area of
increasingly strong special interest partisanship. As FIGURE 2.13 illustrates, we still see
a dip in participation after the Republican Revolution, though it is not as dramatic as in
other areas. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, for example, still contributed a significant amount
of testimony to hearings between 1995 and 2006. Their participation is relatively low in
the late 2000s, which is interesting given the increasing prominence of health care reform
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Figure 2.13: Testimony by Health Insurance Organizations. This figure includes graphs
for the top three organizations in this industry, based on 2012 spending on lobbying. The
y-axis measures the number of times each group served as a witness in a Congressional
hearing in each year. Source: data from ProQuest Congressional hearings database
All in all, this analysis provides preliminary evidence that special interest
partisanship in legislation extends beyond the roll-call voting stage. It appears that, at
least for some groups, participation in the formal information-gathering process
depends on party control of Congress. While it may not be especially shocking that
environmental groups would be more involved in lawmaking under Democratic
majorities, this is nevertheless an important addition to the overall portrait of special
interest partisanship. Of course, parties’ differing priorities may account for some of
what we see here. That is, Democrats may hold more hearings on environmental issues
than Democrats. The next section will examine this possibility.
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2.5 Agendas
Whereas roll-call votes demonstrate party positions, agendas illustrate priorities.
Which issues do the parties think deserve attention, for substantive or political reasons?
I get two perspectives on these questions by looking at congressional hearings and State
of the Union Addresses.
2.5.1 Congressional Hearings
The roll-call stage does not represent the entire policy process. A lot of the action
in Congress takes place in committees, especially in the House of Representatives. To get
a deeper sense of special interest partisanship in government, then, we can look to see if
attention to issues in Congressional hearings depends on party control. If parties take
issue competition more seriously over time, we should not only see them developing
more distinct positions, but also more distinct agendas. That is, each will develop its
own policy program, a set of issues it would like to be associated with the party. If this is
in fact the case, then standard measures of polarization—however dramatic—actually
underestimate party difference.
To examine this possibility, I use data on congressional hearings from the Policy
Agendas Project. They classify the 89,926 Congressional hearings held between 1946 and
2010 by topic, using the same coding scheme used to classify roll-call votes. I used this
data to identify the number of hearings held in House and Senate committees on each of
my 40 special interest issues in each year, and added dummy variables for Democratic
control of each chamber, and an interaction between year (rescaled to run from 1 to 63)
and Democratic control for each chamber. This allows me to analyze whether the effect
of party control has increased over time.
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Figure 2.14: Marginal Effect of Democratic Control on Attention to Abortion. This
graph uses Brambor, Clark and Golder’s (2006) code to graph the marginal effect of
Democratic control of the House of Representatives on the number of hearings held by
the chamber on this issue. A negatively sloped line indicates that Republican majorities
held more hearings on the issue, and that this effect has increased over time. The dotted
lines represent 90% confidence intervals. The interaction is statistically significant when
both dotted lines are on the same side of zero, as they are here. Source: Policy Agendas
Project data
For each issue, I regress the number of hearings in each chamber on year, the
chamber-specific party dummy, and chamber-specific interaction term. I then used code
from Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) to graph the marginal effect of Democratic
control on attention to the issue in each chamber over time. FIGURE 2.14 is an example
of this kind of graph for abortion in the House. When the solid line is above zero, that
means more hearings are held under Democratic majorities; when it is below zero, as it
is here, more hearings are held under Republican majorities. The dotted lines represent
90% confidence intervals. When both dotted lines are on the same side of zero, as in
FIGURE 2.14, the marginal effect of party is statistically significant. When they are on
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Figure 2.15: Marginal Effect of Democratic Control on Attention to Tobacco Issues.
This graph uses Brambor, Clark and Golder’s (2006) code to graph the marginal effect of
Democratic control of the House of Representatives on the number of hearings held by
the chamber on this issue. A positively sloped line indicates that Democratic majorities
held more hearings on the issue, and that this effect has increased over time. The dotted
lines represent 90% confidence intervals. The interaction is statistically significant when
both dotted lines are on the same side of zero. Here, they are not. Source: Policy Agendas
Project data
Overall, in the House, there have been more hearings under Democratic majorities
on 28 issues: active military, air transportation, alcohol, cars and trucks, commercial
banks, education, environment, ethnic and racial minorities, farming and ranching, food
processing and sales, health insurance, hospitals and nursing homes, insurance, labor,
LGBT, low-income people, mining, oil and gas, people with disabilities,
pharmaceuticals, railroads, rural, sea transport, securities and investments, tourism,
urban, veterans, and women. On only two issues (abortion, and computers and internet)
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were there more hearings under Republican majorities. On the remaining ten issues,
there was no difference between Republican and Democratic control.15 This means that
special interest partisanship has increased over time for 75% of the issues in my sample
in the House.
We do not see nearly the same degree of difference in the Senate. This is not
especially surprising, since committees are generally less important in the upper
chamber. Whereas there are differences on 30 of 40 issues in the House, there are only
differences on 7 issues in the Senate: commercial banks, environment, guns, health
insurance, pharmaceuticals, small business owners, and tourism. All 7 of these issues
receive more hearings under Democratic majorities, meaning that on no issue were there
more hearings under Republican majorities. For the remaining 33 issues, there was no
difference between parties.16
We can get a slightly different perspective by looking at relative attention. That is,
of all hearings held in a particular year, how many are devoted to different issues?
While, looking across the whole time period, party control does not affect the total
number of hearings held in each session, there could be some variation year to year.17
Examining relative attention, we still see party effects that grow over time, though for a
smaller range of issues—17 in the House and 6 in the Senate (compared to 30 and 7,
15These issues are: electric utilities; entertainment; guns; human rights; immigrants; lawyers and law
firms; older people; small business owners; telecommunications; and tobacco.
16These issues are: abortion; active military; air transportation; alcohol; cars and trucks; computers and
internet; education; electric utilities; entertainment; ethnic and racial minorities; farming and ranching; food
processing and sales; hospitals and nursing homes; human rights; immigrants; insurance; labor; lawyers
and law firms; LGBT; low-income people; mining; oil and gas; older people; people with disabilities; rail-
roads; rural; sea transport; securities and investments; telecommunications; tobacco; urban; veterans; and
women.
17Bivariate OLS regressions for each chamber reveal no significant relationship between the number of
hearings held and party control. This remains true when controlling for whether or not it was an election
year.
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respectively, for absolute attention). We see more of a split between the two parties in
this analysis, however. Whereas 28 issues received more hearings under Democrats in
the House, while only 2 received more hearings under Republican majorities, when we
examine relative attention, we find that 10 received more hearings under Democratic
majorities, and 7 received more hearings under Republican majorities.18 In the Senate, it
is an even split—3 issues received more relative attention under Democratic majorities,
and 3 received more under Republican majorities.19
Whether we look at absolute or relative attention, we can see that parties are
developing more distinct issue programs over the second half of the twentieth century.
Differences between parties extend beyond their positions in roll-call votes to their
priorities. Importantly, on no issue did the effect of party decrease over this period. We
find a similar, if narrower, pattern in examining State of the Union Addresses.
2.5.2 State of the Union Addresses
To get a sense of parties’ rhetorical agendas, I analyzed State of the Union
Addresses from 1946 to 2005 using PAP data. While these are not official party positions,
they are delivered by the party’s symbolic figurehead. PAP categorizes each
quasi-statement of each address by major topic and subtopic. I used their categorizations
18The issues receiving more hearings under Democratic majorities are: environment; ethnic and racial mi-
norities; food processing and sales; health insurance; hospitals and nursing homes; insurance; labor; LGBT;
low-income people; and people with disabilities. The following issues received more hearings under Re-
publican majorities: abortion; computers and internet; entertainment; lawyers and law firms; sea transport;
small business owners; and telecommunications. There was no difference on the following issues: active
military; air transportation; alcohol; cars and trucks; commercial banks; education; electric utilities; farm-
ing and ranching; guns; human rights; immigrants; mining; oil and gas; older people; pharmaceuticals;
railroads; rural; securities and investments; tobacco; tourism; urban; veterans; and women.
19The following issues receive more attention under Democratic majorities: commercial banks; health
insurance; and pharmaceuticals. Republican majorities hold more hearings on active military; computers
and internet; and LGBT.
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to identify statements regarding the 40 group issues at the center of this analysis. Five
issues contained no observations, leaving 35 groups.20
To see if attention to issues varies over time and/or by party, I regressed the
percent of quasi-statements in each address devoted to each issue on the year of the
address and the president’s party. This produced 35 separate regressions, results of
which are available in the appendix (see TABLES A.24, A.25, AND A.26). The
presidential party dummy is coded 1 for Republicans and 0 for Democrats, and I
rescaled year to run from 1 to 60 to ease interpretation. Over time, State of the Union
Addresses have included more discussion of computers and internet, education, guns,
health insurance, lawyers and law firms, LGBT, low-income people, older people,
tobacco, and women, and less discussion of electric utilities, farming and ranching,
labor, and veterans. Democratic presidents pay significantly more attention to
computers and internet, education, food processing and sales, guns, health insurance,
hospitals and nursing homes, human rights, and tobacco.
To see if the effect of party has changed over time, I ran another set of regressions
with an interaction between year and party, and graphed the marginal effect of the
president’s party over time, using code from Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006). When
the solid line is above zero, that means the issue gets more attention from Republican
presidents; when it is below zero, it is more of a Democratic issue. The dotted lines
represent 90% confidence intervals. When both dotted lines are on the same side of zero,
as in FIGURE 2.16, the marginal effect of party is statistically significant. When they are
on opposite sides of zero, as in FIGURE 2.17, the effect is not significant. Overall, the
20This does not necessarily mean those five issues were never discussed in State of the Union Addresses.
Because the Policy Agendas coding scheme is exclusive, quasi-statements that could potentially fall into
two different categories can only be assigned to one. It is possible that those five issues were discussed in
the same quasi-statements as other issues that were ultimately deemed more significant.
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Figure 2.16: Marginal Effect of President’s Party on Attention to the Environment. This
graph uses Brambor, Clark and Golder’s (2006) code to graph the marginal effect of the
party of the president on attention to environmental issues over time. A negatively sloped
line indicates that Democratic presidents paid more attention to the issue in State of the
Union Addresses, and that this effect has increased over time. The dotted lines represent
90% confidence intervals. The interaction is statistically significant when both dotted lines
are on the same side of zero, as they are here. Source: Policy Agendas Project data
president’s party has a significant effect that has grown over time in 12 of the 35 areas
examined. Four issues have become greater priorities for Republicans (lawyers and law
firms; LGBT; older people; and securities and investments), and 8 have become greater
priorities for Democrats (computers and internet; education; environment; ethnic and
racial minorities; guns; immigrants; pharmaceuticals; and tobacco). In none of the 35
issues examined did the effect of party decrease over time.
By this measure, the change in agendas is narrower than in legislation, affecting
34% of group issues (compared to 73% and 74% in House and Senate roll-call votes). It is
difficult to compare partisanship across branches, however, as there has been more
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Figure 2.17: Marginal Effect of President’s Party on Attention to Commercial Banking.
This graph uses Brambor, Clark and Golder’s (2006) code to graph the marginal effect
of the party of the president on attention to commercial banking issues over time. A
positively sloped line indicates that Republican presidents paid more attention to the
issue in State of the Union Addresses, and that this effect has increased over time. The
dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals. The interaction is statistically significant
when both dotted lines are on the same side of zero. Here, they are not. Source: Policy
Agendas Project data
partisan turnover in the presidency than in the legislature. Still, this analysis
demonstrates that party difference extends beyond positions. Over the same period in
which we see growth in the overlap between party and issue coalitions in Congress, we
also see presidents paying different degrees of attention to issues. This suggests that
priorities were becoming more partisan, along with positions.
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2.6 Campaigns
So far, this analysis has focused on the party side of special interest partisanship.
By examining campaign donations and endorsements, we can gain more insight into the
group’s perspective. If activists are at the root of polarization, we should see their
partisanship begin to rise before the parties’, and intensify throughout this period. If
activists appear to be following the parties, however, this would shed doubt on their
responsibility for the growth of polarization. This analysis will show that the latter
scenario more closely matches reality.
2.6.1 Campaign Donations
To examine campaign donations over time, this section uses two sources of data.
Ideally, we would examine campaign finance data spanning the past century. Because
contemporary reporting requirements did not arise until the 1970s, however, most of the
analysis will employ data on hard money contributions from political action committees
(PACs) to candidates from 1980 to 2010, sorted into industries by the Center for
Responsive Politics (CRP). It is not impossible to analyze campaign finance before this
period. Louise Overacker published a series of articles on the subject in the American
Political Science Review during the 1930s and 40s, based on reports from Congressional
investigations and documents filed by the parties. While these data do not fill out the
time series, they provide a rough point of comparison.
FIGURE 2.18 lists all groups donating $1,000 or more in elections between 1932
and 1944, and the percentage of their money that went to Democrats in each cycle. The
group universe in 1932 was small and relatively bipartisan. While three of the seven
groups split their money roughly 80 to 20 percent between the parties (publishers and
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Figure 2.18: Partisan Breakdown of Campaign Contributions, 1932-1944. These graphs
use data from Overacker (1933, 1937, 1941, 1945) to graph the partisan breakdown of
campaign contributions in the 1932, 1936, 1940, and 1944 election cycles.
advertising; mining and oil; and manufacturers), four groups (bankers and brokers;
retail stores; professional people; and railroads, airways, and public utilities) came close
to an even split. The landscape changed quite dramatically in 1936, as more groups
appeared and most gave disproportionately to one party. Several groups that
contributed in both elections became much more partisan in 1936. Most significantly,
bankers and brokers, who split their donations evenly in 1932, gave almost exclusively
to Republicans in 1936. Over the next two election cycles, however, this spike in
partisanship decayed. Still, partisanship appears to be higher in campaign finance than
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in roll-call voting in the mid-twentieth century. Despite scholars’ characterization of this
period as an era of low special interest partisanship, it was quite common for groups to
favor one party financially.
CRP data show this is still true today, though several broad changes have
developed in the electoral arena over time. First, the number of PACs increased
dramatically, from 608 in 1974, when the Federal Election Commission was established
and first began collecting these data, to 4,234 in 2008. This mirrors a larger “advocacy
explosion” in the United States since the New Deal. Baumgartner and Leech (1998)
document a growth in associations from 5,843 in 1959 to 23,298 in 1995, as well as a
diversification of the group universe (i.e., some groups, like those concerned with social
welfare, proliferated at much higher rates than others, like trade groups and chambers of
commerce). We can see this diversification in the electoral arena as well. Today, the
parties receive contributions from traditional groups like bankers, as well as new
economic industries like computer and internet companies, and many non-economic
groups, like those concerned with human rights, abortion, and guns. In other words,
many more groups choose to participate in electoral politics today.
To analyze special interest partisanship in campaign finance between 1980 and
2010, I converted all contributions in CRP’s dataset to 2010 dollars using the Consumer
Price Index, and added dummy variables for Democratic control of the House, Senate,
and Presidency, midterm elections, and the period after the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act banned parties’ use of soft money. I also created a new time variable,
running from 1 to 16 (i.e., 1980 cycle=1, 1982 cycle=2, etc.), as well as a squared version
of this variable. This allows me to test for a statistically significant quadratic time trend,
as well as a standard linear trend.
Special interest partisanship has changed in the financial arena over time, though
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not nearly as neatly as in legislation and agendas. FIGURE 2.19 aggregates campaign
giving by cycle, displaying mean special interest partisanship (the absolute value of the
percentage of each group’s money directed to Democrats minus the percentage directed
to Republicans) across all industries over time. The lowess curve in this figure indicates
that special interest partisanship has not increased broadly in campaign finance; in fact,
it appears to have decreased. We see large changes in mean special interest partisanship
during this period, but—unlike aggregate polarization—this trend is not gradual or
linear. There is a sudden spike in 1996—the first cycle after the Republican Revolution in
Congress—and a similarly-sized decrease in 2008—the first cycle after Democrats
regained control.
This is not especially surprising, given Republicans’ insistence on
disproportionate giving. In October of 1994, when the Republican Revolution appeared
likely, if not quite as large as it turned out to be, then-House minority whip Newt
Gingrich famously warned PACs, “For anybody who’s not on board now, it’s going to be
the two coldest years in Washington” (Hook 1997). The Los Angeles Times reports, “Word
spread quickly among PAC directors and the business community: They should not only
give generously to Republicans but also cut off money to Democrats or suffer political
consequences” (Hook 1997). Republican fundraiser Brad O’Leary emphasized this
message with a newsletter showcasing a “PAC List of Shame,” identifying groups who
donated unacceptable amounts to Democrats in 1992. The newsletter, distributed to
PACs and Republican legislators, reiterated Gingrich’s efforts in “laying down the law
with certain PAC executives who have been seen consorting with the enemy”
(Weisskopf 1994). The National Republican Congressional Committee later compiled a
similar list for its members, labeling PACs as “friendly,” “neutral,” or “unfriendly,”
based on their contributions in the 1993-1994 election cycle (Hook 1997). If groups took
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Figure 2.19: Aggregate Special Interest Partisanship in Campaign Finance. The blue
line shows mean special interest partisanship (absolute difference between the percent of
each group’s money that went to each party in each election cycle, and then averaged
for the group universe for each cycle). The gray line is a lowess curve, showing a locally
weighted trend. Source: Center for Responsive Politics data
these threats seriously, we should expect to see special interest partisanship rise when
Republicans gain control of Congress.
Multivariate regression analysis confirms that the patterns observed in these
graphs are statistically significant. I begin with two pooled models to evaluate broad
changes in special interest partisanship over time. Model 1 in TABLE 2.1 shows no
statistically significant quadratic change over time, while Model 2 shows that there has
been a significant linear decrease. Special interest partisanship does, however, increase
significantly when Republicans control the House of Representatives and when
Democrats control the Presidency. Party control of the Senate is not significant in either
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model. Special interest partisanship also does not change between midterm and
presidential elections, or after the enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.
The third and fourth models include industry fixed effects, which an F-test
confirms are appropriate. These models show that differences across industries are not
driving the overall results with respect to time and control of government. Even just
looking within industries over time, we do not see a significant increase in special
interest partisanship. There is a significant linear decrease over time (see the negative
coefficient on time in model 4), but no significant quadratic trend (see the non-significant
coefficients on time and time squared in Model 3). Again, control of the House and the
Presidency significantly influence special interest partisanship—it is higher when
Republicans control the House and when Democrats control the Presidency.
To highlight the differences between various permutations of partisan control of
government, I used King, Tomz and Wittenberg’s (2000) software, Clarify, to calculate
the expected value of special interest partisanship under various scenarios, based on
Model 1. When we move from Democratic unified government to a Democratic Senate
and President, but Republican House, the expected value of special interest partisanship
rises from .4 to .52, meaning the partisan differential in campaign giving rises from 40 to
52 percentage points. Taking Senate control away from Democrats makes almost no
additional difference, raising the expected value of special interest partisanship from .52
to .53. When we move from a Republican unified government to a Republican Senate
and President with a Democratic House, the expected value of special interest
partisanship drops from .5 to .38. Turning the Senate Democratic has very little
additional effect, dropping the expected value from .38 to .37.
Under these broad trends lies a lot of variation by group, however. As FIGURE
2.20 demonstrates, some (e.g., environment) have remained fairly constant, while others
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(e.g., mining) have changed quite substantially. Even within the second category, we see
different patterns of change over time. Interestingly, only one group displays a relatively
linear trend similar to the classic polarization trend: abortion policy/pro-life. In contrast,
many groups increased their partisanship after Republicans gained control of Congress
in 1994, and then returned to a more even distribution of campaign funds after
Democrats regained control in 2006. Of the 87 groups identified by the Center for
Responsive Politics, 32 (37%) maintain their party affiliation over time and 55 (63%)
cross the aisle (i.e., cross the 50% mark). Of these switchers, 10 change parties only once,
15 change and then change back, 17 change 3 times, and 13 change 4 or more times.
In sum, looking at money, special interest partisanship is quite high for most years
in this analysis. While some groups split their donations evenly between parties, rarely
does the group universe, on average, demonstrate this kind of bipartisanship.
Importantly, though, this is not new. Looking at the available data from the 1930s and
1940s, it appears campaign finance was always partisan, even in an era of special interest
bipartisanship. Of course, more groups participate in electoral politics today than in the
1930s and 40s. We might consider this a rise in special interest partisanship, since
campaign finance is an inherently partisan arena. If a group wants to focus on specific
issues, rather than party politics, it could spend money on lobbying instead of
contributing to campaigns. Indeed, Ansolabehere, Snyder and Tripathi (2002) find that
groups more involved in lobbying tend to be more bipartisan in their campaign
donations.
Still, based on this analysis, it would be difficult to argue that activists caused the
increase in special interest partisanship we observe in government. Evidence from
campaign finance suggests that groups are responding to parties just as much, if not
more than parties are responding to them. Endorsement patterns tell a similar story.
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Special Interest Partisanship in Campaign Finance, by Group
Figure 2.20: Special Interest Partisanship in Campaign Finance by Group, 1980-2010.
The blue lines in these graphs show mean special interest partisanship over time for each
group. The gray lines are lowess curves. Source: Center for Responsive Politics data
2.6.2 Endorsements
Unfortunately, comprehensive data on political endorsements by special interest
groups are not available. Building a database of this nature will be an important next
step in this project and broader research agenda. In the meantime, we can look at the
timing of prominent groups’ entrance into the endorsement arena. If groups started
endorsing candidates before the rise of elite polarization on issues, that would support
the argument that activists have caused polarization. If group endorsement generally
CHAPTER 2. THE GROWTH OF SPECIAL INTEREST PARTISANSHIP 67
lags the rise of polarization, however, that would not support this conventional wisdom.
My preliminary analysis indicates that many of the most prominent membership-based
organizations did not begin endorsing candidates until the 1980s, well after polarization
started to rise in the early 1970s.
The National Rifle Association (NRA) offered its first presidential endorsement in
1980 for Ronald Reagan.21 This came after the parties began to differentiate their
positions in Congress (see FIGURES 2.8 AND 2.9). The trends in these figures are
consistent with work by Karol (2009), who, examining Democratic and Republican
lawmakers’ support for gun control between 1967 and 2000, finds growing party
divisions beginning in the 1960s. The NRA’s endorsement also came after Ford and
Carter took different positions on gun registration in the 1976 election cycle (though
Carter would back off of his position) (Karol 2009). Reagan, who “seemed more eager
than Nixon to have the [NRA’s] backing,” was quite active on gun rights issues during
his tenure, attempting to dismantle the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and
supporting the successful Firearm Owners Protection Act of 1986 (Karol 2009: 88).
The National Organization for Women, the nation’s largest feminist organization,
gave its first presidential endorsement in 1972 to Shirley Chisholm, the first
African-American woman to run for the nation’s highest office. This cannot be
considered the organization’s true entrance into endorsement politics, however, since
Chisholm was a member of NOW, and the organization did not endorse another
candidate until Walter Mondale in 1984.22 This came after the Republican Party backed
21“100 Years: Remembering President Ronald Reagan.” National Rifle Association 17 March 2011. Last
visited 18 February 2013 <http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/articles/2011/100-years-remembering-
president-ronald.aspx>.
22“Highlights from NOW’s Forty Fearless Years.” National Organization for Women. Last visited 25 Febru-
ary 2013 <http://www.now.org/history/timeline.html>.
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off its previous endorsement of the Equal Rights Amendment, removing support from
its 1980 platform. The parties had also begun differentiating themselves on women’s
issues in the House in the late 1960s, well before NOW’s endorsement (see FIGURE 2.8).
The Sierra Club, the oldest and largest environmental organization in the country, also
supported Walter Mondale in its first ever presidential endorsement.23 FIGURES 2.8 AND
2.9 show that the parties began to diverge in Congress before this date, suggesting that
the Sierra Club was responding to a party-driven trend that was already in motion.
The Human Rights Campaign, the nation’s largest advocacy organization for
LGBT rights, did not enter the game for almost another decade, offering its first
presidential endorsement to Bill Clinton in 1992.24 This followed Bill Clinton’s
pathbreaking support for the LGBT movement. On October 28, 1991, when a student at a
presidential forum at Harvard University asked the candidate if he would issue an
executive order to overturn the ban on military service for LGBT individuals, Clinton
responded simply: ”Yes. I think people who are gay should be expected to work, and
should be given the opportunity to serve the country” (Rimmerman 1996: 113). With this
remark, Clinton became the first presidential candidate ever to support the LGBT
movement. However, party divisions had already begun to grow on LGBT issues in
Congress in the late 1980s (see FIGURES 2.8 AND 2.9).
While this is by no means a comprehensive list of American special interest
organizations, it does represent the most prominent organizations in some of the most
partisan industries. Interestingly, even these organizations, so strongly associated with
23“‘Taking the Initiative.” Sierra Club. 23 June 2008. Last visited
18 February 2013 <http://sierraclub.typepad.com/carlpope/2008/06/airtime-in-cl-
1.html>; “About Sierra Club.” Sierra Club. Last visited 25 February 2013
<http://action.sierraclub.org/site/PageServer?pagename=AboutWildPlaces>.
24“Working for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Equal Rights.” Human Rights Campaign. Last
visited 25 February 2013 <http://www.hrc.org/the-hrc-story/our-victories>.
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party politics today, did not begin endorsing candidates until more than a decade after
polarization began its modern rise. Examining them one at a time, we can see that their
entrance into endorsement politics also followed the growth of party divisions on issues
specifically relevant to the organizations. This supports the notion that activists were, at
most, cooperating with parties in the rise of special interest partisanship. They do not
appear to have been driving the trend all by themselves.
2.7 Contours of the Puzzle
Based on these measures, what can we conclude about special interest
partisanship? First and foremost, there is, in fact, a puzzle to be explained. Special
interest partisanship has increased significantly over time in legislation and agendas.
This analysis also reveals an elite-mass gap similar to the one we see in studies of
political polarization. The decline of special interest partisanship in attitudes suggests
that group identification is playing a less important role in people’s political identities
over time. This is not surprising, given Putnam’s (2000) observations regarding the
erosion of associational ties over this period.
Systematic analysis of group-party relations suggests that the puzzle of special
interest partisanship is more complex than we might expect, however. First, there is
significant variation between groups. Some groups are clearly more partisan than others
throughout this period, and some experience more change than others. This variation
appears to be more complex than a simple divide between economic and social groups.
A few groups, like abortion and labor, stand out from the crowd. Are they contradictory
outliers, going against a general trend, or extreme cases revealing important lessons
about group-party alliances? The answer to this question hinges largely on whether or
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not there is a theoretical explanation for their exceptionalism.
Even if we isolate those experiencing change, we see two distinct patterns of
increase across groups and measures. For some groups, we see a long, gradual trend
(mirroring the aggregate trend) beginning around 1970, while others exhibit more
abrupt changes. Some of these sharp changes are part of larger patterns of volatility, and
may simply demonstrate unstable partisan preferences. Looking across groups,
however, we can identify moments that seem to be important for many groups. These
are signals of “critical moments” that group idiosyncrasies cannot fully explain. Rather,
they indicate contextual changes. A good example is the 1994 Republican Revolution in
Congress, at which point we see an abrupt increase in partisanship for many
groups—even some exhibiting a gradual trend up to that point. A thorough analysis of
group-party relations will need to address both types of change.
There is a striking difference in patterns of change across legislation and money.
While there is a mix of gradual and sharp change in voting patterns in Congress, the
latter predominates in campaign finance. Only among pro-life groups does partisanship
increase steadily over time; others experiencing an increase tend to spike in the first
cycle after the 1994 Republican Revolution, and plummet after Democrats regain control
in 2006. Campaign finance records indicate that groups see different incentives
operating under Democratic versus Republican controlled Congresses.
Groups’ strong reaction to changes in control of the House of Representatives
sheds doubt on the increasingly common argument that activists caused polarization.
This is, at best, an oversimplification—activists appear to be responding to parties at
least as strongly as parties are responding to them. Both groups and parties have
contributed to changing group-party relations, though groups’ role has received more
scrutiny. In examining special interest partisanship, then, it makes sense to pay
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particularly close attention to the party side of this puzzle. Why would parties change
their relationships with groups? The next chapter develops a theory of group-party
relations to examine this question.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
pooled pooled industry fe industry fe
time -0.005 -0.008** -0.007 -0.008***
(0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
time2 -2.06e-04 -7.51e-05
(0.001) (3.72e-04)
Democratic Senate -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015
(0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012)
Democratic House -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.121***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.016) (0.016)
Democratic President 0.031* 0.029* 0.031*** 0.030***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.010) (0.009)
Midterm -0.002 -0.003 -3.93e-04 -0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.009) (0.001)
After BCRA 0.025 0.013 0.023 0.019
(0.048) (0.033) (0.028) (0.019)
Constant 0.499*** 0.508*** 0.507*** 0.510***
(0.043) (0.034) (0.025) (0.020)
Observations 1,336 1,336 1,336 1,336
R-squared 0.049 0.048 0.135 0.135
# of industries 87 87
F test that all u i=0: F test that all u i=0:
F(86, 1242) = 30.57 F(86, 1243) = 30.60
Prob > F = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000
Table 2.1: Special Interest Partisanship in Campaign Finance. Models 1-4 are OLS re-
gressions. The first two are pooled models, while the third and fourth include industry
fixed effects. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001. Source: Center for
Responsive Politics data
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Chapter 3
The Efficiencies and Pathologies of
Special Interest Partisanship
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In his classic 1969 book, Labor in American Politics, J. David Greenstone argues that “the
emergence of organized labor as a major, nationwide electoral organization of the
national Democratic party represents the most important change in the structure of the
American party system during the last quarter century” (Greenstone 1969: xxxi-ii).
Labor was exceptional in this way, he notes—most groups did not even affiliate with
parties, let alone become part of their machinery. Today, in contrast, labor is far from
unique in its party alliance, as a wide range of groups offer campaign funds
disproportionately to one party or the other, and parties have taken strong and opposite
positions on many special interest issues. Two puzzles emerge from these observations.
First, why would organized labor ally with a party in the mid-twentieth century, while
other groups remained bipartisan? And second, why would we see a broader pattern of
change in group-party relations from bipartisanship to alliance?
To address these questions, this chapter examines group-party relations through
an organizational lens. Scholars and pundits often discuss polarization in substantive
terms. Changes in the nature of politics, like increased acrimony between parties, have
received a great deal of attention. People increasingly socialize only with members of
their own party, and express distaste for those across the aisle (Gelman et. al 2008).
Republican and Democratic legislators not only vote differently, but seem unable to
cooperate on anything. Talk of a “culture war” peppers American political discourse.
While these substantive changes are undoubtedly important, they have overshadowed a
related and equally important evolution in party organization. These institutional
changes can provide new insight into the striking substantive developments we have
seen over the past few decades.
The strong version of this argument is that the substance of politics has changed
because party organization has changed. The weaker version is that mutually reinforcing
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substantive and organizational evolutions occurred simultaneously. Either way, it begs the
question: why did party organizations change? This chapter develops a theory to
address this question, explaining the rise of group involvement in party politics, and the
pattern of movement from bipartisanship to party alliance.
To understand why groups, like labor, would become more involved in party
politics, we will need to address the prior question of why they would become involved
at all. We could, of course, answer this question from the parties’ or groups’ perspective.
This chapter will focus primarily on the parties’ perspective. What can groups offer
parties? The first section will explain groups’ contributions to parties from a
micro-perspective. What motivates individual politicians to work with groups? What do
they need, and what do groups offer? This will help us to understand why parties
would ever bother having relationships with groups.
Party-group relations can take different forms, however; the incentives described
in the first section do not necessarily lead to one common relationship. The second
section of this chapter will map out the range of possible group-party relations, from
fluid, short-term interactions—similar to those described by scholars of pluralism—to
long-term, institutionalized alliances, as we would see in a firm. Borrowing theory from
the new institutional economics literature on firm formation and expansion can help to
explain what parties gain from institutionalizing relations with groups, and the
conditions under which we might expect movement in this direction. Some of the costs
and benefits of institutionalization vary by group, however, so we should not necessarily
expect parties to have the same kind of relationship with all groups. The theory of the
firm can provide insight into why parties might be more likely to build alliances with
particular groups.
This is only the first step in understanding why group-party relations might shift
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over time, as incentives, costs, and benefits depend, in large part, on context. While
many institutional studies of politics “take the interests and aims of political actors as
given,” Lieberman (2002) notes, “actors’ understanding of their own interests is apt to
evolve as the ideological setting of politics changes” (Lieberman 2002: 698). A benefit in
one political context might become a liability in another. To understand changes in
group-party relations over time, then, we need to consider how context might influence
politicians’ incentives to work with groups, and the costs and benefits of pluralism
versus institutionalization. This combination of micro- and macro-level analyses is key
to understanding changes in group-party relations over time. Chapters four and five
will use the incentives and cost-benefit considerations identified in this chapter to guide
a deeper analytical history of group-party relations.
3.1 Group-Party Relations at the Individual Level
To understand why parties would turn to special interest groups, we need to
consider politicians’ goals, and how groups can contribute resources needed to achieve
them. It is well known that politicians care about winning elections. Mayhew believes
this so strongly that his classic 1974 book begins with the assumption that Congressmen
are motivated solely by reelection. Even if they also care about policymaking, he claims,
electoral success is a proximate goal. Aldrich (1995) echoes this sentiment, arguing that
in order to understand parties we must consider the reelection goals of their members.
Though few works in political science challenge this conventional wisdom, it
remains important to avoid overemphasizing individual elections. As Galvin (2010)
demonstrates, minority party presidents tend to care about the party’s electoral
prospects generally—not just their own races. Throughout the second half of the
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twentieth century, Republican presidents endeavored to build a new electoral majority
to destabilize the Democratic leviathan in Congress, dating back to Franklin Delano
Roosevelt’s presidency. Reelection is both an individual and group prospect, given the
value of majority status in Congress.
Mayhew identifies three general methods by which members of Congress attempt
to achieve their reelection goals: advertising, position-taking, and credit-claiming.
Advertising includes “any effort to disseminate one’s name among constituents in such
a fashion as to create a favorable image but in messages having little or no issue content”
(Mayhew 1974: 49). Attending community events and appearing on television constitute
advertising. By bolstering name recognition, these kinds of activities can make people
more likely to support the officeholder on election day. The second and third methods,
position-taking and credit-claiming, are more substantive. Position-taking involves
“public enunciation of a judgmental statement on anything likely to be of interest to
political actors” (Mayhew 1974: 61). Politicians can accomplish this in many ways, from
speech-making to roll-call voting. Credit-claiming is fairly self-explanatory—legislators
want to take credit for “particularized benefits” given to their constituents (Mayhew
1974).
While these strategies may seem simple, they are not costless. Credit-claiming
requires politicians to know what their constituents want, pass legislation or secure
appropriations to gain these benefits, and communicate their successes to constituents.
While legislative success is unnecessary for position-taking, this strategy still requires
politicians to identify the “correct” position, and communicate it to constituents.
Communication is crucial for successful advertising as well. While these activities are
fairly constant throughout a politician’s term, leading up to an election, direct
mobilization efforts become increasingly important as well. By helping politicians raise
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money and get out the vote on election day, mobilization efforts reinforce earlier work in
advertising, position-taking and credit claiming.
In sum, then, politicians need resources for information gathering,
coalition-building, communication, and mobilization. Legislators can draw upon many
sources of these resources, and different sources have different strengths. Congressional
committees are classic tools for information gathering and coalition-building. By
gathering information about policies and reporting their findings back to the floor,
committees provide an efficient system of specialization allowing Congress to make
informed decisions about a wide range of policies (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987; Krehbiel
1991). The committee system also facilitates coalition-building by allowing legislators to
trade influence over different policy areas, instead of simply trading votes (Weingast and
Marshall 1988).
Yet, committees face a much larger agenda today than they did at the time of their
creation. Polsby (1968) and Gamm and Shepsle (1989) argue that increasing workloads
motivated members of Congress to institutionalize because they needed a more efficient
system by which to make decisions. As society has become even more complex and
workload has increased even further, committees have become less sufficient,
incentivizing officeholders to seek additional ways to reach their reelection and policy
goals. Just as the floor needed to delegate to committees, so do committees need to
delegate some of their work to groups in the modern era. The floor can also access
information through groups directly, which they may compare to information they
receive from committees. This allows lawmakers to triangulate, and make more
informed policy decisions.
Special interest groups’ informational contributions to parties might not be
obvious, but they are important nonetheless. As Grossman and Helpman (2001) note,
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“Many special interest groups are well placed to deal in information because their
members gain knowledge about issues of concern to the group in the course of
conducting their everyday business, and because groups frequently collect information
that bears on their members’ interests” (Grossman and Helpman 2001: 22). Legislators
cannot always completely trust the information they receive from special interest
groups, just as they cannot always completely trust the information they receive from
congressional committees. This does not render the information useless, however. As
long as legislators can estimate the size and direction of the group’s bias, they can still
use the information to make policy decisions. If, as Krehbeil argues, they are able to do
this with respect to congressional committees, then they ought to be able to do this with
special interest groups as well. Since they cannot become experts in every field and they
cannot research the implications of every bill before Congress, this informational
assistance has great value.
Special interest groups can also assist coalition-building efforts in government
through two mechanisms: communication and selective incentive provision. The value
of communication is vastly underappreciated in the Congress literature. When the
president or a member of Congress wants to pass a bill, he often needs to court
legislative votes. This can be an arduous process, and special interest groups can help
lessen the burden by contacting members of Congress to persuade them to support the
bill, and mobilizing their members to do the same. This kind of behavior is often termed
lobbying, but it is by no means restricted to traditional K Street outfits. Even
membership-based social movement organizations perform this service. Special interest
groups can also help legislators build coalitions in government by offering selective
incentives like campaign resources, rewarding those who join and honor coalitions and
withholding resources from those who do not. This is especially valuable in recruiting
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the last few key votes to push a bill over the edge. These two mechanisms can also help
lawmakers block unfavorable legislation.
Special interest groups’ contributions to elections are well-known. Their most
obvious offerings, campaign funds, have increased dramatically since the mid-twentieth
century. Political action committees are major sources of campaign support, and it is
difficult to imagine contemporary electoral politics without them. Special interest
groups also provide information about candidates and issues to their members through
preexisting communication networks. A feminist organization might profile candidates
in its newsletter, or a religious organization might encourage ministers to discuss
important political issues in their sermons. This kind of communication can be used to
promote candidates or rally people around certain legislative programs. Churches have
been particularly successful networks for political mobilization, as we have seen in the
civil rights movement (Morris 1981) and the modern religious right (Oldfield 1996).
Communication networks deserve special emphasis for a few reasons. First,
communication plays a key role in advertising, position-taking, and credit claiming. In
other words, it is important for almost everything politicians do. Second,
communication networks are a relatively unique resource for special interest groups.
While congressional committees can provide information and coalition-building
assistance, they cannot reach the electorate—their job is to communicate with the floor,
not the citizenry. Communication is also a precursor to mobilization, which is obviously
important for politicians. To win elections, they need their supporters to go to the polls.
There are several advantages to communicating with the electorate through
groups. First, communication is expensive, and groups are often willing to share this
cost. Second, special interest leaders typically have more credibility than parties with
their members. Messages coming from special interest leaders can therefore be more
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persuasive than those coming from parties. Third, and most important, groups have
access to proprietary communication networks, which can be much larger than the
party’s own network.
In sum, special interest groups provide many resources and services to parties,
which helps to explain why parties would want to build closer relationships with them.
But why would groups come to play a greater role in party politics over time? The
simplest answer is that we should expect parties to draw on groups more when (1) they develop
a greater need for the resources groups are best positioned to supply; and/or (2) their current
supply of these resources declines.
Chapters four and five will argue that both circumstances arose in the post-war
period. In his 1942 classic, Party Government, Schattschneider laments the bullish
strength of parties’ “private faces” and the relative feebleness of their “public faces”.
Patronage, rather than policy, was the primary political currency at this time—and
patronage ultimately served the machines, not the public. The roots of this woeful
arrangement lay in party decentralization, according to Schattschneider. Stronger
national party leadership could resist the machines’ demand for patronage, and more
extensive infrastructure would liberate national parties from their dependence on
machines for mobilization. I will argue that as national parties grew stronger, and
politics became more about issues than patronage in the decades following the
publication of Party Government, the importance of information and communication
increased. The value of information also rose over this period as the electorate grew
larger and more complex. Parties increasingly needed groups to help them appeal to
new voters. The process of party decentralization also compromised a key mobilization
resource: political machines. While the power of bosses declined dramatically by the late
1960s, the importance of mobilization did not; thus, parties needed new ways to activate
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the electorate. In sum, party centralization contributed to groups’ increased involvement
in party politics over the second half of the twentieth century by raising the value of
resources provided by groups, and depressing parties’ supply of these resources.
This tells us little about the form of group-party relations, however. What is the
range of possible relationships between groups and parties, and under what
circumstances might we expect different arrangements? Answering the latter question
will require attention to both preferences and capabilities. As McCarty and Rothenberg
(2002) note, we cannot assume alliances will form just because both sides desire them.
Various challenges in the political arena (e.g., non-contemporaneous exchange) can
impede cooperation. While party organizations can theoretically facilitate alliances by
enforcing agreements between individual politicians and groups, albeit without legal
standing, McCarty and Rothenberg argue that their ability to do this depends on their
capacity to discipline their members and ally groups.
3.2 The Range of Group-Party Relations
There is a wide range of possible relationships between groups and parties, from
the fluid interactions described by Key, Truman, and others, to the kind of highly
institutionalized partnership we have seen between labor and the Democratic Party.
What are the advantages and pitfalls of different locations on this continuum? To define
and explore the less structured end, I will draw on pluralism—the quintessential system
of fluid interactions between parties and groups. The theory of the firm can guide us
through the opposite extreme of rigid institutionalized alliances. We simply need to
replace the primary goal of business, profit, with the primary goal of politics, winning
elections.
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The continuum between pluralism and institutionalization can apply to more than
one level of analysis. We could evaluate each group’s position on the continuum at any
historical moment, or mark its average position over time, as some groups are
traditionally more partisan than others. We could also aggregate the groups, and place
the entire pressure system on the continuum at any historical moment, or separate them
by party to see if Republican-leaning groups are more institutionalized than
Democratic-leaning groups. All of these options would provide valuable information
about the party system, the pressure system, and American politics more broadly.
3.2.1 Pluralism: A Free Market of Group-Party Relations
At one end of the continuum is a free market of exchange between parties and
groups. This is akin to political pluralism, in which groups compete for attention and
policy in a political marketplace without a central power structure. This process of
interaction, made famous by Dahl, “normally has many units, [and] many
interrelationships that shift over time” (McFarland 2007: 48). While groups and parties
may work together, coalitions are typically “time bounded” (Polsby 1960: 481). We
might see a particular group influencing a policy area, but this does not mean they will
align with a party. Indeed, the alignment of many groups with a party would create a
central power structure, the lack of which is a defining feature of pluralism. Polsby
(1960) explains, “If there exist high degrees of overlap among issue-areas in
decision-making personnel, or of institutionalization in the bases of power in specified
issue-areas, or of regularity in the procedures of decision-making, then the empirical
conclusion is justified that some sort of a ‘power structure’ exists” (Polsby 1960: 483).
Under what conditions might we expect parties and groups to operate in a free
market? What are the costs and benefits of this system? According to Greenstone (1969),
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it was an auspicious arrangement for both sides. “Because these groups’ political
demands are relatively limited,” he argues, “the major parties try to build alliances on
particular issues with as many interests as possible, rather than make broad
programmatic commitments that might alienate possible supporters” (Greenstone 1969:
5). This system also offers flexibility to groups, who “tend to move between the parties,
bargaining for the best arrangement” (Greenstone 1969: 5). With a tone of concern,
Greenstone notes that labor’s alliance with the Democratic Party during the New Deal
“has taken from the labor movement much of its freedom to bargain with each of the
major parties” (Greenstone 1969: 6). In sum, free market negotiation allows groups to
get the best deal possible, and helps parties appeal widely to the electorate.
Truman (1951) offers a more extensive explanation for special interest
bipartisanship, grounded partly in the structure of American government, partly in the
party system, and partly within groups themselves. At the broadest level, he argues, the
American federal system encourages pluralism. When groups must appeal not only to
different party regimes at the national level, but also different state and local
governments, they need to be able to work with both parties. One party will almost
certainly never control the entire system at once. Since there are often links between
parties at different levels, Truman remarks, “open and continuing identification with one
of these forces may easily cost more than it gains” (Truman 1951: 296).
Weak national parties also encourage this arrangement. Conventional wisdom
suggested that parties were in a state of “disorganization, if not of unrelieved chaos” in
the mid-twentieth century (Truman 1951: 282). Though this perception might be a bit
overblown, Truman notes, “it is apparent that the national party at any given time is
fluid and unstable, consisting more of temporary personal alliances than of continuing
institutionalized relationships” (Truman 1951: 282). Consequently, he argues, “It follows
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that relations between political parties and other political interest groups will be
similarly protean” (Truman 1951: 282). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine strong external
relationships existing alongside weak internal infrastructure.
Low party discipline, resulting from weak national party leadership, also makes
special interest bipartisanship attractive. When national parties are “essentially devices
for electing the president, rather than instruments for operating the government,” as
they were in the mid-twentieth century, groups know that bipartisan support is critical
(Truman 1951: 285). Even under unified government, Truman notes, “discipline is
normally so weak that the group identified with the majority party may enjoy no special
advantages from being so” (Truman 1951: 297). Key (1942) takes this argument a step
further, claiming that “friendly legislators of whatever party are thus the principal
concern of most interest groups; they have nothing to gain and everything to lose by
consistent partisanship” (Truman 1951: 296-7). In sum, when party discipline is so low
that successful lawmaking requires bipartisan support, alignment can be costly.
Additional reasons for bipartisanship may be found within groups themselves.
Cohesion is one important consideration. Key argues that intra-group variation
encourages bipartisanship, since it is difficult to mobilize a heterogenous group behind
one party. Moreover, Truman notes, it could be discrediting for leaders to make alliances
at the national level if significant variation exists in the partisan preferences of state and
local affiliates. Group norms may also render political involvement taboo. Partisan
activity may be inconsistent with founding principals or the scope of the group’s work.
Even if a group is cohesive, it might not be considered “‘right’ for group leadership to
tell the members to back a particular party or, for that matter, a particular candidate”
(Truman 1951: 297-8).
Partisanship also carries a “very real threat” of isolation, according to Truman.
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When the group’s ally party is not in power, it will most likely lose access to
government. Under these circumstances, Truman argues, “some measure of
bipartisanship...becomes a sort of insurance” (Truman 1951: 302). Since party discipline
in Congress was weak at the time, Truman noted that this danger was only relevant for
presidential elections. Still, it was “usually great enough so that a group will hesitate to
take sides unless it is fairly certain that access to one of the candidates is likely to be
denied anyhow and nothing is to be lost by backing his opponent” (Truman 1951: 302).
Choosing sides could also make it more difficult for groups to cooperate with
other groups. To pass legislation, it is often important for groups to be able to make
alliances with other groups. Sometimes they will want to work with groups very
different from themselves—successful coalitions can “involve some exceedingly strange
combinations” (Truman 1951: 304). However, groups may hesitate to cooperate with
other groups that have strong party attachments, for fear of isolating themselves. Such
cooperation could “threaten to produce cleavages within one of the participating groups
or to reduce its chances of independent access to political leaders” (Truman 1951: 304).
In sum, a federal system with weak national parties facilitates fluid group-party
relations. Under these circumstances, alliances seem to carry few benefits and many
costs. Since group-level factors also influence special interest partisanship, we should
expect to see some variation between groups, however. Still, pluralist scholarship
explains why the pressure system as a whole might tend toward bipartisanship. To
understand why the system might move away from a free market system, we can
examine the costs and benefits of institutionalization.
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3.2.2 Institutionalization of Group-Party Relations
On the other end of the group-party continuum, we have rigid, routinized
relationships between parties and groups. Here, parties and groups are not free to
negotiate on a policy-by-policy or election-by-election basis. Rather, they maintain
long-term relationships. At the most extreme point on this continuum, the party
internalizes the group, as a manufacturer might acquire a distributor. To understand the
benefits and costs of this arrangement, we can look to the classic theory of the firm,
which aims to explain why some exchanges do not take place on open markets (Coase
1937).
Why establish a firm instead of operating through short-term contracts? If
someone wanted to build and sell furniture, for example, he could negotiate contracts
with leather and cloth dealers, carpenters, salespeople, and others whose goods or
services he needed to run his business. By bargaining with all of these actors, he could
always be confident that he was getting competitive prices. Over the long term,
however, this is a costly way to conduct business. Some costs, like contract negotiation
and creation, arise before the exchange, while others, like implementation, surveillance,
and problem resolution, appear afterwards. Coase argues that certain organizational
forms and contractual patterns can reduce or even eliminate these transaction costs.
Instead of negotiating with carpenters over each product, for example, the manufacturer
could hire them to build all of his furniture in house. Rather than bargaining with
dealers, he could establish his own sales department.
We can think of the firm as “a web or nexus of contracts” providing centralized
leadership to manage exchange, so as to avoid transaction costs associated with making
all deals on an open market through the traditional price mechanism (Eggertsson 1990:
48; Coase 1937). Centralized leadership can also allow the firm to capitalize on potential
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economies of scale (Coase 1937: 390, 392). All firms will not necessarily look the same; as
Weingast and Marshall (1988) note, we should see “production and exchange take place
through institutions (contractual patterns, organizational forms) that reflect the specific
pattern of transaction costs found in trade” (Weingast and Marshall 1988: 134).
Application of this literature to political science has important and widely
accepted precedent. Though Aldrich (1995) does not use the language of new
institutional economics, his argument about party origins is consistent with Coase’s
theory on firm formation. Ceding power to a central authority (i.e., party leadership)
dramatically reduced the number of formal and informal contracts needed in daily
political life, thereby reducing transaction costs. Weingast and Marshall (1988) explicitly
employ the theory of the firm to explain why legislators (i.e., elite members of parties in
Congress) built the committee system, and Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) draw upon
this literature to study Congressional delegation.
I argue we can apply this intuition to political science in a new way, to understand
how and why parties evolve. The group-party arrangement that Key, Truman, and
others describe in the middle of the twentieth century looks like a market dominated by
the price mechanism. Parties and groups have some interaction, but it is generally fluid
and short-term. They work together to accomplish discrete tasks, but do not maintain
long-term relationships. Groups work with both parties, and parties work with a wide
variety of groups. Overall, there is very little structure in this arrangement. Today, in
contrast, there appears to be a cabal of liberal groups on one side of the aisle facing a
similar band of conservative groups on the other, implying long-term, institutionalized
relationships between groups and parties. This suggests not that a firm has been
created—the party already existed—but that it has expanded, and perhaps changed in
organizational form. To understand special interest partisanship, then, we can look to
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the literature on firm expansion and evolution.
3.2.2.1 Changes in Organizational Form
Classic studies of American business, like Chandler’s (1962) Strategy and Structure,
offer clues to the types of changes we might expect to see in political parties. American
companies undertook major organizational changes during the twentieth century,
transitioning from unidivisional (“U-Form”) to multidivisional (“M-Form”) structures.
Du Pont and General Motors pioneered this transformation shortly after World War I,
and American businesses began adopting M-Form structures en mass between 1945 and
1960. Growth and increasing economic complexity taxed the U-Form system, producing
problems of coordination, communication and opportunism (Williamson 1981). The
M-Form corporation alleviated these problems in several ways.
Whereas traditional U-Forms were organized by function (e.g., production,
marketing, etc.), M-Forms were organized by product or region. This transition
dramatically decentralized authority, and separated operational and administrative
functions (Chandler 1962). No longer did executives manage day-to-day operations. At
the top of the M-Form hierarchy lies a general office, which “makes the broad strategic
or entrepreneurial decisions as to policy and procedures and can do so largely because it
has the final say in the allocation of the firm’s resources—men, money,
materials—necessary to carry out these administrative decisions and actions” (Chandler
1962: 11). Under the general office are several quasi-autonomous divisions, each
responsible for a particular product or region of the country. While divisions can make
some strategic decisions concerning their product or region, they do not control
firm-level strategy regarding that product or region. Within each division, there are
several departments responsible for different functions (e.g., sales, research,
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manufacturing, etc.), and under these department lie field units. Only at this last level
do managers directly oversee day-to-day operations.
Decentralization and separation of administrative and operational duties relieved
overburdened executives and smoothed coordination within rapidly growing
companies. Separating administrative functions like resource allocation and policy
creation from operational functions also helped to control opportunism. Those working
on particular products had incentives to maximize productivity within their divisions,
but could not allocate firm resources to those products. Instead, firm executives could
look across divisions in an M-Form corporation, and distribute their resources in a
manner most efficient and profitable for the company as a whole.
To what extent should we expect to see similar changes in parties? As the
electorate grows larger and more diverse, we might see more specialization by group,
with specific people in government responsible for maintaining relationships with
specific groups. This would be the party equivalent of organizing by “product” (here,
special interests in the electorate). It would also make sense to see a separation of
operational and administrative duties. The party should want a centralized figure to
control allocation of resources to different group liaisons to control opportunism. These
resources could range from time with the party in government (e.g., the president,
agency representatives, etc.) to acknowledgment in a State of the Union Address to
agenda space in Congress. Hence, while we might expect to see the development of
specialists in group liaison, we should not expect these specialists to control resources.
Instead, they should need to persuade a more central figure to allocate resources to their
groups. Analyzing the evolution of group-party relations in government, chapter five
will show that these kinds of changes do in fact occur in the last few decades of the
twentieth century.
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This creates a system of internal as well as external competition for groups.
Pro-choice groups, for example, are not only competing with pro-life groups for
outcomes on abortion policy, they are also competing with other liberal groups for
attention from the Democratic Party. Thus, thinking about the party as a firm helps us to
better understand groups’ relationships to parties, as well as to each other.
3.2.2.2 Changes in Size
In addition to changes in organizational form, we may also see changes in firm
size. Just as forming a firm can reduce transaction costs, expanding through
consolidation, integration, and geographic dispersion can help the firm increase
production, take advantage of economies of scale, direct resources efficiently, protect the
quality of its products, safeguard its technological investments, and ultimately lower the
market price of its products.
Growth outside the firm may stimulate expansion. Studying changes in American
business, Chandler (1962) argues that “strategic growth resulted from an awareness of
the opportunities and needs—created by changing population, income and
technology—to employ existing or expanding resources more profitably” (Chandler
1962: 15). Technological innovation can change the firm’s ability to communicate
externally to consumers and internally to other parts of the firm or industry. In one
sense, this may relieve stress by making communication easier; in another, however, it
may pressure the firm by quickly and vastly expanding the potential market for goods
and services. Both positive and negative stimuli are powerful, as Chandler argues, “the
prospect of a new market or the threatened loss of a current one stimulated geographical
expansion, vertical integration, and product diversification” (Chandler 1962: 15).
Different kinds of expansion provide different benefits. One option is to expand
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horizontally through consolidation with similar organizations. Firms are willing to
relinquish some autonomy in forming a consolidated organization because this enables
“economies of scale through standardization of processes and standardization in the
procurement of materials” and—even more importantly—a “concentration of
production in a few large favorably located factories” (Chandler 1962: 31). In other
words, the central office ensures efficient direction of resources, and produces goods at a
lower cost. Firms may also integrate horizontally with other firms in order to expand
their business into new geographic areas.
Horizontal expansion can lead to vertical expansion for a few reasons (Chandler
1962). Enhanced production capacity heightens distributional needs; the more goods the
firm can produce, the more it needs to sell. Under these circumstances, Chandler argues
businesses were no longer comfortable contracting product distribution out to
wholesalers, since they also sold competitors’ products. Their interests do not
necessarily conflict, but neither do they align (Chandler 1962: 31). By engaging in
forward integration, internalizing post-production functions like distribution, firms gain
more confidence that they are selling as much as possible.
Williamson (1981) argues that forward integration also protects product quality. In
a market system, producers rely on wholesalers and retailers to maintain the quality of
their products. Because these entities bear only part of the cost of quality deterioration,
their incentives to maintain product quality are lower than the producer’s. The problem
could be managed with proper supervision, but this, of course, is not free. Since
metering and enforcement are cheaper to carry out internally than externally, firms have
incentives to internalize distribution to protect the quality of their product. Thus,
Williamson argues, firms will be more likely to substitute administrative mechanisms for
market mechanisms—effectively increasing the size of the firm—when the quality of
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their particular products could deteriorate in the hands of distributors outside the firm.
They will also be more likely to internalize functions through integration when
developing highly specific assets. Williamson argues, “as assets become more fully
specialized to a single use or user, hence are less transferable to other uses and users,
economies of scale can be as fully realized when a firm operates the asset under its own
internal direction as when its services are obtained externally by contract” (Williamson
1981: 1548). When assets are non-transferable, at least not without a substantial loss in
value, internalization provides substantial security over contracting.
Even in the absence of incentive and security problems, coordination between
different levels can become difficult. This encourages companies to engage in forward
integration, internalizing post-production functions like distribution so the firm’s
administration can manage the flow of goods through different levels. In addition to
smoothing coordination, this also “provided a more certain cash flow and more rapid
payment for services rendered” (Chandler 1977: 7). Internalization brings informational
advantages as well. Chandler notes, “by linking the administration of producing units
with buying and distributing units, costs for information on markets and sources of
supply were reduced” (Chandler 1977: 7).
These insights help to explain why parties and groups might be willing to
institutionalize their relationships, despite the many benefits of fluid relations identified
by Key, Truman, and Greenstone. Some of the problems described by Chandler and
Williamson, like coordination and incentive misalignment, arise in politics as well as in
business. Like businesses, parties face population expansion and technological
advancements, and, as Chandler argues, “growth without structural adjustment can
only lead to economic inefficiency” (Chandler 1962: 16). Consequently, when the universe
of political consumers (i.e., voters) changes, we should expect structural changes to follow. As
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the population diversifies, party coalitions become less clear, and both individual
legislators and party leaders have growing incentives to gather more information about
the electorate. Who are their constituents, what do they want from their government,
what are their ideological leanings, and how can the party appeal to them?
Groups are well positioned to help parties answer these types of questions. They
tend to know a lot about their members, and how to communicate effectively with them.
Special interest groups can help parties understand how to appeal to new voters, and
parties can, in turn, give special interest groups new access to government. In this
context, groups may also be willing to share the costs of building relationships with new
constituents and adapting to technological advancements.
Structural changes will look different for parties than for businesses. Parties are
unlikely to integrate formally with other organizations, the way two companies might
agree to merge or one might pursue a hostile takeover of another. By creating long-term
alliances with certain groups, however, parties can simulate internalization. This can
increase efficiency in both the legislative and electoral arenas. Relatively stable alliances
obviate the need to build a coalition de novo every time the party wants to pass an
important piece of legislation. The same is true for electioneering. When special interest
partisanship is high, parties know they can count on certain groups for support. This
may have certain costs for special interest groups, as Frymer (1999) has shown, and it
may leave parties vulnerable to charges of extremism. However, it also streamlines the
coalition-building process in both the electoral and legislative arenas, lowering
coordination and negotiation costs.
Long-term coalitions also align incentives, increasing the reliability of information
and decreasing opportunism. This is especially powerful in an age of political
polarization. When the group’s legislative agenda is linked to the party’s electoral fate,
CHAPTER 3. EFFICIENCIES AND PATHOLOGIES OF SPECIAL INTEREST
PARTISANSHIP 95
the party can be more confident in its delegation to groups. We can think of
communication with the electorate as the “distributional” phase of party operations. As
discussed earlier, advertising, position-taking and credit-claiming all require
communication with the electorate in order to be effective, and groups can be very
valuable in this arena. When group and party incentives are aligned, the party can be
more confident that the group is sending favorable messages, and working hard to
mobilize voters behind the party.
Incentive alignment can also initiate a positive feedback loop, making long-term
coalitions easier to achieve. McCarty and Rothenberg (2002) note that parties are better
able to facilitate cooperation between legislators and groups when groups care which
party controls Congress. They find, “If the group cares about majority status . . . it may
value a member’s election—even if she is not ideologically preferable relative to her
opponent or if access to her is given no value—because access to the other member
favored by the group becomes more valuable” (McCarty and Rothenberg 2002: 32).
Under these circumstances, groups may be more willing to compromise with the party
on key decisions, like the allocation of electoral resources between different party
members. The party “can attempt to make majority status as valuable as possible to the
group and, by extension, to the incumbent by, for example, treating the minority party
especially harshly” (McCarty and Rothenberg 2002: 35-6). On the softer side, the
incentive alignment provided by internalization can have a similar effect.
This is not something we should necessarily expect to see with all groups. Given
the specific benefits of internalization, we might be especially likely to see parties build
long term coalitions with groups that have strong distributional capabilities—that is,
membership-based groups with strong grassroots communication networks. This helps
to explain why labor would be an especially good candidate for party alliance, even in
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an age of special interest bipartisanship. It would also make sense to see long coalitions
when a certain group and party are working together to develop an asset they could not
easily convert to another purpose.
Having examined the two extremes of pluralism and internalization, we can now
consider the full continuum of group-party relations. What occupies the space between
pluralism and internalization?
3.2.3 The Full Continuum of Group-Party Relations
We can think of group-party relations on a continuum running from left to right.
At the left-most point, we have the least amount of structure in group-party
relationships, and at the right-most point, we have the most amount of structure. For
simplicity’s sake, I have divided the continuum into four zones: pluralism, routinization,
cooperation, and internalization. To determine the level of structure, we can look to
certain features of group-party relations for clues. As structure increases, we are likely to
see changes in the degree of centralized authority, the stability of relationships, and the
overlap between group and party infrastructure and goals. These categories are ideal
types, which are unlikely to match reality in full. However, they can serve as a guide for
evaluating group-party relations.
The left-most zone, pluralism, is characterized by fluid, informal relationships. At
the most extreme point in this zone, there is no centralized structure or authority, and no
overlap between party and group infrastructure. In other words, there are no shared
resources. Parties and groups may work together, but only on a short-term basis, and
only to the extent that it suits their immediate goals. This is a zone of low special interest
partisanship.
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To the right of pluralism is routinization. In this zone, we will see more
repetition—the same kinds of interactions will happen over and over. Some structure
will be necessary to design and maintain the routines, but there will be no strong
authority. There is more stability, but no more obligation than under pluralism. Groups
and parties are still free to change the routines and negotiate on the open market, but
they do so less often in this zone than under pluralism. Also, there is a clear separation
between group and party goals and activities.
Next in line is cooperation, marked most notably by a partial fusion of group and
party objectives. In this zone, parties and groups are working together toward at least
one common goal. This requires more structure and authority, and will produce greater
stability in group-party relations. For efficiency’s sake, we may see some resource
pooling; however, most of their resources will remain separate.
The right-most zone is internalization. At the most extreme point in this zone, the
group becomes part of the party’s apparatus. Though both are responsible to the same
centralized authority, their goals need not be completely identical; even within a
corporation, different divisions might have conflicting desires and objectives. However,
we have significantly more goal alignment than in the cooperation zone. Relationships
in this zone are very stable, dislodged only by serious conflict. They are also
exclusive—in other words, groups can only be internalized by one party at a time.
Hence, this is a zone of high special interest partisanship.
Placing party-group relations on this continuum provides an alternative view of
political polarization. If parties internalize all groups, they will end up with very
different platforms. In this situation, we are likely to see little overlap between parties in
roll-call votes. Compromise will be difficult, because the parties have stronger policy
commitments than they would under pluralism. Understanding movement along the
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group-party continuum can therefore shed light on the origins of polarization.
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter argues that parties had their own internal reasons for encouraging
the growth of special interest partisanship. They did not need activists to push them
away from pluralism. Because the costs and benefits of different group-party
arrangements can change over time, explaining the evolution of group-party relations
requires careful attention to historical context. Chapters four and five will argue that
changes in group-party relations are part of a larger transformation of parties since the
New Deal. Substantively, the parties have become more distinct, and organizationally,
the national parties have become much stronger. I will argue that these two changes are
related. The substance and organization of party politics are inextricably linked.
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Party Nationalization and Polarization:
The Structural Roots of Ideological
Change
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As chapter two illustrates, the Democratic and Republican parties became more distinct
in a number of different ways over the second half of the twentieth century. Not only did
they develop alternative positions on many issues, but they also began prioritizing
issues differently. The question now is, why?
There is no immaculate conception for issue positions. Echoing Schattschneider, I
argue that position development requires significant work and compromise, which in
turn require organization and infrastructure. Put more starkly, in order for parties to
polarize on a range of issues, they needed stronger organizations than they had in the
early to mid-twentieth century. They also needed compelling reasons to abandon their
“Tweedledee and Tweedledum” arrangement, which had allowed both sides to avoid
alienating moderate voters, and adopt alternative positions on issues. Though parties
may be well-known for their espoused ideologies today, I argue that major changes are
not likely to be caused by ideology. Assuming parties care deeply about elections, if we
see radical changes, it is most likely because the nature of political competition has
evolved.
Party organization has not played a major role in the literature on elite political
polarization. The existing explanation that comes closest to invoking organization is the
increasingly common argument that changes to the Democratic Party’s nomination
processes in the late 1960s and early 1970s opened the process and allowed increasingly
extreme activists to pull elites away from the median voter. While these developments
were certainly not immaterial, I argue that critical changes in party organization began
well before changes to the party nomination process in the late 1960s. The roots of
modern polarization lie in the New Deal era. I challenge the conventional wisdom
further by arguing that activists did not cause polarization. Rather, as the previous
chapter argued, parties had compelling reasons to evolve as the nature of political
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competition changed.
I begin with an explanation of my theory, which draws heavily on
Schattschneider’s work on party similarity in the mid-twentieth century. This brings me
to my central hypothesis, that elite party polarization stems from the nationalization of
the party system since the New Deal. The spectacular growth of federal power during
the New Deal spurred the centralization—albeit gradual and sometimes rocky—of party
power. As patronage politics declined with the dissipation of local machines by the late
1960s, issues became more important in political competition, encouraging parties to
take them more seriously. And as national party committees grew stronger and more
professional over this period, they were better equipped to develop issue positions.
This is not an easy hypothesis to test, for reasons of data availability as well as
complexity. I will address it in a few stages, marshaling different kinds of evidence.
First, I exploit state-level variation in polarization and patronage history to test the link
between these phenomena. This analysis suggests that patronage politics do in fact
depress party differences, just as Schattschneider argued. I will then review changes in
the primary independent variable in this analysis: party nationalization. This amounts
to a history of the American party system, particularly how and why the balance of
power between national and state/local parties changed, and how this affected political
competition. Then, I will show how these changes influenced parties’ incentives and
capabilities with respect to issues. I will begin by zooming in on one issue, abortion,
using archival data to illustrate how changes in political competition, rather than
ideology, drove the Republican Party to adopt a strong, distinct position. This is an ideal
test case, as it has become one of the most intensely ideological issues in contemporary
American politics. If the Republican Party’s decision to adopt a strong pro-life position,
in contrast to its opponent, was motivated by strategic electoral considerations rather
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than ideological change, I have strong evidence in favor of my argument. Finally, I will
show how stronger national party infrastructure supported the development of party
positions.
4.1 Decentralized Parties and Issue Position Convergence
Though Franklin Delano Roosevelt may be remembered as one of the strongest
Democratic politicians in American history, his party was weak at the national level.
State and local party bosses were the “locus of power” at this time; above them were
“ghost parties,” national committees technically sitting atop the party hierarchy, but
actually having very little power or responsibility. These organizations met infrequently,
did little, and disbanded between elections.
Patronage was the primary currency (Lowi uses the word “technique”) in this
decentralized system (Lowi 1990: 194; Schattschneider 1942). To gain support from
voters, state and local parties used “material incentives” like jobs and contracts, rather
than “purposive incentives” (Mayhew 1986). In exchange for federal patronage, state
and local parties would mobilize their constituents in national elections as well, since the
feeble national parties were ill-equipped to do this themselves.
This arrangement had important consequences for issue politics. Since candidates
“have not counted very much on workers or supporters inspired to activity by issues,
principles, causes, or ideologies,” issues played a negligible role in electoral competition
(Mayhew 1986: 20; Schattschneider 1942). This environment gave parties little incentive
to address issues, let alone take strong alternative positions (Schattschneider 1942; APSA
Report 1950). Charles Merriam, political science scholar and advisor to President
Roosevelt, observed that “many fundamental questions of public policy are not party
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questions at all,” and “only in exceptional cases is the party bugle sounded to rally the
party members to their party standard, and even then they do not always respond”
(Merriam and Gosnell 1940: 41).
Merriam’s observation alludes to the second reason Schattschneider offers for
issue convergence under weak national parties. Even if they wanted to take strong,
alternative positions, Schattschneider argued, the national parties lacked the necessary
resources and infrastructure to do so. Taking positions is not so easy—it requires
research, experts, and knowledge of constituencies. Moreover, to enforce positions, the
party must have the capacity to discipline its members.
An important hypothesis emerging from this argument is that if the balance of
power between national and state/local parties changes, we should eventually see changes in
parties’ willingness and ability to take distinct issue positions. If true, this suggests that what
ultimately appear to be ideological changes—parties taking stronger, more opposite
positions on a range of issues—actually stem from structural changes to the party
system, which alter the nature of electoral competition. This insight would offer an
important contribution to our understanding of political polarization, which is most
often treated as an ideological phenomenon.
4.2 Testing the Link Between Patronage and Polarization
It is simple enough to see that political polarization began rising dramatically in
the early 1970s, soon after the end of what Mayhew has called political machines’
“golden age” (Mayhew 1986: 330). This is consistent with the hypothesis articulated
above, but could, of course, be a coincidence. To test the link between patronage and
polarization more explicitly, we can exploit state-level variation on these variables.
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States differ widely in their history of patronage organization, as well as legislative
polarization (Mayhew 1986; Shor and McCarty 2011). This approach has limitations,
since polarization scores are only available at the state level from the mid-1990s on, well
after machines’ decline. Still, if Schattschneider’s theory is correct, we might expect
states with a strong history of patronage organization in the 1960s to lag behind states
without such legacies in the development of distinct party positions. Presumably, in
states without strong patronage organizations, parties always needed to rely on
purposive incentives to appeal to voters. Hence, parties in these states would have been
working to develop strong, alternative issue positions for a relatively long time. While
parties in former machine states eventually needed to transition from material to
purposive incentives, they would have started this process later. With less time for
parties develop strong, alternative positions, we should see them on a narrower range of
issues. In sum, states with stronger patronage organizations in the 1960s should be less
polarized today than states with weaker (or nonexistent) patronage organizations.
To measure patronage, I use Mayhew’s “traditional party organization” (TPO)
scores. In a sweeping history of American parties, Mayhew assigns each state a score
between 1 and 5, indicating the level of traditional party organization present in that
state in the late 1960s.1 States with a score of 1 (e.g., Minnesota, North Carolina) had no
TPOs at this time, while states with a score of 5 (e.g., Illinois, Pennsylvania) had strong
TPOs. To measure state polarization, I use Shor and McCarty’s (2011) data. They
estimate ideal points for state legislators that are comparable across chambers, states,
levels of government, and time, using roll-call data (the traditional source for ideal point
estimation at the national level) and surveys of state and federal legislators. To calculate
polarization for each chamber in each state, they measure the distance between the ideal
1For more detail on the process of assigning TPO scores, see Mayhew 1986: 21-22.
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points of the median member of each party. In 2008, this measure ranges from 0.56 to 3.0
in state lower chambers, and 0.6 to 2.7 in upper chambers.
Of course, it is important to consider other known determinants of national-level
polarization in a state-level analysis as well. McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006) show
clear, positive correlations between immigration, inequality, and polarization. To control
for these factors, I include variables indicating each state’s Gini index coefficient in 2008
(an accepted measure of inequality, also used by McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal at the
national level), and the percent of each state’s population that was foreign born in 2008.2
I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyze the effect of TPO scores
on state polarization, controlling for state-level inequality and immigration levels.
TABLE 4.1 summarizes the results. As expected, there is a statistically significant,
negative relationship between patronage legacy and polarization. That is, states that had
strong patronage organizations in the 1960s still lag behind states without such
organizations in polarization in 2008. For every additional point on the 1 to 5 TPO scale,
polarization decreases by 0.12 in both chambers. This is both statistically and
substantively significant, since polarization ranges from approximately 0.5 to 3.
While these findings certainly cannot confirm the whole theory outlined above,
they support the hypothesized link between party organization and issue positions. In
states that had strong patronage-based organizations in the 1960s, parties in state
legislatures have not yet become as polarized. For a more textured analysis of this
relationship, we can analyze changes in party structure—specifically, the increasing
strength of national party organizations in relation to state and local party
organizations—and examine the extent to which changes in parties’ attention to issues
2Gini index data came from an American Community Survey Brief released by the U.S. Census Bureau,
entitled “Household Income for States: 2008 and 2009.” Immigration data came from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s 2006-2008 American Community Survey.
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Model 1 Model 2
State Houses State Senates
TPO Score -0.12** -0.12**
(0.06) (0.04)
% Foreign Born 0.04** 0.04***
(0.02) (0.01)






Table 4.1: Traditional Party Organization and State-Level Polarization. Models 1 and 2
are OLS regressions. There are fewer than 50 observations because polarization data are
not available for all states in all years. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** <
.001. Source: Data from Mayhew 1986, Shor and McCarty 2011, and U.S. Census Bureau
follow.
4.3 Measuring Party Centralization
What does it mean for parties to centralize? In short, either national parties need
to become stronger, state and local parties need to become weaker, or both trends need
to occur. I will focus primarily on demonstrating how national parties became stronger,
though state and local parties are also important parts of the story. They did not
necessarily weaken as national committees developed—they simply changed in a few
key ways. Most notably, party machines waned, and state and local parties became more
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integrated with national parties, particularly on the Republican side.
Of course, this raises the follow-up question: what does it mean for parties to
become stronger? How can we measure party strength systematically? While there has
been little recent work on party organization, with important exceptions by Klinkner
(1994) and Galvin (2010), organizational changes during the mid-twentieth century
inspired a surge of scholarship on party strength in the 1980s, mostly by Bibby, Cotter,
Gibson, and Huckshorn (in different combinations). These scholars thought in depth
about organizational measurement, and conducted a survey of national party leaders
from 1979 to 1980, as well as larger-scale surveys of state party leaders between 1960 and
1980. The metrics discussed below, and the observations discussed in the next section,
draw heavily from their work.
First and foremost, to evaluate a party’s strength, we can determine if and when it
established a permanent headquarters. A strong, active party requires a stable home
base for its operations. It also needs professional staff. In this realm, we can look at the
number of people working for the party and the degree to which they are compensated.
Is the party chairmanship a full-time, paid position? How many paid staff members
does the chair have? We can also examine the size of the party’s budget, since activities
and infrastructure require money, and the manner by which party leaders raise funds.
Do they have systems in place for regular fundraising, or are they constantly scrambling
to raise money in various ways from various sources? We can also look at their
organization. To what extent is the party bureaucratized? The degree of
bureaucratization will be related to staff size, since specialization will be difficult if not
impossible for a small staff. This matters because specialization facilitates strength by
raising efficiency. Finally, we can look at the party’s operations and activities. Most
simply, does it operate continuously or does it fade between elections? Strong parties
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need a reasonable degree of stability in their operations. More specifically, we can
evaluate the party’s programmatic activity. As Gibson, Cotter, Bibby and Huckshorn
(1983) summarize, in addition to bureaucratization, “Strong organizations must also
have programatic capacity—that is, they must be capable of sustaining a high level of
programatic activity. Through such activity the party organization develops a
constituency; firm expectations and support are created and the organization becomes
resilient in the face of disintegrative forces” (Gibson et al. 1983: 198).
Tracing party centralization is considerably more difficult than documenting the
centralization of government power. In the words of Kenneth Janda, “party
organizations rarely tell about themselves.”3 To do so, I rely on a few key sources. For
the period from 1933 to 1945, I use a series of contemporaneous articles on party finance
published in the American Political Science Review by Louise Overacker. These articles
draw on multiple primary sources, most notably a series of reports published by
Congressional committees tasked with investigating the parties over this period. For the
few years leading up to 1950, I use the report published by the American Political
Science Association’s Committee on Political Parties, Toward a More Responsible Two-Party
System. For the period from 1959 to the present, I use the Encyclopedia of Associations,
which contains data on the national committees and affiliated organizations, including
membership, budget, staff size, and publications. Not all of these data are available in
every year, but they allow for a rough estimate of national party organization and
activity over time. I also rely heavily on key secondary sources, most notably Cotter and
Bibby (1980), Klinker (1994), and Galvin’s (2010) work on party organization.
3Janda 1983: 319, cited by Appleton and Ward 1995.
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4.4 The Process of Party Nationalization
The 1968 and 1972 Democratic Party reforms have received a lot of attention in the
literature on polarization. However, critical changes in party organization began well
before this time. As Cotter and Bibby note, “[party] nationalization is a long-term trend
with antecedents dating to the 1940s. The nationalization of party organization in the
United States thus is not an abrupt result of the turbulent 1968 Democratic National
Convention” (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 12). In this chapter, I argue that the impetus for
nationalization arose even earlier than the 1940s.
While woeful, according to Schattschneider, the decentralization of party power
was not especially surprising, as it mirrored the balance of power in government for
most of the nation’s history. From approximately 1800 to 1933, the federal government’s
main functions involved administrative matters, subsidies, tariffs, public lands, patents,
and currency (Lowi 1990: 193). Overall, the federal government had relatively few
responsibilities, while “the states did most of the fundamental governing, and the states
were in particular responsible for those aspects of government that require directly
coercive techniques,” like regulation (Lowi 1990: 194).
It would be an overstatement to say the Great Depression and New Deal began
the shift toward party centralization. Industrialization, urbanization, and advancements
in transportation and communication technology had been gradually raising the salience
of national issues prior to the 1930s (APSA Report: 33). However, the Depression and
ensuing expansion of federal power under the New Deal engendered more sudden and
dramatic changes to the status of national power and policy. The economic crisis
“brought to light the incompetence of the spoils machines to handle the problems of
unemployment and relief,” and people looked to the national government to solve the
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increasingly important issues of the day (Merriam and Gosnell 1940: 441). The New Deal
responded to this crisis by fundamentally transforming American federalism, granting
the national government tremendous, unprecedented regulatory power and
responsibility for citizens’ welfare.
4.4.1 National Parties
While the party system did not go through such a rapid transformation, important
changes were beginning to occur in the national parties. Traditionally, national party
organizations were relatively dormant between elections. The APSA Report quotes a
DNC member’s remarks to this effect in 1919: “It was the custom of this body
immediately after the Presidential election had passed . . . of going out of business in a
week or two, just as soon as we could pay up the bills, and indeed sometimes we went
out of business before we did that.”4 Cotter and Bibby report that DNC Chairman James
Farley distributed termination notices at the 1932 Convention in Chicago, and “his staff
members had to find their own transportation home” (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 5). Yet,
even by this time, some important changes were already brewing.
First, the parties established permanent headquarters. The RNC made this move
around 1918, though its operations still declined significantly between elections (Cotter
and Bibby 1980: 3-4). The DNC lacked adequate resources to maintain their activities
between elections until 1929, when chairman John J. Raskob announced that the party
would establish a permanent headquarters in Washington D.C. with a permanent
executive committee and a full-time director of publicity to facilitate continuous
operations between elections (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 4). While the DNC was still
4APSA Report: 48, quoting Proceedings of the DNC, 1919.
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running a deficit, it was substantially smaller than it had been, and the party could
afford to make what he viewed as a critical change. “After many conferences with
members of the executive and advisory committees,” he announced, “I have reached the
conclusion that the party’s interests can be advanced best by the opening of permanent
and adequate headquarters in Washington, and the conducting of active organization
work 365 days in the year.”5 In addition to providing a place for Democrats to hold
meetings, the office was also to have publicity and research capabilities.6
The chairmanship position also changed significantly. After the 1936 election, the
RNC made its chairmanship a full-time, salaried position (Overacker 1941; APSA Report
1950: 49). The DNC followed 8 years later, in 1944. However, the “full-time” chairmen
could still hold other positions. Notably, several DNC and RNC chairman held federal
executive positions during their tenure with the party committees. DNC Chairman
Robert Hannegan, for example, served as United States Postmaster General under Harry
Truman from 1945 to 1947 during his DNC Chairman appointment from 1944 to 1948. It
is particularly worth noting, for this analysis, that the Postmaster General controlled a
great deal of patronage. Before Hannegan, James Farley and Frank C. Walker both
served this particular dual-role, from 1933 to 1940 and 1943 to 1944, respectively. Dwight
Eisenhower would eventually stop this trend during his presidency, as Cotter and Bibby
note he was “adamant that neither the party chairman nor any member of the national
committee would simultaneously hold a federal executive position” (Cotter and Bibby
1980: 7).
Over this period, the party committees also became more independent of the
chair—they were “no longer a mere extension of the chairman’s personality” (Cotter and
5“Raskob Appoints Shouse to Lead Revival of Party.” The New York Times 1 May 1929.
6“Democrats Will Open Headquarters in City.” The Washington Post 1 May 1929.
CHAPTER 4. PARTY NATIONALIZATION AND POLARIZATION 112
Bibby 1980: 6). This autonomy was also financial, as chairmen no longer bankrolled the
committees.7 The chairman’s independence from the president also increased over the
middle of the twentieth century. Writing in 1980, Cotter and Bibby note, “A few decades
ago it was understood that the chairman and his cronies might legitimately benefit from
exerting the influence associated with that position. It is still a job that involves personal
loyalty to an incumbent president, but within the changing framework of law, there are
now some things that a president is unlikely to ask of a chairman, and there are some
requests to which a chairman will say no” (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 6).
Permanent headquarters and professional, autonomous chairmen did not
immediate translate to continuous organizational work, however. Operations remained
relatively unstable, due largely to the parties’ financial difficulties. Still, both parties
attempted to increase their between-election activities over this period. In spite of their
post-election debt, the DNC maintained a “vigorous organization” following the 1932
contest, with $300,000 in operating expenses in 1934 and $385,000 in 1935. Overacker
(1937) notes, “Apparently Mr. Farley operates upon the theory that the party should
function continuously and that between campaign activity is an important factor in
winning elections. This may be one of the secrets of his success” (Overacker 1937: 475).
The RNC, in contrast, was “practically dormant between the campaigns,” with operating
expenses of $60,500 in 1933, $216,676 in 1934, and $159,977 in 1935 (Overacker 1937: 475).
After the 1936 election, both national committees maintained operations, despite their
post-election indebtedness. This surge in activity fizzled after the 1940 election, however.
According to Overacker, this was largely a consequence of the Hatch Act, which limited
parties’ expenditures per year, spurring a decentralization of party spending. All in all,
7Chairmen did not always finance committee activity before this time. However, Cotter and Bibby
note that previously, “A wealthy chairman could play angel to the national committee. John J. Raskob,
Al Smith’s DNC chairman, for example, ran up a party debt of $1,550,000, much of which he personally
financed” (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 6).
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over the decade following the first New Deal, the concept of continuous operations
gained some favor; however, parties were unable to achieve it consistently.
By 1950, when APSA published Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System, the
RNC and DNC still did not meet regularly (APSA Report: 29). The National Committee
“is seldom a generally influential and much less a working body,” they noted (APSA
Report: 29). Since the committees still focused mainly on presidential elections, it is not
especially surprising that their activities consistently dwindled thereafter (APSA Report:
38). In a comparative analysis of American and British parties, Casey (1944) observed,
“The usual American practice is a feverish construction of a party headquarters staff
capable of real organization and propaganda service a few months before a presidential
campaign. The skeleton gets flesh and bones on the eve of a national convention or soon
after a nominee is chosen. After an election, the major part of a headquarters staff melts
away.”8 This left parties with meager research capabilities, to APSA’s dismay. Instead of
the “frail organs” in existence at that time, APSA argued the parties needed “stronger,
full-time research organization, adequately financed and working on a year-in, year-out
basis” (APSA Report: 81).
Over time, parties did make this transition, if not at APSA’s preferred pace.
FIGURE 4.1 illustrates a significant increase in between-election staffing levels, for
example. Data on party staffing are difficult to come by, though they are available for
certain years. Most of the data used to create FIGURE 4.1 come from Cotter and Bibby,
who in turn relied on work by Hugh Bone (1958, 1971). I supplemented this with data
from Klinkner (1994) and the Encyclopedia of Associations (EA). Raw numbers and
sources for each year can be found in the appendix (see TABLE A.27). EA does not
always get new data from organizations every year. In this situation, they typically use
8Casey 1944, quoted in APSA Report: 48-49.
























1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
























1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
RNC Paid Staff, 1935-2000
Figure 4.1: DNC and RNC Paid Staff, 1935-2000. The data used to make these graphs
come from Klinkner (1994), the Encyclopedia of Associations, and Cotter and Bibby
(1980), who in turn relied largely on work by Hugh Bone (1958, 1971). Raw numbers
and sources for each year can be found in the appendix (see TABLE A.27). Blank spaces
indicate missing data, not necessarily zero staff. The vertical dotted reference lines mark
presidential election years.
data received previously. This means that EA data will exaggerate stability, but it can
provide a rough estimate of party staff size in the contemporary era. Blank spaces
indicate missing data, not necessarily zero staff, and the vertical dotted reference lines
mark presidential election years. In 1935, the RNC had only 11 paid staff members. This
is consistent with scholars’ observations of organizational decline between elections. By
the mid-1950s, however, parties are maintaining more robust organizations in
non-election years. Staffing levels do continue to drop after presidential elections.
Between 1952 and 1953, for example, both parties cut their staff by approximately
three-quarters (DNC from 251 to 59, RNC from 386 to 98). However, the
between-election staff gets significantly larger over time, especially on the Republican
side.
There was also a rise in party-affiliated organizations. EA collects data on national
party and party-related organizations, which I used to create a timeline of their
proliferation. TABLES 4.2 AND 4.3, displayed at the end of this chapter, list these
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organizations alongside their founding year and membership as of 1997. While core
organizations like the DNC, RNC, and national party congressional committees were
established in the 19th century, the vast majority of national party-affiliated
organizations arose after the Great Depression. FIGURE 4.2 shows the density of
organizational establishment over time. Not only were the RNC and DNC growing over
the post-war period, there was also a steep rise in auxiliary organizations like the
National Federation of Republican Women, the Log Cabin Republicans, and the National
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Figure 4.2: The Growth of National Party-Related Organizations. This graph shows
the number of party-related national organizations established per year. A list of these
organizations is available at the end of this chapter. Source: data from the Encyclopedia of
Associations, 1997
As they grew larger, the party committees also became more complex and
bureaucratic. We can measure this by looking at the number of divisions in the
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organization, which increased greatly over time (Cotter and Bibby 1980). Woodburn
(1906) reported that the national parties had five subdivisions as of 1906. By the late
1950s, the RNC had 18 subdivisions, 12 of which were established after 1935 (Cotter and
Bibby 1980).
With greater staff, infrastructure, and bureaucratization came more
institutionalized fundraising operations, at least for the RNC. In the mid 1930s, under
Chairman John Hamilton, the RNC created the National Republican Finance Committee
(NRFC), which established a new system of centralization for national committee and
Congressional campaign committee fundraising. The Hamilton regime also spearheaded
a new membership program, in which people pledged donations to the party each year,
as members of a congregation might promise annual donations to a church. In 1962,
Chairman William Miller moved the RNC toward a direct mail program, which went
from raising $700,000 in 1962 to $5.1 million in 1964. This program would account for a
substantial percentage of the RNFC’s overall receipts over Miller’s tenure (21% in 1962,
40% in 1963, and 47% in 1964) (Klinkner 1994: 62). The party’s direct mail operation
grew even more under Bill Brock’s guidance in the 1970s. During his tenure, the RNC
went from raising $12.7 million from 250,000 contributors in 1976 to $26.5 million from
1.2 million contributors in 1980 (Klinkner 1994: 140-1).
The direct mail program’s success altered the balance of power between national
and state parties (Klinkner 1994: 63, 141). Heard (1960) argued that money was the
primary source of state and local parties’ power over the RNC. “The national leadership
has on occasion rejected the demands of important state and local party leaders,” he
observed, “but the paucity of its independent financial resources, along with other
factors, circumscribes its freedom and denies it a potential source of stability,” which
“pushes the center of gravity further down in the party structure than it need otherwise
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be.”9 By creating a large network of small donors, the direct-mail program gave the
national party more independence. It also changed the balance of party power
geographically. Large northeastern donors saw their share of the party’s receipts decline,
as the party received a larger number of small donations from around the country.
Donations over $500 from mid-atlantic states made up 43% of total contributions in 1960,
but only 25% four years later (Klinkner 1994: 63).
The DNC lagged behind its opponent in the development of systematic
fundraising by more than two decades. The party did not have a permanent, operational
finance committee until 1960. And even then, it was relatively unstable, collapsing in
1964 after a dispute between the presidential and congressional wings of the party, and
then reemerging in 1974. Following a failed attempt to institute a direct-mail program
similar to the RNC’s in 1969 under Chairman Fred Harris, the party had some success
raising money through telethons under Chairman Bob Strauss in the mid-1970s
(Klinkner 1994: 94, 126-7). Though the telethons were relatively isolated events, they
contributed to a more stable fundraising infrastructure by helping the party gather
names for future direct-mail efforts. By 1974, they had collected over a million names
from various sources, and receipts from their direct mail efforts accounted for
approximately half of the DNC’s total receipts under Chairman Strauss.
Even then, however, the DNC’s direct-mail operation was smaller and less
technologically advanced than the RNC’s. Considering the RNC developed much more
stable, institutionalized, and centralized fundraising capabilities than the DNC, it is
unsurprising that the RNC raised more money than the DNC over this period.
Importantly, the RNC received a relatively large percentage of overall contributions from
Republican donors; Democrats, in contrast, donated more often to candidate
9Heard 1960, cited in Klinkner 1994: 62
CHAPTER 4. PARTY NATIONALIZATION AND POLARIZATION 118
organizations (Freeman 1986; Jacobson 1985).
All in all, major changes to national party organizations occurred between the
Great Depression and the early 1970s, when elite polarization began its steep rise. They
established permanent headquarters, began keeping sizable staffs between elections,
developed systematic fundraising capabilities, and maintained more continuous
operations. This resulted in larger, more stable, and professional organizations with far
greater programmatic capacities than the “ghost parties” of Schattschneider’s narrative.
4.4.2 State and Local Parties
So far, this analysis has focused almost exclusively on national parties. What
happened to state and local party organizations over this period? If they grew more than
national parties, we would not have a net centralization of the party system. The answer
to this question differs substantially for state and local parties. At the state level, we also
see different patterns for Republicans and Democrats. Overall, however, the national
parties grew more powerful relative to their state and local counterparts. While this was
not a quick process, it had broad and important consequences.
Though the balance of power between federal and state/local government
changed dramatically in the 1930s by virtue of the former’s ascension, the latter did not
decline right away. In fact, the New Deal fortified machines in the short-term. Programs
like the Works Progress Administration expanded the supply of federal patronage,
which aided existing machines and even helped to build new ones (Mayhew 1986: 324).
Roosevelt’s attitude toward machines also played a role, as Mayhew notes that he
“approached the still-flourishing stratum of organizations at lower levels not as
obstacles that needed to be removed but as possible allies to be mobilized” (Mayhew
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1986: 318). This represented a change in orientation toward machines after the reform
efforts of the Progressive Era. Democratic presidents maintained the attitude that
“traditional party organizations could agreeably supply strength to, as well as draw
benefits from, politicians who built and tended coalitions at the national level” through
this “golden age” of machine politics, which lasted through the late 1960s (Mayhew
1986: 318, 330). Even after this period, however, local party organizations did not fizzle;
rather, they changed in nature, moving away from patronage-dominated machine
politics (Gibson et al.1985).
State parties did not decline either (Gibson at al. 1983; Cotter et al. 1984). By the
early 1970s, almost all state parties had established headquarters outside the chair’s
home (80% in the state’s capitol), their budgets grew, and, on the whole, they became
much more professionalized and bureaucratized between 1960 and 1980 (Gibson et al.
1983). There were important differences by party, however. Republican state parties
grew stronger between 1960 and 1980, while Democratic state parties ascended in the
1960s, before dipping slightly over the following decade. Overall, state Republican
parties were stronger than their Democratic counterparts. This makes sense, considering
the different levels of attention given to state parties by the RNC and DNC.
While state parties may not have declined in the mid to late twentieth century,
they did become more strongly integrated with national parties, albeit in different ways.
The RNC focused on providing more services and resources to candidates (Freeman
1986). Following the party’s defeat in 1964, RNC Chairman Raymond Bliss enacted a
program to strengthen state and local organizations. The RNC helped state parties with
recruitment, and offered extensive training services during the 1960s. These included
live events like conferences and seminars as well as printed materials like manuals.
After the 1976 election, Chairman Bill Brock undertook an even more aggressive
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program, deploying personnel, technological resources, and other assistance for state
party development. For example, the RNC spent $1 million per year to provide each
state headquarters with an organizational director, and offered access to the party’s data
processing network (Cotter and Bibby 1980; Klinkner 1994).
An important part of the RNC’s state-level program was Operation Dixie. This
historic effort, beginning in 1957 under Chairman Meade Alcorn, aimed to build
Republican party infrastructure in the south, a region so dominated by Democrats that
Key (1949) deemed it a non-competitive one-party stronghold. Building party
organizations from scratch was not easy; indeed, even recruiting staff and candidates
was no small task, since running on the Republican ticket was not especially attractive at
this time. These new activists, much like the “amateurs” rising in the Democratic party,
were younger, more educated, and professional than the older, business elite
establishment Republicans. They also turned out to be much more conservative than
Chairman Alcorn and President Eisenhower hoped (Klinkner 1994).
Research on state organizations suggests these party-building efforts were quite
successful. Huckshorn, Gibson, Cotter, and Bibby (1986) use surveys of state party
leaders conducted between 1960 and 1980 to demonstrate, among other things, the level
of national party involvement in state parties. FIGURE 4.3 shows the percentage of state
parties receiving different kinds of assistance from the RNC and DNC. A few patterns
stand out in this graph. The level of assistance from the RNC to state Republican parties
is quite significant, with nearly half receiving aid with polls and research, over 60%
receiving staff assistance, and over 90% receiving campaign seminars from the national
committee. This stands in stark contrast to state Democratic parties, which enjoyed
almost no staff assistance and significantly less aid in other areas, compared to
Republican state parties. Only in rule enforcement did state Democratic parties receive
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Figure 4.3: Party Integration. This graph was created from a chart in Huckshorn et al.
1986, which used data from surveys of state party chairmen conducted between 1960 and
1980.
more assistance from the DNC than their Republican counterparts received from their
national committee, reflecting substantial DNC efforts in this area.
In contrast to their opposition, the DNC tended to use rules and regulations to
assert control over state parties. According to Cotter and Bibby (1980), these efforts were
initially motivated by problems of defection by a number of southern states from the
DNC’s presidential ticket leading up to the 1948 election. In the short-term, the DNC
decided in 1949 to remove six members from Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
South Carolina from the committee. But, they also realized they would need a
longer-term solution to the problem of disloyalty. This need became more urgent after a
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conflict-ridden 1952 convention, in which Chairman Rayburn declared the Virginia,
South Carolina, and Louisiana delegations ineligible to participate in the nomination for
failure to adhere to the loyalty rules adopted at the 1948 convention, only to be
overturned “in two prolonged and turbulent votes” (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 15). While
the DNC decided not to require a loyalty oath in 1956, it increased its authority over
state parties through new requirements regarding the listing of presidential and vice
presidential candidates’ names on state ballots. Before the 1960 convention, Chairman
Paul Butler reinforced this new authority by “formally advis[ing] state leaders that any
policy or device that sought to relieve Democratic electors of their obligation to cast their
ballots for the Democratic nominees would result in a challenge before the 1960
Credentials Committee” (Cotter and Bibby 1980: 16).
Conflict intensified in 1964 when the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party sent
its own delegation to the convention as an alternative to the planned delegation, decried
as racist. Democratic Party leaders managed to accommodate both delegations,
diffusing the situation in the short-term. The DNC also established a Special Equal
Rights Committee in 1964, which would recommend specific delegate selection
procedures in 1968 to make the process more democratic for the party’s many
constituencies. Among these recommendations, adopted in January 1968, were “open
and publicized party meetings, nondiscrimination, broad registration drives, publication
of selection procedures, and publication of qualifications for party officeholding” (Cotter
and Bibby 1980: 17). The McGovern-Fraser Commission, whose reforms are more
well-known to contemporary scholars, would build on these principles.
Though the DNC and RNC asserted control over state parties in different ways,
both grew stronger relative to state and local parties over the post-war period. On the
whole, there was a significant nationalization of the American party system, just as
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Shattschneider hoped there would be. As this processes unfolded, the nature of political
competition slowly changed, with purposive incentives like issue positions becoming
more important. And as the parties grew stronger, they were much better equipped to
develop comprehensive policy programs.
4.5 The Development of Issue Positions
Examining national party platforms in FIGURE 4.4, we can see parties paying
more attention to issues over time. The party platforms gradually lengthen toward the
end of the nineteenth century, before the imperatives of the Great Depression
temporarily focus politics on the most critical issues of the day. By the end of the New
Deal period, however, we begin to see a dramatic increase in platform length. National
parties clearly change their orientation toward issues, viewing them as more worthy of
attention than they were in the past.
Of course, this analysis is not just about attention to issues, but the development
of alternative positions thereon. Schattschneider named two mechanisms by which
party decentralization encouraged issue position convergence: incentives and
organizational capacity. This section will analyze changes in each mechanism, and how
they contributed to the development of strong, opposite issue positions.
4.5.1 Incentives
As patronage politics declined, a culture of political “professionals” gave way to
the rise of “amateurs.” Klinkner summarizes, “For many years the strength of the
Democratic party lay in its control of party machines in the urban centers of the north
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Figure 4.4: Party Platform Length, 1840-2008. This graph shows the number of words in
the Republican and Democratic Party Platforms over time. Source: text of party platforms
gathered from the American Presidency Project (Woolley and Peters)
and in the traditional Democratic loyalties of the rural South. But by the 1950s, a new
breed of amateur Democrats begun to gain ascendance in the party. These Democrats
were more educated and affluent and were motivated less by patronage or the benefits
of local one-party dominance or the need to exclude blacks, than by issues and
programs” (Klinkner 1994: 15). Studying members of the 85th Congress (1957-58), Miller
and Stokes find support for this contention. In their survey, only 25% of “party recruits”
characterized issues as “of equal or greater importance than other factors” in their
election, compared to 61% of “self-starters”.10
10Miller and Stokes, unpublished manuscript, cited in Mayhew 1986: 245. The exact question, with
parenthetical clarification provided by Mayhew, was: “In seeking renomination [this evidently means in
1958], how would you compare the importance of your stands on issues with the importance of other
factors—such as services to your constituents, your standing in the party, and so forth?”
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Direct-mail also heightened purposive incentives in politics. This new fundraising
method widened parties’ support networks, and changed the tools they would need to
gather supporters. In addition to reducing the influence of large contributors in the
northeast, the direct mail system also made ideological appeals more important.
Observing George McGovern’s attention to issue politics, Klinkner notes, “Like Barry
Goldwater and George Wallace, the first presidential candidates to use direct-mail
successfully, McGovern took ideological positions that a great many people believed
strongly in and were willing to support with their money. Such contributors, however,
were less willing to support the more general purposes of the DNC” (Klinkner 1994:
127). As issues became more important in political competition, strong positions gained
value.
This was not only true from a financial standpoint; strong issue positions could
also win votes. We can see this clearly by looking at the development of alternative party
positions on abortion. While abortion might be one of the most intensely ideological
issues in contemporary American politics, archival documents collected at the
presidential libraries of Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan show that the Republican
Party’s decision to take a strong pro-life position in opposition to their opponent’s was
not motivated by ideology. In other words, it is not that members of the Republican
Party suddenly became more conservative on social issues. Rather, this was a strategic
choice, meant to boost the party’s competitive position. Abortion was deliberately used
as a purposive incentive to attract new voters to the party.
While abortion politics were very salient following the Supreme Court’s 1973
landmark decision in Roe v. Wade, the Republican Party’s position on abortion was not
yet clear.11 Even the President and the First Lady were not completely in sync, as she
11Memo; Ray Waldmann to Mike Duval; 24 June 1976; folder Democratic Party Platform [3]; Box 26;
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was generally more supportive than he of Roe v. Wade. Drafting the 1976 platform, party
leaders tried to figure out what position would be most advantageous over the short-
and long-term. Many people did a lot of research in this area, reflecting the party’s
inchoate position at this time.
Interoffice memoranda demonstrate clearly that Ford did not want to involve
himself in abortion politics. The issue was not very important to him, and he was
reluctant to take a strong position on such a controversial topic. When he did express a
position on abortion, it was generally moderate.12 While the administration wanted to
open communication with Catholic leaders, they did not want to focus on abortion, nor
did they want the press to emphasize this issue when reporting coverage of meetings
with Catholic leaders.13 Understanding the issue’s sensitivity, even the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops (NCCB) criticized the media’s over-coverage of abortion,
directing their attention to other issues of importance to the NCCB, like international
food security, refugees, and nonpublic education.14 Though they strongly opposed
Michael Raoul-Duval Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
12Memo; Ken Cole to President Ford; 6 September 1974; folder Abortion [2]; Box 1; Theodore Marrs Files;
Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Article; “Catholics Hold Talk With Ford”; 19 June 1975; folder
National Conference of Catholic Bishops [3]; Box 50; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann
Arbor, MI.
13Letter; James L. Robinson to Theodore C. Marrs; 10 July 1975; folder National Conference of Catholic
Bishops [2]; Box 50; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
14Letter; Reverand James S. Rausch to Editor of the Washington Star-News; 28 January 1975; folder
1975/06/18—National Conference of Catholic Bishops/U.S. Catholic Conference [2]; Box 64; Theodore
Marrs Files; Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Letter; Reverand James S. Rausch to Editorial Page Editor
of The Washington Post; folder 1975/06/18—National Conference of Catholic Bishops/U.S. Catholic Con-
ference [2]; Box 64; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Letter; James L. Robinson
to Theodore Marrs; 29 January 1975; folder 1975/06/18—National Conference of Catholic Bishops/U.S.
Catholic Conference [2]; Box 64; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Press re-
lease; “Bishops Discuss Issues with President at White House Meeting”; folder Religious Groups; Box 25;
Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Letter; James L. Robinson to Theodore Marrs,
enclosing editorial, “The Wronging of Bishop Rausch,” The Washington Post; 13 February 1975; folder United
States Catholic Conference; Box 55; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
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abortion, they also cared deeply about other issues.
Still, many party members saw strategic advantages in taking a position against
abortion. Noting Catholic Bishops’ dissatisfaction with the Democratic platform’s
support for abortion, Republicans thought taking a different stance could “give us a real
opportunity to exploit the Democrats’ weakness on this issue.”15 Special Counsel to the
President Michael Raoul Duval assured Ford that “the proposed Republican Platform
will help us defeat the Carter-Mondale ticket by drawing clear distinctions between our
principles and programs and theirs.”16 Abortion was an important part of this strategy,
as party advisor Henry Cashen told Raoul Duval that “even a modestly anti-abortion
position [by Ford] could win millions of votes.”17
These party elites saw an opportunity to bring traditionally Democratic northern
urban Catholics into the Republican Party. These voters were a “soft spot in Carter’s
support.”18 This kind of stance would appeal to Catholics in the electorate directly, and
also help to reach them indirectly through their leaders. Reemphasizing the value of
communication, Cashen reminds Raoul Duval that the Catholic hierarchy is opposed to
abortion and “they set the policy which is directed for sermons to the various dioceses
throughout the United States.”19 Ultimately, they did not take a stance against abortion
15Letter; Thomas Patrick Melady to William J. Baroody, Jr.; folder Republican Party Platform: Catholic
Issues; Box 27; Michael Raoul-Duval Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
16Notes; Meeting with Selected Members of Executive Committee of the Committee on Resolutions (Plat-
form); 15 August 1976; folder Republican Platform—1976: Platform Committee Negotiations [2]; Box 23;
Michael Raoul-Duval Papers; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
17Letter; Henry C. Cashen II to Michael Duval; 14 July 1976; folder Republican Party Platform: Catholic
Issues; Box 27; Michael Raoul-Duval Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
18Letter; Thomas Patrick Melady to William Baroody, enclosing memo to Dr. Myron B. Kuropas; 25 June
1976; folder Republican Party Platform: Issue Papers [1]; Box 28; Michael Raoul-Duval Files; Gerald R. Ford
Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
19Letter from Cashen to Duval, 14 July 1976.
CHAPTER 4. PARTY NATIONALIZATION AND POLARIZATION 128
because they became more ideologically extreme, but because they saw an opportunity
to gain support for the party.
The Reagan administration agreed with this assessment, believing it was
important to have clear differences between the parties on issues. Though members of
the religious right were focusing their energies on Republican candidates by this time,
they were more likely to become deeply involved in elections when candidates took
different positions on abortion. A post-campaign memo notes, “We believe that pro-life
campaign projects provided the winning increment in at least six 1980 Senate races in
which pro-life Republicans faced pro-abortion Democrats.”20 This logic extended to
special interests in the electorate. Abortion had the potential to bring Democratic
identifiers across party lines, but this would only work if the parties took different
positions on the issue.21
In sum, the incentives underlying politics changed substantially after the New
Deal. As material incentives declined, the importance of purposive incentives rose. As
we can see from looking at the Republican Party’s orientation toward abortion, by the
1980s, elite members of the party in government are self-consciously using purposive
incentives to bolster the party’s competitive position. In a system of patronage, this
would be much less likely. However, incentives alone cannot cause widespread
polarization on issues. In addition to wanting to take positions, the parties need the
ability to develop coherent policy programs. To this, we now turn.
20Memo; To Robert J. Thompson; 11 July 1982; folder Pro-Life II [5]; Box OA9081 (13); Morton Blackwell
Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
21Memo; Gary J. Bauer to Edwin L. Harper; 18 June 1982; folder Pro-Life—Continued—#2 [7]; Box
OA9081, 9082 (14); Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Memo; Gary L. Bauer
to Edwin L. Harper; 18 May 1982; folder Pro-Life—Continued—#2 [7]; Box OA9081, 9082 (14); Morton
Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Memo to Thompson, 11 July 1982.
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4.5.2 Programmatic Capacity
Since members will not always agree on issues, parties must have mechanisms for
managing internal conflict in order to take positions. Stronger party infrastructure was
essential for the development of clear issue programs, according to major scholars of
parties, like E.E. Schattschneider and Charles Merriam. The latter, writing in 1921,
lamented that “on the side of organization for the consideration of party policies and
party techniques [the party] is singularly defective.”22 Party leaders lacked, among other
things, “the interchange of ideas regarding national or party politics.”23 APSA argued
that the parties also needed greater research capabilities in order to move away from
what they deemed a troubling degree of programmatic similarity between parties.
In a comprehensive history of American parties’ responses to defeat in
presidential elections from 1956 to 1993, Klinkner (1994) explains how both parties
increased their programmatic capacity over this period. I will review a few of the
institutions he discusses, and how they contributed to the development of party policy.
Importantly, it seems quite unlikely that Schattschneider’s “ghost parties” could have
supported this kind of activity.
The Democratic Party. Paul Butler, DNC chairman from 1954 to 1960, took the APSA
report very seriously, and endeavored to increase the party’s attention to policy
positions. His “initial effort to locate policy development within the DNC” arose in 1955,
with the establishment of the Democratic Advisory Committee on Agriculture (Klinkner
1994: 20-1). The next year, he added three more committees for labor, small business,
and natural resources. The most important fruit of this effort to increase the national
22APSA Report: 40, citing Merriam 1921, Merriam and Gosnell 1949.
23APSA Report: 40, citing Merriam 1921, Merriam and Gosnell 1949.
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committee’s responsibility for policy came after the 1956 election, with the creation of
the Democratic Advisory Council (DAC) “to coordinate and advance efforts in behalf of
Democratic programs and principles.”24 This was novel, as Klinkner notes, “Though the
party conventions have always played an important role in drafting party platforms, the
national party organizations, whether in or out of power, have made little effort and
have had even less success in developing party policy” (Klinkner 1994: 12). Instead, the
party committees were typically focused on securing patronage for state parties
(Klinkner 1994: 13). Policy development normally happened in the White House for the
presidential in-party, and in Congress for the presidential out-party.
Butler asked twenty people to join the DAC. Interestingly, though not surprisingly,
almost none of the invitees had machine ties. Four had already achieved national-level
prominence (Harry Truman, Eleanor Roosevelt, and presidential candidates Adlai
Stevenson and Averell Harriman). Of the 15 members of Congress invited, all but one
(Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee chairman Michael Kirwan)
represented states or districts in states with low TPO scores (either 1 or 2). The final
invitee was Saint Louis mayor Raymond Tucker. While this certainly does not prove that
patronage depresses issue politics, it is worth noting that 18 of the 20 people asked to
join the DNC’s first major policy initiative were not associated with machine politics,
and one of the two remaining invitees held a leadership position in the national party.
The DAC was controversial—not everyone who was invited agreed to join. Some
were concerned that Republicans, whose votes were necessary to pass bills in a Congress
with low party discipline, would be reluctant to support policies originating in a DNC
body (Klinkner 1994: 23). Others worried about upsetting members of Congress, whose
authority could be undermined by an external policy body like the DAC. This was a
24Quoted in Klinkner 1994: 22.
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major reason why Congressional leaders declined participation. Despite these qualms,
the Council held its first meeting on January 4, 1957. The DNC stressed the importance
of a year-round operation, stating in a resolution, “The recent election proves the virtual
impossibility to have party policy formulated and generally accepted in the brief period
from the opening of the Democratic National Convention to the General Election. We
can win in 1960 only if we begin now to hammer out a forceful, coherent policy and to
keep communicating it to the public.”25 By May 1957, they established eight committees
for different issue areas: foreign policy, economic policy, civil rights, urban and suburban
policy, labor, farm policy, health policy, Social Security, natural resources, and science
and technology (Klinker 1994: 25). In its last year of operation, the DAC’s budget of
$123,400 represented 15% of the DNC’s total budget (Klinkner 1994: 26). James
Sundquist described the Council as part of an “activist triangle,” along with the two
chambers of Congress.26
While opposition from Republican President Dwight Eisenhower and
conservative Democrats in Congress squelched many of the DAC’s policy proposals, it
still contributed greatly to the party’s legislative program. Klinkner (1994) notes,
“Despite the lack of short-term success, the DAC did help to make many of these
proposals a part of the Democratic agenda and to help ensure their passage during the
New Frontier-Great Society Era” (Klinkner 1994: 38). There were some important
shorter-term triumphs too. For example, the Democratic Advisory Committee on
Agriculture’s proposed policy on raising farm price supports was included in the party’s
1956 platform. The Council also provided a forum for discussion of economic policy, a
site of considerable intra-party disagreement (Klinkner 1994: 29-33). Perhaps most
25Quoted in Klinkner 1994: 25.
26Sundquist 1968: 411, cited by Klinkner 1994: 38.
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notably, the DAC played an important role in the development of the party’s more
aggressive and liberal stance on civil rights. The Council spoke out during the Little
Rock school crisis in 1957, earning significant media attention for criticizing
Eisenhower’s response. This kind of action was notable, as DNC press secretary Samuel
Brightman remarked: “At the time of the Little Rock school crisis, there was nobody in
Congress who was getting any headlines or anybody saying that the Democratic Party
was in favor of integration, which was going to be pretty important in the ’58 election,
until the Democratic Advisory Council put out a statement” (Klinkner 1994: 36-7). This
was not the end of the story, however; the Council’s actions and influence extended
beyond the immediate crisis. Klinkner argues, “Later statements by the council also
helped to move the party away from moderation on racial issues. Though the 1960
Democratic platform, as James Sundquist points out, went further on civil rights than
the DAC had advocated, the council still played an important role in making such a
stand acceptable, even required, by the party. It therefore seems accurate to agree with
one historian’s assessment that the civil rights plank of 1960 ‘was a remarkable tribute to
the DAC’ ” (Klinkner 1994: 37).
Klinkner argues that the DAC was possible because the presidential and
congressional wings of the party lined up with the party’s ideological schism, with
liberals controlling the DNC and conservatives in Congressional leadership positions.
These factions supported different party strategies following Eisenhower’s re-election in
1956, so it might have been more difficult for the DNC to take a strong lead on issue
politics if they had to accommodate both factions. While this may be true, it is also
important to note that a group like the DAC requires a degree of organizational maturity
that was not present earlier in the 20th century. A national committee without a
permanent headquarters or staff could not have support this type of council. And an ad
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hoc group of party members who got together once or twice a year would have difficulty
asserting the kind of influence that the DAC did.
The Republican Party. The RNC’s policy program-building efforts began a bit later
than the DNC’s. The Republican Coordinating Committee (RCC) was established in
1965, following a landslide defeat of the party’s prickly presidential aspirant, Barry
Goldwater. Over the previous few years, Goldwater’s supporters had largely taken
control of the RNC, to the distress of more moderate Republicans. Led by the chairman
of the RNC, a group of Republican governors, other party leaders, and RNC members
hoped to bring the party back toward the center. Its initial statement of purpose read:
“The Republican Coordinating Committee was created (1) to broaden the advisory base
on national party policy; (2) to set up task forces to study and make recommendations
for dealing with the problems that confront the people of our nation; and (3) to stimulate
communication among members of the party and others in developing a common
approach to the nation’s problems” (quoted in Klinkner 1994: 84). To this end, the RCC
established a number of task forces on different issues, ranging from foreign relations to
fiscal and monetary policy to senior citizens. This was quite novel for the RNC, which
had been focusing primarily on purely organizational developments.
The RCC differed from the DAC in a few key ways. First, congressional
leadership played a meaningful role in the RCC. This was not the case for the DAC,
which represented the liberal wing of the party, and typically opposed the more
conservative congressional wing. More broadly, Klinkner notes that the RCC “strove to
achieve unity within the party rather than to advance the programmatic goals of one
faction of the party” (Klinkner 1994: 85). Consequently, the RCC was not as “hard
hitting” or provocative (Klinkner 1994: 85).
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Despite this, and the fact that it only lasted until 1968, the RCC contributed
significantly to the formation of party policy. Klinkner argues, “The RCC . . . provided an
internal forum for discussion between party factions and thereby helped to unify a badly
divided party” (Klinkner 1994: 85). Its research efforts were also valuable, as it
“produced a steady flow of reports and statements spelling out constructive, if not
exciting, Republican positions on issues and criticisms of the Johnson administration”
(Klinkner 1994: 85). During this time, the RNC also bolstered its own research division,
producing 116 major reports on various topics between 1965 and 1968—over 100 more
than the number produced over the previous three years (Klinkner 1994: 85-86).
Chairman Bill Brock resumed and intensified these kinds of efforts during the
Ford administration through the Republican Advisory Councils (RACs). Ford, a “key
architect” of the RCC, wanted a new iteration of that organization (Klinkner 1994: 147).
He was not alone—others in the party also thought it was time for the RNC to take a
more active role in policy development. Klinkner reports, “According to Roger Semerad,
an associate of Brock’s who later became director of the RNC’s policy councils, both he
and Brock discussed the need for a ‘serious and substantive vehicle’ for policy
discussion within the party. Such a policy group would bring various points of view into
a ‘common working environment’ with the intention of providing the party with a
coherent policy statement for the 1980 campaign” (Klinkner 1994: 148). They began by
establishing advisory councils for five issue areas in 1977 with a total budget of $100,000,
a small staff, and four hundred members.
As planned, these meetings had major consequences for party policy. Many
members of the RACs also served on the 1980 platform committee, most notably Roger
Semerad, who was director of the former and executive director of the latter. The
council’s contributions were not simply rhetorical, however; they also extended into the
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policymaking process. The concept of “supply-side economics,” perhaps Ronald
Reagan’s most notable legacy, was introduced to a broad range of party members
through the Advisory Council on Economic Affairs. Through interviews and archival
research, Klinkner finds that supply-side economics was “perhaps the most important
idea to gain acceptance in the Republican Party through the advisory councils”
(Klinkner 1994: 149).
Like the DAC, the RCC and RACs were products of stronger party infrastructure.
It would have been very difficult for a non-continuous party organization to support
these kinds of long-term efforts at issue development. They needed money, staff, and
other resources that the paltry national organizations of the early twentieth century
could not have provided. The history of these councils also shows that major issue
positions do not simply appear—they require work and compromise, which a strong
national party organization can facilitate.
4.6 Conclusion
The nationalization of the party system since the New Deal has had major
consequences for political competition, specifically the status of issue politics. This has,
in turn, given the parties both the desire and capacity to develop alternative issue
programs. In sum, as Schattschneider argued, it appears that decentralized,
patronage-driven parties were in fact depressing issue competition. Once this began to
change, the parties slowly moved away from “issueless” politics. What Schattschneider
did not anticipate, however, was the degree to which activists aided this process of
national party-building. This is the subject of my final empirical chapter.
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Party Organization Founded Members
D National Democratic Club 1834 1,200
D Democratic National Committee 1848 390
R Republican National Committee 1856 165
R National Republican Congressional Committee 1866 50
D Democratic Congressional Campaign Commit-
tee
1882 51
R College Republican National Committee 1892 100,000
D Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee 1916 0
R National Republican Senatorial Committee 1916
R Women’s National Republican Club 1921 900
D Women’s National Democratic Club 1922 1,500
R Young Republican National Federation 1931 50,000
D College Democrats of America 1932 80,000
D Young Democrats of America 1932 100,000
D Young Democratic Clubs of America 1932 60,000
R National Federation of Republican Women 1938 115,000
R Bull Elephants 1951 200
R National Republican Club 1951 4,000
D Democratic Study Group 1959
R Ripon Society 1962 10,000
R House Wednesday Group 1963 39
D Democrats Abroad 1964
R National Teen Age Republican Headquarters 1965 100,000
R National Republican Heritage Groups (Nation-
alities) Council
1968 60
Table 4.2: List of National Party-Related Organizations (Part 1). This table lists party-
related organizations in order of their founding. The far right-hand column shows each
organization’s membership as of 1997. Source: data from the Encyclopedia of Associations,
1997
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Party Organization Founded Members
D Association of State Democratic Chairs 1969 114
D National Federation of Democratic Women 1972 300,000
R National Black Republican Council 1972 25,000
R National Congressional Club 1972 200,000
R Republican Presidential Task Force 1974 7,000
R New Leadership Fund 1976
R Republicans Abroad International 1977 1,000,000
R Log Cabin Republicans 1978 10,000
D Conservative Democratic Forum 1980 55
R Republican Congressional Leadership Council 1980 300
R Republicans Abroad 1980
D Business Leadership Forum 1981 850
D Fund for a Democratic Majority 1981 200,000
D New Democratic Dimensions 1981 2,000
D American Democratic Political Action Commit-
tee
1982
R National Federation of Cuban American Repub-
lican Women
1982 350
D National Rainbow Coalition 1984 13,000
R Republican Mainstream Committee 1984
D Democratic Leadership Council 1985 400
R National Jewish Coalition 1985 5,000
D Presidential and Democratic Party Victory Fund 1987
R Republican Liberty Caucus 1987 600
D Arab American Leadership Council 1989 250
Table 4.3: List of National Party-Related Organizations (Part 2). This table lists party-
related organizations in order of their founding. The far right-hand column shows each
organization’s membership as of 1997. Source: data from the Encyclopedia of Associations,
1997
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Changes in electoral competition will not necessarily affect both parties equally. In
the mid to late twentieth century, the parties were in very different competitive
positions. While there were several Republican presidents over this period, the party
struggled in Congressional elections. As Galvin (2010) has demonstrated, even
Republican presidents—electorally victorious in their own right—viewed their party as
the minority party in the mid to late twentieth century. This motivated Republican
presidents to use the stature and resources of their position to bolster their party’s
infrastructure and, consequently, its long-term competitiveness, while Democrats
ignored (and sometimes “preyed” upon) their party until Bill Clinton’s second term,
when Republicans gained control of Congress (Galvin 2010). In this chapter, I build on
Galvin’s narrative by showing groups’ utility in the party-building process. Despite
Schattschneider’s concerns that groups would feed on party weaknesses, I find they
were instrumental in Republican party-building, and, by extension, the development of
a more competitive two-party system.
To show how and why group-party relations evolved, this chapter examines the
party in government’s orientation toward groups from the Nixon administration
through the Reagan administration. I begin with Nixon because group-party relations in
government began to change during his tenure. This essentially amounts to a history of
the Office of Public Liaison, an executive institution established formally in 1974 to
manage relationships with groups. I consult archival documents gathered at the
Presidential libraries of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan
to gain insight into what parties were hoping to gain by drawing on groups, what they
feared, and what benefits they ultimately received.
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Evaluating differences between parties is tricky, since Jimmy Carter is the only
Democratic president to serve during this period.1 Nevertheless, we can see that
group-party relations looked quite different—specifically, more pluralistic—under
Carter than under his Republican counterparts. While the Carter administration was
primarily interested in using groups to build coalitions around specific pieces of
legislation, Republican administrations endeavored to build a broad new coalition to
compete with the long-dominant New Deal Democrats. In this pursuit, movement away
from pluralistic relations carried significant efficiency benefits.
Strategic concerns about electoral competitiveness—not ideology—drove these
changes in group-party relations. Of course, the increase in special interest partisanship
resulting from the evolution of group-party relations may have ideological
consequences. It may have resulted in more divergent party platforms, and attracted
more ideological extremists to party politics. Yet, the origins of these changes were
distinctly non-ideological. Changes in special interest partisanship, I argue, were
reasoned adaptations to an evolving electoral environment.
They were also driven largely by agents within the parties, not activists. This
chapter shows members of the party in government, sometimes in conjunction with the
party as organization, making self-conscious choices to change their relationship with
groups in order to increase efficiency and bolster electoral competitiveness. While it
might be too much to say that parties drove the growth of special interest partisanship
unilaterally, they were, at the very least, active participants in this process.
Polarization—like other changes in special interest partisanship—did not happen to
parties. This was, I argue, an endogenous transformation of the American party system.
1I visited the Clinton Presidential Library, but was not able to collect many materials because very little
has been processed for research so far.
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5.1 The Nixon Administration, 1969-1974
The Nixon administration represents a transitional period for the relationship
between groups and parties in government, which Pika notes “had been
unsystematically scattered among staff members during the presidencies of Franklin D.
Roosevelt through Lyndon B. Johnson” (Pika 2008: 2). Until the Nixon administration,
“staff members assumed liaison responsibilities as the White House figured out who
might have enough personal knowledge to deal with issues as they arose” (Pika 2008: 3).
White House aide Bryce Harlow suggested formalizing group-party relations in the later
years of the Eisenhower administration, but it was not until he served as an assistant for
legislative affairs and counselor to Richard Nixon that his advice led to action. Gerald
Ford, then-minority leader, also recommended establishing an office in charge of group
liaison (Pika 2008).
While Nixon did not establish a formal, dedicated office, he agreed to intensify
White House interaction with groups. He granted most of this responsibility to Charles
Colson, a boisterous and controversial Special Counsel to the President who would later
serve a prison sentence for his role in the Watergate scandal. Though more significant
than preceding liaison, Colson’s operation was still relatively small and informal. He
had a staff of ten to twelve assistants, but the operation was much more of a one-man
show than its successors. Moreover, group liaison was not Colson’s only
responsibility—he was also involved with the Committee to Re-elect the President, and
performed many miscellaneous tasks for Nixon.2 Still, Colson’s operation represented a
significant centralization of group liaison, which mirrored proposed changes in the
2Charles Colson, Video Oral History Interview, 17 August 2007, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and
Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
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Republican National Committee.3
In a November 1969 memo to Nixon’s Chief of Staff, H.R. Haldeman, Colson
describes the proposed purpose of his new project. The starting mission was “to
understand, organize and draw upon the resources of the domestic political substructure
and to further the President’s objectives and policies through direct contact and
interchange with specific groups of all kinds.”4 A “primary function” of his office would
be to “identify and record information about all major domestic groups and
organizations which have specific definable concerns.” In particular, he wanted to
catalogue their “aims and policies,” their “political strengths and resources,” and their
relationship with executive agencies and previous administrations. The fact that this
was a primary function illustrates just how little they knew about the group universe at
this time. His office would also keep track of how the Nixon administration was faring
with respect to these groups.
In addition to gathering information, Colson also planned to build relationships
with groups. This process would begin with “develop[ing] contacts and ‘friends’ in
various special interest groups.” Acting as a “sounding board” for their concerns would
help the White House anticipate problems, and involving them in policy discussions
would make them feel included even if they did not actually affect the decision-making
process. These relationships could then become “resources” that the White House could
“activate” (an earlier handwritten draft uses the term “exploit”) “in support of the
3Memo; Jeb S. Magruder to the Attorney General and H.R. Haldeman; 21 January 1971; folder Repub-
lican National Committee [7 of 10]; Box 25; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection: Jeb
Stuart Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
4Memo; C.W. Colson to H.R. Haldeman; 6 November 1969; folder HRH Memos 1969-1970 (complete) [2
of 3]; Box 1; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson; Richard Nixon
Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
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President’s positions.”5 This was not a reaction to pressure from groups; it was, as
Colson summarized in a 2007 oral history, a proactive effort “to mobilize constituencies
around the country—all kinds, every kind—in order to build public support for the
President’s policies.”6
Some parts of Colson’s plan developed as designed. A March 3, 1970 memo from
Colson and Ken Cole, Director of the White House Domestic Council, to H.R. Haldeman
and John Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, notes, “We have
taken great pains in the last few months to establish an organization through which the
President could achieve better coordination and faster action on domestic issues.”7 Over
the course of Nixon’s first term, however, they focused more on electoral coalition
building than legislative coalition building. As we will see, this is not true of some of his
successors. The Ford and Carter administrations, for example, dedicated a lot of time
and resources to building support for the President’s policy agenda.
This is not especially surprising, as the late 1960s and early 1970s represented a
time of great electoral change in American politics. Following the civil rights struggles
and victories of the fifties and sixties, the South transitioned from a one-party
Democratic stronghold to a two-party region of Republican dominance. Moreover,
African-Americans were included in elections in a meaningful sense for the first time in
history, women were emerging as a more unified, independent voting bloc whose
partisan position was not yet clear, and traditionally Democratic white Irish-, Polish- and
5Handwritten notes; folder HRH Memos 1969-1970 (complete) [1 of 3]; Box 1; White House Special Files:
Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba
Linda, CA.
6Video Oral History Interview with Charles Colson, 17 August 2007.
7Memo; Ken Cole and Chuck Colson to Bob Haldeman and John Ehrlichman; 6 March 1970; folder HRH
Memos 1969-1970 (complete) [1 of 3]; Box 1; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files:
Charles W. Colson; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
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Italian-Americans appeared to be reconsidering their partisan loyalties. As traditional
party bases loosened, the Nixon administration endeavored to figure out what a 1972
winning coalition—and a longer-term Republican coalition—might look like.
While they communicated with organized groups to some degree, they also
worked to build relationships with special interests in the electorate themselves. They
wanted to appeal to specific voting blocs, but worried about depending too much on
organized groups whose reliability they questioned. A good example of this strategy
was the “voter blocs” effort, a joint project of the White House and the Committee to
Re-elect the President leading up to the 1972 election.8 The Committee believed they
could win a potentially tight election by “focusing attention on important blocs with
common characteristics.” At the national level, the Committee identified nine groups to
which they could make “specific appeals,” and planned “a concerted effort . . . to appeal
to individuals on the basis of their membership in the group.” Each group had its own
Washington-based staff to “represent the interests of their constituency in overall
campaign strategy.” The director of each constituency staff team would also “represent
the campaign’s interests with White House and Executive Branch units that affect his
constituency.” CRP encouraged State Chairmen to adopt similar efforts “to generate
volunteers for . . . the fundamental campaign activities of registration, voter
identification, and get-out-the-vote.”
The Women’s Surrogate Program is another example.9 Eight teams of three
8Draft presentation with notes; Notes on Voter Blocs and Voter Bloc Presentation; folder Voter Bloc Pre-
sentation; Box 30; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Frederic Malek Papers;
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
9This program was implemented. Memo; Barbara Franklin to Clark MacGregor through Fred Malek
and Jeb Magruder; 12 October 1972; folder Women’s Surrogate Program [2]; Box 28; Committee for the Re-
Election of the President Collection: Jeb Stuart Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and
Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
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women—generally wives of White House staffers, Cabinet members, Governors,
Senators or Congressmen—would travel to key states to “persuade women to vote for
Richard Nixon” and “demonstrate the visible, active involvement of women in the
Nixon Administration and campaign.”10 Organized groups were not involved with this
plan; as in the “voter blocs” effort, the party in government was attempting to
communicate directly with women in the electorate.
This strategy had limitations, however. Despite their reservations about group
liaison, the administration valued organizations’ publicity capabilities. Parties in
government need to advertise themselves, their positions, and their accomplishments. A
March 1971 RNC memo notes, “Since we cannot depend upon the news media to convey
our story accurately and fully, we must communicate with the voters in a variety of
ways, including direct mail; television, radio and newspaper advertising; speakers; and
the like.”11 Groups could assist these efforts by sharing some of the costs and offering
access to their networks, which were often larger than the party’s.
Cost was a significant issue for Republicans during Nixon’s first term, as the RNC
found itself in “serious financial difficulty” leading up to the 1972 election.12 In
December 1971, Jeb Magruder of CRP reported to the Attorney General that, “After the
1968 Campaign, the Finance Chairman announced that the campaign was financially
10Memo; Barbara Franklin to The Honorable Clark MacGregor through Jeb Magruder and Fred Malek; 18
August 1972; folder Women Surrogate Program (PP) [1 of 2]; Box 28; Committee for the Re-Election of the
President Collection (CRP): Jeb Stuart Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum,
Yorba Linda, CA. Draft proposal; Proposal for Women’s Surrogate Program; 18 August 1972; folder Women
Surrogate Program (PP) [1 of 2]; Box 28; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP):
Jeb Stuart Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
11Memo; Thomas B. Evans, Jr. to Jeb S. Magruder; 17 March 1971; folder JSM Republican National Com-
mittee [5 of 10]; Box 25; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Jeb Stuart Ma-
gruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
12Memo; Jeb S. Magruder to the Attorney General; 16 December 1971; folder JSM Republican National
Committee [1 of 10]; Box 24; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Jeb Stuart
Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
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solvent. However, what he thought to be a handsome surplus, turned out to be a large
deficit which we are still trying to liquidate.”13 They sold the RNC airplane, reduced
their staff, froze salaries of all employees making over $10,000, and postponed payment
on many bills as they paid off debt accumulated in the 1968 and 1970 campaign cycles.14
By the end of 1971, their debt was expected to reach $2.4 million, and $1.2 million of
their $6.9 million budget for that year was earmarked for debt payment.15 Though the
situation improved significantly by the end of 1972, it was still a period of significant
cost consciousness.
Because communication expenditures were “the major cost item in the [RNC]
budget,” a November 1971 memo argued they needed to “develop some controlls [sic]
and budgetary objectives in this area.”16 A line item budget for June 1971 shows their
monthly postage expenses ($43,000) were more than their rent ($18,000), airline ($4,000),
employee benefits ($5,700) and professional fees ($7,770) expenses combined—second
only to salaries ($166,000) as their highest single expense.17 Overall, 19% of the 1971
RNC budget was slated for communications, and $193,000 of the $983,404 budgeted for
Nixon’s re-election was allocated for television, radio and promotional video.18 The
13Memo; Barry Mountain to Tom Evans; 10 June 1971; folder JSM Republican National Committee [4 of
10]; Box 24; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Jeb Stuart Magruder Papers;
Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
14Memo from Mountain to Evans, 10 June 1971.
15Memo; Jeb S. Magruder to Attorney General; 22 June 1971; folder JSM Republican National Committee
[6 of 10]; Box 25; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Jeb Stuart Magruder
Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA. Memo from Mountain to Evans,
10 June 1971.
16Memo; Jon M. Huntsman to Gordon Strachan; 19 November 1971; folder JSM Republican National
Committee [3 of 10]; Box 24; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Jeb Stuart
Magruder Papers; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
17Memo from Mountain to Evans, 10 June 1971.
18Memo from Mountain to Evans, 10 June 1971.
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communications division of the RNC was responsible for direct mailing (both the
mailing itself and the maintenance of distribution lists) as well as RNC publications like
its weekly Monday, monthly First Monday, and miscellaneous promotional materials. The
communications division was also responsible for “develop[ing] new programs to bring
members of American ethnic and minority groups and senior citizens into the
Republican party” and “advis[ing] Chairman Dole on the interests and problems of
American ethnics, senior citizens, blacks, agriculture and labor.”19 These duties
overlapped Colson’s, and there was frequent communication—if not always
cooperation—between the two offices.
Building relationships with groups could help them control costs in this area.
Taking out a single page ad in three Catholic newspapers in New Jersey with a combined
circulation of 173,700 was estimated in March 1972 to cost $2,590.20 If the President met
with Catholic leaders, however, Catholic newspapers across the country would cover the
meeting for free. In scheduling such meetings, Colson’s office made sure to “be alert to
groups the President can receive, who have the will to publicize their reception.”21
In addition to sharing costs, groups could also offer access to their networks, some
of which were larger than the party’s. While the RNC’s weekly publication, Monday,
went out to 45,000 people, the National Council of Senior Citizens’ publication, Senior
Citizen News, boasted a circulation over 2.5 million people.22 Modern Maturity, a
19Memo from Mountain to Evans, 10 June 1971.
20Budget Recommendations to Nelson Gross for the Catholic Campaign; folder Citizens—Catholic Vote
[1 of 2]; Box 27; Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Frederic Malek Papers:
Series III: Citizen Groups; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
21Memo; George T. Bell to Charles W. Colson; 19 January 1972; folder Aging; Box 29; White House Special
Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson: Subject Files; Richard Nixon Presidential Library
and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
22Memo from Mountain to Evans, 10 June 1971. Memo; L.J. Evans, Jr. to Chuck Colson; 28 February 1972;
folder Aging; Box 29; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson: Subject
CHAPTER 5. PARTY-BUILDING THROUGH GROUPS 148
magazine published jointly by the American Association of Retired People (AARP) and
the National Retired Teachers Association (NRTA), circulated to 1.8 million people.23
Another source puts AARP’s publication circulation at 3.5 million.24 Even these were
modest compared to the Catholic press, which was estimated to reach 50 million
people.25 These numbers were extraordinary not only in comparison to Monday’s
circulation, but also the RNC financial base. In 1977, for example, the RNC had
approximately 300,000 contributors—a significant achievement, but still a small network
in comparison to those available to other groups (Klinkner 1994: 139).
The nature of groups’ reach also had value. A goal of the 1972 campaign was to
make communication with the electorate more selective—a “rifle shot approach” as
opposed to a “shotgun approach.”26 While the RNC was developing its own ability to
do this, special interest publications allowed the party to communicate easily with
specific parts of the electorate at little to no cost. They provided, in many ways, a major
shortcut for party-building.
Knowing their value, group leaders could use their communications capabilities
as currency with the administration. For example, in exchange for a public statement
supporting a social security increase and “urging the states not to ignore the very real
Files; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
23Letter; Cyril F. Brickfield to Charles W. Colson; 23 January 1970; folder American Association of Retired
Persons/National Retired Teachers Association; Box 31; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office
Files: Charles W. Colson; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
24Memo; L.J. Evans, Jr. to Fred Malek; 24 May 1972; folder Citizens—Older Americans [6 of 8] II; Box 33;
Committee for the Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Frederic Malek Papers: Series III: Citizen
Groups; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
25Handwritten Notes; 17 March 1972; folder Citizens—Catholic Vote [1 of 2]; Box 27; Committee for the
Re-Election of the President Collection (CRP): Frederic Malek Papers: Series III: Citizens Groups; Richard
Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
26Memo from Evans to Magruder, 17 March 1971.
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problems just because Congress did,” National League of Senior Citizens leader Bill
Forst promised to “give the positive aspects of the President’s ‘aging program’ front
page coverage from now until the election, include special articles which various
departments write concerning their programs benefiting the elderly,” and put a picture
of himself with the President on the front page of the League’s publication, which had a
circulation of 150,000. This offer was especially significant for Nixon, since the group
was traditionally “Democratically-oriented.”27
Communication was not groups’ only value. They contributed information to the
party in government as well. For example, the National Women’s Political Caucus
gathered information on candidates (both Democratic and Republican) running in the
1972 elections, and Colson’s operation turned to groups—often grudgingly—for
information on special interests in the electorate. Groups also helped them find people,
particularly women, to appoint for positions within the administration.28
As with communication, they often tried to perform these tasks on their own.
They did not want to rely too much on organizations whose credibility they could not
assure. At Colson’s request, in early 1972, the White House planned to conduct its own
public opinion survey of older Americans. The aim was clear, as an interoffice memo
from Bud Evans, liaison to groups concerned with aging issues, to the Committee to
Re-elect the President’s Deputy Director Fred Malek notes, “Hopefully, this survey will
allow us to get away from relying on what organized older Americans’ organizations
27Memo; L.J. Evans, Jr. to Charles W. Colson; 7 August 1972; folder Aging; Box 29; White House Special
Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson: Subject Files; Richard Nixon Presidential Library
and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
28Memo; George T. Bell to Charles W. Colson; 18 August 1970; folder General Federation of Womens’
Clubs; Box 67; White House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson; Richard Nixon
Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA. Memo; Fred Malek to Chuck Colson; 10 June 1971;
folder [Barbara] Franklin—Memos; Box 29; Barbara Franklin Reference File—Office File; Richard Nixon
Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
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claim to be the opinion of the majority of older Americans, and will allow us to
understand how the silent older people list their priorities. It may be that the results will
agree with what organized groups have represented the opinions of older persons to be;
or they may be substantially different. This has been a point that Colson has constantly
brought up, and is one for which it is time we established an answer.” Handwritten
notes next to this section of the memo remark “good point” and “this is what prompted
Bud and I to push for this poll.”29
Their wariness of organized groups becomes especially apparent in their plans to
create their own membership-based organization for older Americans. A January 1972
memo from Evans to Colson argues, “It is probable, but not absolutely certain, that a
mass membership organization of older persons—properly controlled—should be
created to provide an alternative to persons now joining existing associations.”30 Again
reinforcing the importance of communication, Evans notes “a primary purpose of such a
new organization would be control of comprehensive communications lines with those
who call themselves ‘older Americans.’ ” They also talked about creating other
organizations to help recruit volunteers, build “effective and continuous Republican
communication lines” with older Americans in the electorate, and “develop organized
‘voices’ in the field of aging which will reflect Republican points of view after the
election.” This was not a reaction to pressure from groups, or even older Americans in
the electorate; rather, it was a proactive attempt to build the party.
Even in this effort, however, the Nixon administration recognized that they would
not be able to completely avoid organized groups. Because their “most immediate need
29Memo from Evans to Malek, 24 May 1972.
30Memo; L.J. Evans, Jr. to Chuck Colson; 24 January 1972; folder Aging; Box 29; White House Special
Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson: Subject Files; Richard Nixon Presidential Library
and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
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[was] defensive,” they argued that “use of ‘neutral’ organizations—even when not
totally reliable—should be considered, i.e., AARP, NARFE, others.”31 Though they
hoped to “reestablish” the “Republican orientation” of AARP-NRTA, they were
uncertain about whether or not this would be possible.
Sometimes they employed a mixture of approaches, working through groups and
also attempting to appeal directly to special interests in the electorate. They used this
“dichotomous” approach for labor, with different strategies for leaders and rank-and-file
workers. Convinced that inroads were possible in the labor movement, the Nixon
administration made significant efforts to improve their relationship with labor leaders.
They attended an AFL-CIO convention, included labor on a list of groups receiving
priority from the White House Office of Spokesmen Resources, and maintained frequent
contact with them through Colson’s operation.32 Knowing this would be a difficult,
long-term project, however, they engaged in simultaneous efforts to attract union
members. Plans in this arena ranged from meeting with union members who won
recognition to showing interest in baseball, football, “patriotic rallies” and other “hard
hat type activities” that would help Nixon “[appeal] to them as ‘gutsy, and a hard
worker.’ ”
There were good reasons to believe Republicans could make progress with this
traditionally Democratic constituency. At the rank-and-file level, there were large
overlaps between labor and other special interest groups like Catholics and white
31Memo from Evans to Colson, 24 January 1972.
32Memo; Stephen Bull to H.R. Haldeman via Dwight L. Chapin; 16 December 1971; folder Scheduling
Objectives Quarterly Reports: Presidential Scheduling [1971-72]; Box 4; White House Special Files: Staff
Member and Office Files: Stephen B. Bull; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda,
CA. Memo; Patrick E. O’Donnell to Charles W. Colson; 9 February 1972; folder Peter Flanigan; Box 7; White
House Special Files: Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson: Memoranda File; Richard Nixon
Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
CHAPTER 5. PARTY-BUILDING THROUGH GROUPS 152
immigrants who seemed to be loosening their traditional identification with the
Democratic Party. Democratic machine bosses were “becoming less important,” and
many whites were unhappy about changing race relations, and particularly outraged
over the prospect of busing to facilitate school desegregation.33
Overall, Colson’s work was significant because it centralized liaison for the first
time. The Nixon administration was thinking about the electorate in terms of groups,
which makes sense given the diversification of the electorate during this era. Though
they had reservations about depending too much on organized groups, the
administration did see some value in drawing upon them for help. Colson’s operation,
though relatively small, provided an important building block for the expansion of
group-party relations under Ford. The administration’s discussions also reveal concerns
about incentive alignment and information reliability—two problems that can be
addressed by changes in organizational structure (i.e., expanding the firm). Nixon’s
successor increased the level of structure in group-party relations, moving into the zones
of routinization and cooperation.
5.2 The Ford Administration, 1974-1977
When Gerald Ford assumed the presidency after Nixon’s resignation in 1974, he
institutionalized and widened relations with groups by establishing the Office of Public
Liaison (OPL). William Baroody, who assumed Colson’s duties after his resignation
during the Nixon administration, would direct this new office. Baroody’s appointment
tells us something about the office’s purpose and place in the broader development of
33Memo; Charles Colson to Ken Cole; 17 January 1972; folder Aging; Box 29; White House Special Files:
Staff Member and Office Files: Charles W. Colson: Subject Files; Richard Nixon Presidential Library and
Museum, Yorba Linda, CA.
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conservative infrastructure, as he had strong ties to a prominent conservative think tank,
the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). AEI was one of the initial institutions
established during Republicans’ long-term effort to build conservative intellectual
infrastructure to rival the Brookings Institution and the university system, which they
believed were dominated by Democrats (Phillips-Fein 2009).34 Baroody’s father founded
AEI, and the younger Baroody returned there after his tenure at OPL.
From the outset, Ford’s OPL was more ambitious than Colson’s operation under
Nixon, joining the Congressional Office, the Domestic Council, and the Press Office as
one of the four “Major White House Links to America.” FIGURE 5.1, taken from
background materials on OPL, provides a good image of the office’s intended place and
function. The White House connected to the media through the Press Office, to state and
local governments through the Domestic Council, to Congress through the
Congressional Office, and now to the public through OPL. Certain business sectors
already had regular communication with agencies, and OPL would offer the wider
public similar opportunities. They identified 12,628 major organizations in the United
States, and 1,326 with “special OPL emphasis.” The latter category broke down as
follows: consumer/environmental (243 organizations), Hispanic (163 organizations),
minorities (100 organizations), youth (250 organizations), and women (295
organizations).
Communication between OPL and these organizations occurred in a few different
ways. OPL provided a centralized “point of contact,” serving “as a clearing house for
communication directed to the White House on virtually every conceivable subject.”35
34Article; “White House Link to Outside: Baroody Builds an Empire,” Washington Star; 23 February 1975;
folder Office of Public Liaison [3]; Box 19; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
35Notes; Points to be covered in Cabinet Presentation on Public Liaison Office; undated; folder Public
Liaison Office—General [1]; Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
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Figure 5.1: The Office of Public Liaison’s Purpose. This figure was part of the initial
planning materials for OPL under William Baroody. Source: Miscellaneous Planning Ma-
terials; folder Public Liaison Office—Concepts; Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford
Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
Although this was not a small task—they received approximately 2,500 such contacts
per week—it was not their main focus. Baroody did not want to be an ombudsman.36
Internal correspondence suggests OPL was less concerned with listening and more
concerned with persuading groups to support the president’s programs. Ultimately,
they hoped OPL would “establish for the President and his departments a ‘floating
coalition’ in relationship to his governmental priorities and programs.”37 These benefits
36Interview; An Interview with William J. Baroody, Jr. Assistant to the President; November 1974; folder
Public Liaison Office—General [2]; Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
37Background material on the Office of Public Liaison; undated; folder Public Liaison Office—Concepts;
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could extend to the party as well. Special Counsel to the President Michael Raoul
Duval’s notes for a meeting with Ford and the Republican Platform Committee
encourage the President to “indicate that the people back here will have the capability to
turn on a lobby effort, if necessary, with special interest groups, Cabinet who are back
here, etc.” He proceeds to note, “This is a major resource that we should be prepared to
take advantage of.” This part of Baroody’s operation is similar to Colson’s before and
Carter’s afterward.
Ford’s OPL was much more active than Colson’s operation, however. The office
was not simply reactive—they spent most of their time actively reaching out to groups.38
Communicating with the public through groups provided significant efficiency gains. In
a November 7, 1974 interview, Baroody defended Ford’s group strategy. In a country
with 214 million people, he argued, “a President attempting to use his time and the
resources at his disposal to reach the broadest cross-section . . . it strikes us the best way
is to do it this way: working through the organizations.”39 When asked if working
through groups disadvantaged individuals, Baroody—in Tocquevillian spirit—noted
that most people belong to at least one group. Working through groups provided a
“systematic” way to reach the American people.
This was no easy task, however. To communicate effectively, the office first
needed to know with whom they should be speaking. Part of OPL’s job was to map out
the special interest universe. An early memo to Ford promises that “within a relatively
short time frame, we will be able to identify leaders of any segment of society in any
Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
38Points to be covered in Cabinet Presentation on Public Liaison Office, undated.
39Press Conference of William J. Baroody, Jr.; 7 November 1974; folder Public Liaison Office—General [2];
Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
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Figure 5.2: The Office of Public Liaison’s Functions. This figure, taken from initial plan-
ning materials, illustrates OPL’s proposed functions. Source: Miscellaneous Planning Ma-
terials; folder Public Liaison Office—Concepts; Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford
Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
geographical area of the country within a few hours.”40 They then communicated with
these groups during a series of routine meetings, which took four primary forms:
Tuesday meetings with citizen groups (“Tuesdays at the White House”); Wednesday
meetings with business groups (“Wednesdays at the White House”), White House
Conferences on Domestic and Economic Affairs (“field conferences”), and miscellaneous
meetings like State of the Union briefings. They supplemented these face-to-face
interactions with other communications like mailings and periodic telephone and
written correspondence. FIGURE 5.2 illustrates how they foresaw the value of these
40Memo; William J. Baroody to President Ford; 31 May 1974; folder Office of Public Liaison [1]; Box 19;
Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
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interactions.
“Tuesdays at the White House” were the most frequent, occurring weekly and
lasting for two to three hours with an average of 70 people representing 35 organizations
and 100 government actors representing 25 agencies or divisions at each meeting. These
meetings were geared toward citizen groups, like veterans, minority groups, religious
groups, women’s groups, and volunteer organizations—what they called the “human
resources segment of society.”41 OPL would bring together special interest
representatives and government officials to encourage two-way communication about
various issues like bilingual education, the 1976 defense budget, and housing. As
Baroody noted in his presentation to the Cabinet, “The best decisions are those made
with input and advise [sic] with those most familiar with the subject and those most
affected by the decision that is made. Where strong feeling about a pending decision
exists we feel that it is especially appropriate that the Public Liaison Office become
involved.”42
Gathering a diverse cross-section of groups interested in a particular policy
facilitated not only party-group communications, but also group-group
communications. Baroody believed that encouraging inter-group discussion could help
them manage heterogeneous views. In a November 7, 1974 press conference, he argued
“by putting labor, consumers and environmentalists in the same room talking about
issues, you are also creating better dialogue and understanding among the various
groups about the problems the other groups really face, and hopefully, if that process is
carried on routinely, it is going to maximize the ability of making a major contribution to
41Background material on the Office of Public Liaison; undated. Background material on ‘Tuesday Meet-
ings’; undated; folder Public Liaison Office—General [1]; Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford
Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
42Points to be covered in Cabinet Presentation on Public Liaison Office, undated.
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the public policy process.”43 This makes the government more of a moderator than an
arbitrator, relieving some pressure stemming from increased heterogeneity in the
population and growing societal and economic complexity.
Bi-monthly “Wednesdays at the White House” focused more on business-oriented
groups like labor organizations, food processors, grocery manufacturers, heavy
manufacturers, and business women. These meetings typically lasted for half a day and
included an average of 20 people representing 20 organizations, and 41 government
participants representing 30 agencies or divisions.44 They tried to keep both Tuesday
and Wednesday meetings small to facilitate communication. In contrast to Tuesday
meetings, which focused on specific issues, Wednesday meetings were more general
discussions of groups’ interests. A government representative would usually start the
meeting with a brief presentation on the administration’s position on a particular issue,
and the rest of the time was reserved for discussion.45
Field conferences were held across the country approximately twice a month,
co-sponsored by OPL, regional, state and local organizations. These were different from
Tuesday and Wednesday Meetings at the White House in many ways, beyond their
location outside Washington. While Wednesday meetings focused on particular groups,
and Tuesday meetings focused even more narrowly on particular issues, the White
House Conferences included many different organizations like labor, community,
business, and ethnic groups. The group to government personnel ratio was far larger
than for Tuesday and Wednesday meetings, at around 700:9. These meetings were also
open to the media, which took full advantage of the opportunity—an average of 400
43Press Conference of William J. Baroody, Jr., 7 November 1974.
44Background material on the Office of Public Liaison, undated.
45Press Conference of William J. Baroody, Jr., 7 November 1974.
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media representatives in addition to the White House press corps requested credentials
for each conference.
White House Conferences helped the administration communicate with special
interests at a relatively low cost. Though Baroody’s operation was more formal and
ambitious than Colson’s, it still operated with modest resources. They began with a staff
of only six people, including Baroody and an administrative assistant, and a “very
limited budget.”46 This was not a problem, Baroody argued in an interview, because
groups shared many of their operating costs and did a lot of the work. Field conferences
essentially belonged to these organizational co-sponsors, Baroody explained, “So, in
terms of getting the hotel and putting the meeting itself on and the cost of that kind of
thing, they are absorbed by the organizations.”47
In addition to routine meetings and conferences, OPL also organized interactions
with groups at important times. For example, they would hold briefings before and/or
after major presidential addresses like State of the Union messages. There were also
special meetings to discuss issues, as well as special commissions and public hearings.48
After all meetings, Baroody wrote a detailed report for the administration, offering “an
early-warning system—a key to what people are thinking at the grass roots. This is
valuable in shaping executive actions and decisions and in determining the form and
substance of our legislative proposals.”49 This report would go to the President and his
advisors as well as people in the department or agency relevant to the issue at hand.
Reactions to OPL were mixed. To many, the office signaled a new responsiveness,
46Press Conference of William J. Baroody, Jr., 7 November 1974.
47Press Conference of William J. Baroody, Jr., 7 November 1974.
48Points to be covered in Cabinet Presentation on Public Liaison Office, undated.
49Interview with William Baroody, November 1974.
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or at least a new willingness to listen. The value of transparency was especially high
after the Watergate and Pentagon Papers scandals, and many people lauded what
appeared to be a more open door under Ford.50 Some groups, like Catholic
organizations, were pleased to gain access to the White House that they had not enjoyed
for many years. Others were more skeptical of what The New York Times called a “public
relations campaign that is unsurpassed by any in previous Administrations.”51 Echoing
this sentiment, The New Republic referred to OPL as “Ford’s Image Machine.”52 To these
critics, OPL looked like a shameless attempt by an unelected incumbent to build a base
leading up to the 1976 election. There was at least some truth to this—even Baroody
referred to field conferences as “road shows.”53 Party infrastructure was thin, and
Watergate had severely damaged public trust. Ford had only two years to rehabilitate his
party’s image and build himself a base before the general election. And before getting to
that stage, he would have to face the formidable Ronald Reagan in a primary election.
This gave him even less time; essentially, he needed to build a base immediately. In this
light, it is not surprising that creating OPL was one of his first actions as President.
OPL’s efforts appear to have been politically effective. They built new
relationships with many groups, which brought some political benefits. Polls taken
50See, e.g., Newspaper article; “Ford Tries to Run an ‘Open’ Shop,” The Denver Post; 1 March 1975; folder
Scrapbook Materials [4]; Box 13; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI. Newspaper
article; “Mr. Clean in the White House,” The Miami Herald; 23 February 1975; folder Scrapbook Material [4];
Box 13; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
51Newspaper Article; “Selling of a President: Publicity Expands Under Ford,” The New York Times; 17
March 1975; folder Scrapbook Material [4]; Box 13; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann
Arbor, MI. Newspaper article; “Selling Ford as right for job,” The Houston Post; 18 May 1975; folder Public
Liaison Office—General [4]; Box 10; William Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
52Article; “Ford’s Image Machine,” The New Republic; folder Scrapbook Material [4]; Box 13; William
Baroody Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
53Memo; William J. Baroody, Jr. to President Ford; 31 May 1974; folder Office of Public Liaison [1]; Box
19; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
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before and after field conferences found that support for the administration increased by
five to nine percent. Importantly, these increases did not only come from expected allies.
Baroody notes, “These White House Conferences have been received favorably by not
only our traditional supporters but especially by those who have had a past record of
opposition to the Administration and to its policies. The [sic] have been a very
successful tool in garnering confidence and therefore support.”54
Whether OPL represented a base-building effort, a pure desire to regain people’s
trust in government and the Republican Party after Watergate, or something in between,
it was a proactive attempt to build relations with groups—not a reaction to group
pressure—and the motivation behind it was strategic, not ideological. Though OPL had
many critics, few, if any, alleged that it was a response to pressure from groups. Many
argued, as a New York Times headline did, that “Bill Baroody’s Job is to Sell Ford’s
Policies to Leaders of Special Interest Groups,” not that Ford was acquiescing to
arm-twisting.55 OPL was a party-building institution, consistent with other efforts to
strengthen the party during this time.
Like other Republican presidents, who viewed their party as the minority, Ford
was not only concerned about his own re-election, but also party fortunes over the long
term (Galvin 2010). Many believed the party was in danger of extinction. Indeed, in a
speech before the National Federation of Republican Women in September 1975, Ford
warned that “America is truly on the road to one-party rule.”56 This is, of course,
54Points to be covered in Cabinet Presentation on Public Liaison Office, undated.
55Article; “Question for Today: Is the Nation Ready to be ‘Baroodied’?,” The Wall Street Journal; 25 Febru-
ary 1975; folder Office of Public Liaison [3]; Box 19; Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann
Arbor, MI.
56Speech; Remarks of the President at the 18th Biennial National Federation of Republican Women’s
Convention; 13 September 1975; folder District of Columbia 9/17/76 National Federation of Republican
Women Reception; Box 4; Gwen Anderson Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
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rhetoric; but, it is very different rhetoric than we typically hear today. Highlighting the
depth to which the party had fallen, Klinkner notes, “At the January 1977 meeting of the
RNC, John East, then national committeeman and later senator from North Carolina
. . . suggested that the Republican label had become an albatross and that the committee
should consider changing the party’s name” (Klinkner 1994: 134). East was not alone in
these sentiments; prominent Senator Jesse Helms and even Ronald Reagan also
discussed a potential name change (Klinkner 1994).
Saving the party would require building infrastructure, a project dating back to
Eisenhower (Galvin 2010). In addition to gathering support for the President, one of
OPL’s other central objectives was to “improve communication between national and
local leadership.”57 This is significant, as national parties were still in the process of
building themselves into the strong, complex organizations we see today. Field
conferences helped the party link national and local resources to benefit both. Local
organizations were responsible for inviting people, allowing them to grant political
access to people and groups of their choosing. This also helped the party, which would
not necessarily know where to direct messages in different areas.
Just because Ford did not win the 1976 election does not mean institutionalized
liaison was an unsuccessful party-building effort—the Republican Party survived a
tumultuous period, despite Ford’s loss to Carter. In fact, many of the seeds of the
Republican ascendancy in the eighties and nineties were planted during this time. That
OPL was a party-building entity does not make it insidious. As Schattschneider and
other scholars have noted, parties are meant to serve the majority. Strengthening the
party can enhance its ability to serve the population, as well as candidates. OPL met
with a wide variety of groups throughout Ford’s short presidency. Though some have
57Points to be covered in Cabinet Presentation on Public Liaison Office, undated.
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questioned his motivations for engaging these groups, it is difficult to argue this was not
a step forward in openness.
Regardless of Ford’s intentions, OPL’s creation marks an important moment in the
history of group-party relations. In a May 1974 memo to Ford, Baroody argues that OPL
“must be systematic enough to run smoothly [and] institutionalized enough to be
recognized as essential.”58 Baroody is alluding to what we now call institutional
stickiness. Even if the reasons for their creation fade, institutions tend to endure. As
Schickler (2001) argues, it is common to build institutions on top of each other, but
uncommon to eliminate them. This has certainly been the case for OPL. Presidents have
used the office differently, and even changed the name; but, the institutionalization of
group-party relations endured.
5.3 The Carter Administration, 1977-1981
When control of the presidency shifted from Ford to Carter, the Democratic Party
was in a very different position than its adversary. Not only were Democrats less
encumbered by the legacies of Watergate, but they had also enjoyed a long-standing
majority in Congress. Consequently, long-term party-building was less of a concern for
the Carter administration. While he maintained OPL, Carter used it very differently than
his Republican predecessor and successor.
From the beginning, Carter’s OPL was tied less closely to party politics than its
predecessors. An early interoffice memorandum notes that “The Office of Public Liaison
in the past served as a political arm of the President working closely with the Republican
58Memo; William J. Baroody to President Ford; 31 May 1974; folder Office of Public Liaison [1]; Box 19;
Theodore Marrs Files; Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
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National Committee and—in the case of the Nixon years—with the Committee to
Reelect the President.”59 This would no longer be the case under Carter. Rather, “In
keeping with the President’s directives and Margaret Costanza’s personal approach to
the office, the work of the Office of Public Liaison has become more substantive and the
activities of the staff less partisan.”60
While the office maintained its distance from the Democratic National Committee
throughout Carter’s tenure, it assumed quite different personalities under its two
directors. There were essentially two OPLs under Carter. Under the direction of Midge
Costanza, the first aimed to provide representation for groups in government. This often
involved “symbolic interactions with groups, some of which, such as gay rights activists,
had no previous White House access.”61 By communicating with “organized America,”
OPL would serve as the administration’s “stethoscope on the nation’s heartbeat.”62 As
under Ford, they met with a wide range of groups, though they were particularly
interested in less resourced organizations.63 Costanza believed OPL could help open
government to the underrepresented, offering access these groups would not normally
have. Meetings would include OPL representatives as well as staff members from other
parts of the White House and relevant agencies.64
59Memo; 31 March 1977; folder [Public Liaison and Reorganization] 3/77-4/77 [O/A 4455]; Box 14;
Costanza Files; Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.
60Memo, 31 March 1977.
61Peterson 1992: 615, citing Kumar and Grossman 1984: 300, Pika 1985: 20.
62Memo; Ed [last name not specified] to Seymour [last name not specified]; 20 November 1977; folder
Office of Public Liaison—Year-End Report to the President 11/77 [O/A 5772]; Box 7; Costanza Files; Jimmy
Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.
63Brief Description; Margaret Costanza; folder Memos, 2/77-6/77 [0/A 4455]; Box 14; Costanza Files;
Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.
64Memo from Ed to Seymour, 20 November 1977.
CHAPTER 5. PARTY-BUILDING THROUGH GROUPS 165
This only lasted for fifteen months before the administration changed the office’s
direction, however. Costanza’s replacement, Anne Wexler, was a political expert with
significant campaign experience whose main objective was to use OPL to gather support
for the President’s legislative program. In a memo to Hamilton Jordan, Carter’s Chief of
Staff, Wexler emphasizes “the need for an aggressive and sustained program of
constituency group contact.”65 The purpose of these efforts was not, as under Costanza,
to offer access to groups. Rather, she argued, “Such a program is essential to the separate
functions of policy development; the enlistment of public support for Presidential
initiatives; and the ultimate expansion of our political base.”66 Over the next few years,
OPL worked hard in pursuit of the first two goals. The third did not receive priority, and
would in fact turn out to be a casualty of OPL’s efforts in other areas.
Wexler’s OPL did not completely abandon what she called “case work.” As under
Ford, there were still individuals responsible for maintaining relationships with different
constituencies. The office had special assistants for blacks, Hispanics, women, senior
citizens, consumers, environmental groups, and others. This was necessary, she argued,
because special interest groups had an increasingly significant presence in Washington.
It was important to be aware and “responsive.”67
The administration thought it was important to separate operational and
administrative functions in this area. The special assistants were responsible for
handling routine communications and “day-to-day problems.” Wexler and Jordan
informed the assistants that they would “be expected to develop lists of organizations
65Underline emphasis in original changed to italics. Memo; Anne Wexler to Hamilton Jordan; 13 July
1978; folder Public Liaison (Urban Policy); Box 47; Anne Wexler Files; Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.
66Memo from Wexler to Jordan, 13 July 1978.
67Anne Wexler Interview, Exit Interview Project, 12 December 1980
<http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/
oralhist.phtml> (“Wexler Exit Interview”).
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and their leaders; maintain regular contact with the groups; and have intimate and
up-to-date knowledge of their leadership and concerns.”68 They would also be
responsible for conducting briefings on specific projects and general administration
goals, and should “be in a position to periodically contact the groups to ascertain their
positions on major policy pieces.”69 Like a manager in an M-Form corporation, Wexler
then used the information she got from the special assistants to come up with broader
strategies to build support for the President’s agenda.70
Developing experts in group liaison was very useful in coalition-building. If, for
example, Wexler thought women’s groups could have a stake in a particular bill of
interest to the President, she would go to Sarah Weddington, the special assistant to
women, “and say ‘Listen, I need help with women’s groups’ and she would provide me
with the list and often organize the meetings. I would need to have these women get to
work on whatever it was I needed them to work out.”71 Having special assistants in
charge of different groups was, essentially, the political equivalent of organizing a firm
by product. Just as companies facing rapidly growing markets felt it was more efficient
to manage their businesses this way, the party in government felt it was easier and more
productive to manage the proliferation of groups in Washington through an M-Form
organization.
This arrangement also helped to control opportunism. While special assistants
could be influential, in that the information and services they provided could be
68Memo; Anne Wexler and Hamilton Jordan to White House Distribution List; 27 July 1978; folder Public
Liaison (Urban Policy); Box 47; Anne Wexler Files; Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.
69Memo from Wexler and Jordan to White House Distribution List, 27 July 1978.
70Anne Wexler Interview, Miller Center, University of Virginia, Carter Presidency Project, 12-13 February
1981 <http://millercenter.org/president/carter/oralhistory/anne-wexler> (“Wexler Oral History”).
71Wexler Exit Interview, 1980.
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valuable, they had limited decision making power. Above these specialists was a
“coordinator” whose job it was to “monitor contact, assess group needs in terms of the
President’s priorities, seek ways to make optimal use of established relationships, and
insure maximum linkages to policy development, developing public support for issues
and political action”72 The coordinator would also screen requests for Presidential
appearances at group events, help the Personnel and Political Coordination group with
appointments, and “monitor such prizes as political appointments, invitations to White
House functions and prenotification of Administration action.”73 In sum, the people
who were responsible for developing relationships with groups were not the same
people who controlled resources allocated to those groups. The coordinator, along with
other higher level members of the President’s staff, could look at the information
provided by all of the special assistants and allocate resources in a manner deemed most
beneficial for the administration as a whole.
Whether or not something was deemed beneficial depended largely on its
potential to advance the President’s legislative agenda. Wexler summed up OPL’s job as
building “campaigns on issues” and her job as “lobbying the lobbyists.”74 When faced
with a new issue, they would begin by thinking through every group that could have a
stake in it (“it is a far bigger group than you might think at the start”), and talk to many
groups to figure out who would support the effort and who would oppose it.75 This
strategy would often result in a coalition of groups that would not normally work
together. Yet, because they all had an interest in the issue and a part in its development,
72Memo; Jane Wales to Anne Wexler; 6 July 1978; folder Public Liaison (Urban Policy); Box 47; Anne
Wexler Files; Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA.
73Memo from Wales to Wexler, 6 July 1978.
74Wexler Oral History, 1981. Wexler Exit Interview, 1980.
75Wexler Exit Interview, 1980.
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she noted “when it came time for the vote they were fighting like the dickens for us.
And that’s when we were successful.”76
This is not an entirely pluralistic group-party arrangement, since OPL was
providing a certain degree of central power structure. However, it was a step back in the
direction of pluralism. The office’s relationships were broad, bipartisan, and constantly
in flux. Indeed, Wexler reinforced the notion that allies and opponents were fluid,
changing continually from one issue to the next. They tried to keep groups that opposed
particular bills in the negotiations “and talk with them and reason and negotiate.”77 This
did not always work, but it was still worthwhile in the long run, as it allowed OPL to go
back to those groups for support on other issues.
Party weakness had a lot to do with this strategy. The DNC was not helpful in
coalition building, according to Wexler. She recalled, “In the early days when we were
having East Room briefings the political operation in the White House would insist that
we call the desk people at the Democratic National Committee to get some names from
them. And we did that a few times. But the desk person would call up some local person
and say exactly what...they should not have said: ‘Who do you know that would like to
come to the White House?’ They had absolutely no relation to the issue involved and we
were constantly getting all these yo-yos would wouldn’t help us at all! So, we quit doing
it.”78
Moreover, weak party discipline made constructing broad, bipartisan coalitions
important and often essential. It was not easy for the President to get widespread
support from Congress, even from members of his own party. Legislators were not
76Wexler Exit Interview, 1980.
77Wexler Exit Interview, 1980.
78Wexler Oral History, 1981.
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motivated by party, she recalled, but by what was in the bill for them.79 Something that
was important to Carter might not affect many Congressional districts. Wexler recalls,
“The Congress was saying to the President, ‘Show me that you have got enough support
out there to earn my vote for this issue.’ . . . They wanted it proven to them so that they
could feel safe and secure in supporting him. That’s what happens when you don’t have
any strong political system. Congress had no particular vested interest in doing that
because it wasn’t going to help them at home.”80
As discussed in chapter three, groups can help the executive bargain with
Congress. OPL staff was “putting together what would become a working coalition on
the Hill to get legislation passed and at the same time a grass roots effort to support that
working coalition on the Hill.”81 Through liaison efforts, Wexler stated, “We were then
able, when necessary, to target grassroots efforts in particular Congressional districts or
states or to call up 25 to go to the Hill because we needed their help with a subcommittee
or full committee. Quite often we needed to do things like that.”82 They had a close, if
not always smooth, relationship with the Congressional Liaison’s office. Wexler
describes the division of labor as follows: “They would be visiting Senators, counting
votes, and bringing the vote counts back to us. In response, we would be deploying the
interest groups to go back to Senator X or Senator Y to try to change their mind on a vote
or shift them on an amendment. Literally, it was like a general moving an army around.
Congressional Liaison would be moving out and finding out where concentrations
79Wexler Oral History, 1981.
80Wexler Oral History, 1981.
81Wexler Exit Interview, 1980.
82Wexler Oral History, 1981.
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needed to be made, and then we would be moving the people to the designated areas.”83
While Carter’s pluralistic OPL may have been able to compensate for party
weakness, at least in part, it did not help to correct this problem in the long-term. “It is
not useful for political organizing and for building support around issues to have the ad
hoc situation we had,” Wexler stated, “In fact it is destructive, but I don’t know how else
you can do it.” Building coalitions around issues “does not in any sense create a political
base.” Indeed, it can erode the party. By “pandering to interest groups,” this strategy
“makes them stronger and encourages them to divorce themselves a bit from their
philosophical political party and say, in effect, ‘My issue first, my party second.’ ”84 She
regretted “the destruction I wrought on the political parties for the last three years in
order to try to get a job done for my President,” and noted that “it’s an issue that all of us
in our leisure now are going to have to address in terms of the future of the political
system as we know it in this country.”85 This is consistent with a wider pattern,
discussed by Galvin (2010), of majority party presidents putting their own political goals
ahead of party-building. With long-standing majorities in Congress, Democratic
presidents tended to be much more concerned about policy, viewing success in this
arena as key to their electoral success. Republican Presidents, in contrast, used their
position to help build their party. Nowhere is this more clear than in OPL’s transition
from Carter to Reagan.
Even in the short-term, OPL’s ad hoc strategy had some major drawbacks, most
notably in terms of efficiency. The problem with creating coalitions by issue is that “you
have to start from scratch on every single issue,” Wexler noted, “You have to start all
83Wexler Oral History, 1981.
84Wexler Oral History, 1981.
85Wexler Oral History, 1981.
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over again and reinvent the wheel every single time.”86 It also has implications for the
nature of the president’s legislative program. Some issues cannot easily be tied to clear
constituencies, making them difficult to push under this kind of system. As Donald Kettl
remarked during Wexler’s oral history interview, “there are no chips to cash in from the
past.” OPL’s “matchmaker role . . . tends to exclude some kinds of policies and makes
other kinds of policies more costly, but in any case it is not neutral with respect to the
outcome.”87 He also notes that the costliness of this process limits the scope of the
President’s agenda. In the absence of economies of scale, there is only so much the
administration can reasonably take on. In the next administration, moving away from
pluralistic relations with groups brought significant efficiency gains for Reagan.
5.4 The Reagan Administration, 1981-1989
Though many view him as the father of the modern conservative coalition,
Reagan did not build it alone. His achievements added to the significant liaison
foundation built by Nixon and Ford. Like Nixon, Reagan wanted to build a long-term
winning coalition to compete with the Democratic leviathan forged during Franklin
Delano Roosevelt’s presidency. Watergate interrupted Nixon’s efforts, which may
explain why the modern conservative coalition is often dated back to Reagan. Looking
back, Colson remarks regretfully, “but for Watergate I’ve always felt that what became
known as the Reagan Democrats would have been the Nixon Democrats.”88
Reagan’s OPL was larger than Ford’s and Carter’s, with a staff of 18 (Pika 2009).
86Wexler Oral History, 1981.
87Wexler Oral History, 1981.
88Video Oral History Interview with Charles Colson, 17 August 2007.
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Reagan maintained his predecessors’ focus on group liaison, but the nature of liaison
changed. Compared to Ford and Carter, Reagan’s OPL held fewer meetings with large
groups both inside and outside Washington. Whereas Ford established loose liaison
with a wide range of groups, Reagan engaged in strong liaison with a relatively small
number of groups. Based on responses to 1980 and 1985 surveys of organizations,
Peterson finds the Reagan administration “had regular, ongoing interactions with a
rather limited number of groups in the sample of membership organizations” (Peterson
1992: 617). He also finds that more conservative groups were more likely to enjoy access.
Twenty-eight percent of very conservative groups enjoyed “frequent” access, compared
to four percent of very liberal groups, and two-thirds of very conservative groups
enjoyed “at least occasional access,” compared to less than one-quarter of very liberal
groups. This includes interaction with any part of the Executive Office of the President
(e.g., OPL, the Office of Management and Budget, etc.).89
Under Reagan, the Republican Party partially internalized conservative Christian
groups. In other words, instead of merely cooperating, they built these groups into the
party’s infrastructure. This represents an important moment in the history of
group-party relations, as it marks the beginning of a long coalition that still exists today.
While religious conservatives may be at the forefront of contemporary “culture wars,”
Republicans’ decision to ally with them was not driven by ideological change. It was, in
fact, a strategic party-building maneuver. This organizational innovation brought
important efficiency gains in coalition-building. Reagan needed broad-based support for
his economic program, the administration’s chief concern, addressing social issues only
when necessary to keep religious conservatives in the party’s nascent coalition.
The administration was trying to build the party’s infrastructure, creating a robust
89To measure ideology, Peterson uses responses to questions about federal service provision.
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national network by strengthening links between national, state and local levels. Their
vision of a strong party as a strong network distinguishes them from the Democratic
Party at this time, whose thinking was more short-term (Galvin 2010). We can see the
desire for network building in Reagan’s decision to recruit Amway cofounder Richard
DeVos as the party’s finance chairman. The company became a multibillion-dollar
enterprise by encouraging people to sell common household products to people they
knew, and then encouraging those people to do the same. Reagan wanted DeVos to
apply this business model to the Republican Party. Between January 1981 and August
1982, DeVos “fundamentally restructured the party’s fund-raising apparatus and
redoubled his commitment to nurturing small donors” (Galvin 2010: 123). This was not
all about money, as DeVos’s “main goal was to turn small donors into grassroots party
activists on a mission for the Republican party” (Galvin 2010: 123). Reagan was correct
about the value of this model, as the party raised over $30 million in 1981 and over $40
million in 1982—extraordinary numbers, considering the party’s entire budget in 1971
was $6.9 million.
Special interest groups, particularly religious groups, had great value in this
pursuit. Special Assistant and Deputy Chief of Staff Richard S. Williamson told Reagan
that the National Right to Life Committee “is actually—like a major political party—a
coalition of autonomous organizations.”90 In an interview with scholar Philip Klinkner,
Ben Cotton, associate of RNC Chairman Bill Brock’s, explained groups’ value in the
language of new institutional economics. Klinkner summarizes, “According to Ben
Cotton, Brock and others on the RNC saw the evangelical churches as a ‘distribution
system’ for disseminating Republican information and as an institution for mobilizing
voters” (Klinkner 1994: 147).
90Memo; Richard Williamson to President Reagan; 21 January 1981; folder Right to Life; Box F026, F027;
Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
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With strong infrastructure and communications capabilities, religious
conservatives provided for Republicans what unions had long provided for Democrats:
a solid grassroots network and coalition anchor. Business could provide money, but not
volunteers or communication networks. Though their missions are clearly distinct,
structurally, labor and religious conservatives are very similar. Both have large networks
and frequent, regularized contact with their members. They also have a degree of power
over their members not seen in many other groups.
Communication networks were often discussed in letters between members of
Congress and the President, as well as inter-office memoranda.91 In scheduling meetings
with the President, OPL staff took special note of groups with a “strong national
network” who were “adept at generating news.”92 Communicating with special interest
organizations was more efficient than attempting to communicate with special interests
in the electorate, as Ford had previously noted. In a letter to Reagan, Rep. Robert
Livingston emphasized the “ability of these groups to marshall [sic] public opinion in
support of [the President’s] programs unaided by public media.”93
This communication network’s value was not just in its reach, but also its position
outside mainstream media. As Trent Lott reminded Reagan in a letter urging him to
meet with pro-family leaders, “these individuals have their own means of
communication which bypass the usual media outlets,” which Republicans viewed as
91Letter; Trent Lott to The President; 21 May 1981; folder Pro-Family—1982; Box F008(11); Elizabeth Dole
Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Letter; Stan Parris to President Reagan; 19 May 1981; folder
Pro-Family—1982; Box F008 (11); Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Suggested
Invitees to Small Meeting of the President and Conservative Leaders with the Most Political Clout; folder
Conservatives—General; Box F001; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
92Suggested Invitees to Small Meeting of the President and Conservative Leaders with the Most Political
Clout.
93Letter; Robert L. Livingston to President Reagan; 8 June 1981; folder Pro-Family Activists [2]; Box
OA9081 (12); Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
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left-leaning.94 Senators Orrin Hatch and John East expressed similar sentiments, the
latter with particular urgency. “Given the barrage of media criticism of your spending
cuts, tax reduction and block grant proposals,” he warned Reagan, “I am convinced that
we need to reply with all of the forces we can muster.”95
OPL agreed, noting that groups “provide an important multiplier effect through
their communications networks at the state and local levels.”96 Pro-family activists “each
have effective networks at their disposal” and “they are not only supporters of the
President, they each feel it is their duty to educate and activate more people in the
political process,” notes Morton Blackwell, OPL liaison to religious groups.97 Expressing
a similar sentiment in a May 19, 1981 letter to Reagan, Rep. Stan Parris remarks, “I need
not outline to you the communications capacity and demonstrated record of responsible
activism that many of these [pro-family] individuals have developed over the years, nor
the impact their support could have on the positions of the administration we are all
trying so desperately to promote.98
The communications capabilities of gun rights groups and religious and
pro-family groups were tremendous. Moral Majority founder Jerry Falwell maintained a
mailing list of more than five million names, and his Old Time Gospel Hour program
aired to audiences between sixteen and thirty million on over 500 television stations
94Letter from Lott to the President, 21 May 1981.
95Letter; Orrin Hatch to President Reagan; 28 May 1981; folder Pro-Family Activists [1]; Box OA9081 (12);
Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Letter; John P. East to President Reagan;
28 May 1981; folder Pro-Family Activists [2]; Box OA9081 (12); Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan
Library, Simi Valley, CA. Letter from Lott to the President, 21 May 1981.
96Proposal; 28 January 1982; folder Equal Rights Amendment [2]; Box F002, F003; Elizabeth Dole Files;
Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
97Schedule Proposal; Meeting with “Pro-Family” Activists; 22 April 1981; folder Pro-Family Activists [1];
Box OA9081 (12); Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
98Letter from Stan Parris to President Reagan, 19 May 1981.
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every Sunday, and daily programs on over 500 radio stations.99 The Moral Majority’s
annual budget exceeded $60 million—two times the amount the Republican Party was
able to raise in 1981, even after successfully adopting the Amway model. These
audiences were not only large, they were also growing. In 1983, the Moral Majority’s
membership was increasing at a pace of 11,000 every month.100 They were not alone, as
notes in preparation for a 1983 meeting with Falwell state, “Virtually every group is in a
period of rapid growth in terms of numbers, funding, and political expertise. All of these
leaders have already decided that part of their role in life is to activate others in political
processes.” Clearly, special interest networks were able to contribute a significant
volume of communication efforts.
Sometimes special interest group action could substitute for party action in
beneficial ways. Because they are technically outside the party, groups can say and do
things that the president or other party members could not without damaging their
reputations. For example, in June of 1982, the administration was trying to decide what,
if anything, they should say publicly about the expected fall of the Equal Rights
Amendment. An interoffice memo by staffer Michael Ulmann suggests allowing their
pro-family allies to handle this messaging for them. “With Phyllis Schlafly [leader of the
conservative group the Eagle Forum] preparing to celebrate the end with victory parties
and the like, and the specter of the fasting women, there will be media thrills a minute,”
he notes,“and I see nothing but disaster in having the President become the third ring in
the circus.”101 Schlafly, who the administration recognized had “arguably the best
99Memo; Morton Blackwell to Red Cavaney; 27 January 1983; folder Conservatives—General—1982 [6];
Box F001; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Notes on Meeting with Dr. Jerry
Falwell; 14 March 1983; folder Moral Majority [3 of 9]; Box 9; Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan
Library, Simi Valley, CA.
100Notes on Meeting with Dr. Jerry Falwell, 14 March 1983.
101Memo; Michael M. Uhlmann to Edwin L. Harper; 11 June 1982; folder Women’s Strategy—January
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national network of any conservative movement leader,” would rally against the ERA
and publicize its demise under Reagan, which would advertise the party’s
accomplishment in a way the party could not.102 This spectacle could be associated with
the party, gaining attention, without being attributed to the party, arousing criticism.
The party also drew on groups to help mount campaigns. While campaign
donations are important, groups provide many other critical resources like volunteers
and communication with the electorate. Support from business groups helped the party
raise money, but corporations could not provide campaign labor. Organized labor
provided these services to the Democratic Party beginning in the 1930s; however, for
most of the twentieth century, the Republican Party had no similar support system. Part
of Reagan’s coalition-building involved constructing a corollary to organized labor
within the Republican Party. This was especially important following changes to
campaign finance laws, which increased the importance of small donors.
In some ways, this is simply an application of communications capabilities to
campaigning. Private communication networks were especially valuable after changes
to campaign finance laws, as groups like the National Rifle Association (NRA) were
allowed to undertake independent expenditures to communicate with their own
members (as well as non-members).103 Leading up to the 1980 election, the NRA’s
Institute for Legislative Action “sponsored a multi-media campaign for Reagan which
included direct mail, magazines, tabloids, newspaper advertisements, radio spots, and
1982-June 1982 [3]; Box F014; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
102Suggested Invitees to a Small Meeting of the President and Conservative Leaders with the Most Political
Clout.
103Memo; Morton Blackwell to Elizabeth Dole thru Diana Lozano; 23 March 1982; folder Conservatives—
General—1982 [2]; Box F001; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
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literature distribution at firearms exhibits and gun club gatherings.”104 The volume of
campaign communication was substantial. They direct-mailed 629,377 letters “praising
Gov. Reagan and castigating Pres. Carter” to members in Texas, California,
Pennsylvania, and Maryland, as well as Life Members in other states. Another direct
mail campaign distributed a chart on Reagan’s positions to 1.6 million members. They
also included two full-page ads, one endorsing Reagan and the other criticizing Carter,
in American Rifleman and American Hunter magazines, which had a combined circulation
of 1.8 million members.105 The week before the election, they distributed 800,000
get-out-the-vote postcards in eighteen states where the election was expected to be
tight.106 These were not only communications—they were targeted communications.
The people who received them were, for the most part, more likely to support Reagan
than Carter.
Internalization enhanced the value of group networks by aligning group and
party incentives, making groups more reliable coalition partners. When the fate of the
group’s agenda becomes linked to the party’s electoral fate, the party needs to worry less
about the group’s dependability, as the Nixon administration often did. Just as increased
production can lead a firm to expand vertically instead of simply outsourcing tasks, as
they are no longer comfortable contracting out product distribution to wholesalers who
also sell their competitors’ products, so did the Republican Party want to assure that, as
they expanded, they could rely on key communication networks to spread favorable
messages. A network is also a specific asset, intended to activate a select group of
people. When assets are non-transferable, at least not without a substantial loss in value,
104Memo from Blackwell to Dole, 23 March 1982.
105Memo from Blackwell to Dole, 23 March 1982.
106Miscellaneous; Administration Position on McClure-Volkmer Bill; folder Conservatives—General—
1982; Box F001; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
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internalization provides security. In this light, the party’s internalization of groups with
significant networking capacities is unsurprising.
Internalizing groups carries many important advantages for the party. First, it
keeps the campaign infrastructure in abeyance between elections. When the party needs
to gear up for another election, it does not need to build a new coalition from scratch.
Second, it makes groups more likely to support all party candidates, not just the most
prominent ones. This is valuable even to the President, who needs Congressional
support to push his agenda. Third, once their interests are aligned, groups are more
likely to support the party on issues outside their own area. This is valuable not only
because it helps to move the party’s agenda forward, giving them support they might
not otherwise have, but also because it increases legislative efficiency. With a long
coalition in place, the party does not need to go out and build a new coalition every time
it wants to pass the budget or push a piece of legislation, as Carter’s OPL did.
We can see this efficiency in action throughout Reagan’s tenure. Religious and
gun rights groups provided a vital support system for Reagan’s economic program.107
Right before Reagan’s economic package went to Congress, OPL Director Elizabeth Dole
reinforced the importance of mobilizing the conservative coalition—gun rights groups,
pro-life groups, right-to-work groups, etc. They “are his most avid supporters and have
the most clout in terms of grassroots support, political organization and structure, ability
to mobilize citizenry and influence members of Congress.”108 This support extended to
other issues as well. In March of 1983, Jerry Falwell “announced Moral Majority’s main
107Notes on various groups; folder Conservative Groups [1 of 4]; Box 7; Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald
Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
108Schedule Proposal; Meeting with Conservative Coalition Groups; 11 February 1981; folder Conserva-
tive Coalition Group Meeting; Box F026, F027 (31); Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley,
CA.
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goal for 1983 is to combat the nuclear freeze movement.”109 This brings to mind
Greenstone’s (1969) observation that allying with the Democratic Party broadened
labor’s support for the party. Whereas before the alliance, they worked to mobilize their
own constituency, after their informal integration into the party, they worked to mobilize
the party’s entire base. Republicans received similar benefits from the party’s
internalization of gun rights, religious and right-to-work groups.
This partnership was not motivated by ideology. Reagan did not bring them into
his coalition because he was primarily concerned about abortion or other highly
ideological issues. The partnership provided an efficient, effective way to push the
administration’s economic program and build a long-term coalition to compete with the
New Deal Democrats. While the administration periodically raised social issues, these
issues did not receive high priority on its agenda.
On some issues, like tuition tax credits to aid parochial schools, the administration
was simply not as supportive as it claimed to be. While the administration rhetorically
advocated for this issue of great importance to Catholics, an OPL memo notes that
tuition credits did not make the President’s first tax cut proposal because they were
expected to cause a $4 billion loss in tax revenue.110 On other issues—most social issues,
in fact—the administration was not unsupportive, but not especially committed either.
Though the administration endorsed constitutional amendments prohibiting abortion
and allowing school prayer, their support for these measures was tepid. Interoffice
communications indicate that the Human Life Amendment was unlikely to pass, but
that “it is important for this Administration for there to be votes on this issue, preferably
109Notes on Meeting with Dr. Jerry Falwell; 14 March 1983; folder Moral Majority [3 of 9]; Box 9; Morton
Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
110Memo; Jack Burgess to Elizabeth H. Dole via Red Cavaney; 6 August 1981; folder Tuition Tax Credits
1981; Box F010 (16); Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
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repeated votes, in both Houses.” Even the appointment of anti-abortion activist Dr.
Everett Koop as Surgeon General was qualified, as “he is instructed to make no public
statements regarding abortion.”111 Support for school prayer was similarly weak. In a
July 23, 1982 memo to Elizabeth Dole, Blackwell notes that, “To date neither the
President nor any Administration figures have given the Congress any reason to believe
that we are prepared to take vigorous action on this amendment this year.”112 Symbolic
support through the State of the Union Address could offer “balm on the wounds” to
these groups whose initiatives the administration was “to put it gently, not far advanced
in proposing.” Since the 1980 election, Blackwell argues, “we have indulged in unilateral
moral disarmament.” Emphasizing their lack of commitment to conservative social
positions, he notes, “the Reagan Administration behaves as if these issues were skunks
at our garden party.”113
Economic issues were the centerpiece of their 1984 campaign and the top priority
on their legislative agenda.114 Social issues were raised cautiously and grudgingly. As
the President’s Chief Domestic Policy Advisor, Gary Bauer, wrote in a March 3, 1982
memo, “Rather than be forced to deal with social issues on an ad hoc basis and/or on
someone else’s timetable, I recommend we undertake an analysis of key components of
the social agenda with an eye towards deciding which ones we are willing to support
and under what terms and conditions.”115 In this category, he includes school prayer,
111Miscellaneous; Reviving the Winning Coalition: The Strategy for Conservatives; 17 January 1983; folder
Revising the Winning Coalition—Morton Blackwell [1]; Box 14; Morton Blackwell Files; Ronald Reagan
Library, Simi Valley, CA.
112Memo; Morton C. Blackwell to Elizabeth H. Dole thru Diana Lozano; 23 July 1982; folder School Prayer
July 1982—December 1982; Box F008 (11); Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
113Reviving the Winning Coalition: The Strategy for Conservatives, 17 January 1983.
114Miscellaneous; OPL Issues Travel Book; folder Travel—OPL Issues Travel Book [1]; Box F010 (16); Eliz-
abeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
115Memo; Gary Bauer to Edwin Harper and Roger Porter; 3 March 1982; folder Conservatives—General—
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busing, the Family Protection Act, and similar issues. Emphasizing the administration’s
strategic, instrumental attention to these issues, Bauer says, “By moving to the forefront
on one or two of these issues, the President’s social link can be reforged, and the
conservative grassroots can be rejuvenated for the upcoming legislative battles. To do
little or nothing will lead to greater conservative dissatisfaction and diminished active
support for the economic battles.” Next to this section of the memo, Chief of Staff James
Baker handwrote a note stating “Please tell [Elizabeth Dole] we’re doing this via tuition
tax credits and school prayer.”
These groups were not entirely unaware of the administration’s questionable
commitment to their cause. At one point, Blackwell warned Dole that some groups
“indicated their intention to attempt to convince members of the House and Senate to
oppose the Reagan tax cut package feeling that only a defeat of the tax package will force
the Administration to take social issues seriously.”116 This threat came shortly after the
nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor to the Supreme Court, a surprising
disappointment to many who expected a more conservative nomination. Knowing the
value of their communication networks, groups would warn the administration that
inaction on social issues would make it difficult for them to rally their troops for the next
election. Elizabeth Dole informed Reagan after a meeting with groups about the Family
Protection Act that “the point was repeatedly made that without some meaningful signs
of encouragement from the Administration, much of the grass-roots enthusiasm which
produced startling changes in the 1980 elections in both Houses will not be available for
1982 [2]; Box F001; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA. Memo; Elizabeth H. Dole
to Edwin Meese III, James A. Baker, III, and Ed Harper; 9 March 1982; folder Conservatives— General—
1982 [2]; Box F001; Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
116Memo; Morton Blackwell to Elizabeth H. Dole; 8 July 1981; folder Conservatives—General; Box F001;
Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
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candidates who support your policies in 1982.”117
Though relations were not always smooth, the alliance between religious
conservatives and the Republican Party marked another shift away from pluralism. The
party did not internalize all groups, of course. But, they did have a core group of
supporters who traveled across different issues, demonstrating considerably more
structure in group-party relations than we saw earlier in the twentieth century. These
party-building efforts were successful in the short-term, as they helped Reagan enact
sweeping economic reforms, as well as the long-term, as Republicans gained control of
Congress in 1994 after a generation of Democratic dominance. This revolution gave the
party new leverage over special interest groups, which they used to demand stronger
group partisanship, as discussed in chapter two.
5.5 Conclusion
Over the course of Nixon, Ford and Reagan’s presidencies, liaison with special
interest groups became more centralized, institutionalized, and eventually partially
internalized. This narrative challenges the increasingly common argument in political
science that activists caused political polarization. Parties and special interest groups did
indeed become closer over the second half of the twentieth century, but they built this
relationship together in response to a changing historical context. Parties were active,
willing participants in this endogenous transformation of the American party system.
This narrative also challenges the notion that group and party strength are inverse, as
Schattschneider argued. Though special interest partisanship may have some negative
117Memo; Elizabeth H. Dole to President Reagan; 19 October 1981; folder Family Protection Act—1982 [1];
Box F003, F004 (3); Elizabeth Dole Files; Ronald Reagan Library, Simi Valley, CA.
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manifestations, it is not inherently detrimental to parties. Since groups can assist parties
with many important tasks, relationships with groups can fortify, rather than sap party
strength.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion: For Better or for Worse?
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When APSA called for “a more responsible two-party system,” the current climate of
intense party conflict is most likely not what they had in mind. While many scholars
have examined the roots of polarization, there has been little attention to the relationship
between special interest groups and political parties since the pluralism debates of the
mid-twentieth century—to the detriment of our understanding of polarization. In
examining the relationship between political parties and special interest groups and
group issues over time, my dissertation aims to make four interventions in the political
science literatures on parties, groups, and polarization.
First, I have argued that the timeline of polarization is quite a bit longer than is
currently appreciated in the literature. While it may not have begun its dramatic rise
until the early 1970s, its origins actually lie in the Great Depression and the New Deal,
which spurred a broad nationalization of the party system. If we think of polarization as
growing out of the Democratic Party reforms of 1968 and 1972, or even the civil rights
revolution earlier in the 1960s, we miss its organizational foundation.
This leads to my second main point. Although we might associate polarization
with a “culture war” in contemporary American politics—with zealots on both sides of
the spectrum roaring polemics on increasingly partisan news programs—its origins
were not entirely or even primarily ideological. Polarization cannot be understood
simply as a process of ideological “sorting,” in which all liberals become Democrats and
all conservatives become Republicans, though this does occur. Nor can it be understood
simply as a process of elite party member preferences drifting away from the political
center. If we look only for factors that could have caused changes in beliefs, we miss
changes in the structure of the American party system. Polarization, I argue, is just as
much an organizational phenomenon as it is an ideological phenomenon—perhaps even
more so.
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As Schattschneider aptly noted, the nation’s strongly decentralized,
patronage-driven party system depressed the importance of issues in electoral
competition, as well as national parties’ ability to devise and promote clear policy
positions. This led to a high level of programmatic similarity in the mid-twentieth
century. National party weakness also facilitated fluid group-party relations. When Key,
Truman and others observed widespread special interest bipartisanship in the
mid-twentieth century, national parties were not strong enough to facilitate alliances
between elite party members and groups. By transforming the balance of power
between national and state and local governments, the New Deal disrupted this
equilibrium. While machines received a temporary boost from the surge in patronage
provided by programs like the Works Progress Administration, the New Deal also
sparked long-term processes that would eventually undermine patronage politics. The
most important of these was the growth of national party organizations. While this
process was slow and sometimes fragmented, party nationalization had major
consequences for American politics.
As material incentives declined, purposive incentives grew more important, and
issue politics became a key site of electoral competition. Parties began vying for voters’
affections through issues. In order to appeal to voters in this way, however, a party
needed to claim to offer something different than its opponent. This encouraged the
development of alternative issue programs, both rhetorically (i.e., in party platforms)
and behaviorally (i.e., on the floor of Congress). In other words, a strong, centralized
party system based on issues rather than patronage facilitates opposing positions. In the
aggregate, we observe this as a broad polarization of American politics at the elite level.
As national parties matured, with permanent headquarters, sizeable staffs, and
increased programmatic capacities, they were also much better equipped to “pick sides”
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on issues—and, for that matter, to pick which issues to pick sides on! Developing a
policy program is not easy. The parties need to know what issues will attract certain
voters, and what positions will be most likely to boost their competitive position. These
things were not obvious, especially as the electorate grew more diverse and complex.
Constructing issue programs required research, as well as the capacity to resolve
disputes between different members.
All in all, Schattschneider’s argument about the relationship between party
decentralization and issueless politics was quite right. As parties centralized, issue
politics intensified. What Schattschneider did not anticipate was the degree to which
groups could aid in the process of party nationalization. This is my third intervention in
the existing literature. Group and party strength are not inherently inverse, as he often
argued (Schattschneider 1942, 1948, 1960). Indeed, they can—and did—develop
symbiotic relationships. Groups played a critical role in twentieth century
party-building. As national parties strengthened and machines weakened, groups took
over some of the key tasks machines once performed, like electoral mobilization.
The process of national party-building also intensified parties’ need for efficiency,
motivating movement away from fluid, pluralistic relations on the group-party
continuum. Thinking about the party as a firm helps to explain its incentives to evolve
structurally over time. The rise of special interest partisanship involved fundamental
changes to parties’ organizational form. Relationships between groups and parties grew
more structured, which brought efficiency gains for national parties as they developed
from the “ghost parties” of the early to mid-twentieth century to the strong,
professionalized organizations we see today.
This analysis complements some existing explanations for polarization, and
brings others into question. On the one hand, it supplements McCarty, Poole and
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Rosenthal’s (2006) argument about the role of immigration. Needing more efficient ways
to reach an increasingly diverse and complex electorate, parties drew on groups for
assistance with information gathering, coalition building, communication, and
mobilization. As groups became more strongly linked to the party apparatus,
party-group relations became more clearly defined and the parties grew more distinct.
On the other hand, my analysis undermines the increasingly popular argument that
activists caused polarization. The transformation of American parties was, at the very
least, a joint effort between parties and groups. Taking a step further, I argue that the rise
of special interest partisanship was an endogenous transformation of the American
party system. This is my fourth intervention in the existing literature.
These distinctions matter not only for our understanding of American history, but
also for research outside the United States. Patronage politics still operate in many
countries, to the dismay of many who consider them corrupt. While “spoils systems”
raise obvious and grave concerns about representation, my argument suggests that
dismantling these regimes could have unintended consequences. Indeed, special interest
partisanship also raises serious questions about representation.
Yet, the growth of special interest partisanship is not all bad. Today, as chapter
two demonstrates, people see clearer differences between the parties than they saw a
few decades ago. While people may harbor negative feelings toward politicians in
general—especially members of Congress, whose already low public esteem has fallen
to a historic nadir—it would be difficult to argue that people do not have a choice today
between distinct policy programs. What Democrats and Republicans “stand for” has
become more apparent over the past few decades, as special interest partisanship has
increased. The parties’ issue positions and interest group affiliations have become quite
clear—even if people do not like them.
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While I would not necessarily go so far as to say this has given American voters
more choice, it has not given them less either. I would argue that voters today simply
have different kinds of choices. As groups come to play a more prominent role in
American politics, we need to broaden our view of political behavior. Voting is not the
only, or even necessarily the most important way in which people participate in politics
today. They can participate in party politics, group politics, or both. And this, I argue, is
not necessarily bad, because parties are not always better equipped to represent people’s
interests in the modern era.
Our nation’s formal system of representation is based on geography. That is,
people are represented as a citizens of particular districts and states. At the nation’s
founding, this may have been an adequate basis for high quality republican democracy.
As the nation’s economy and population became more complex and diverse, however,
people’s interests and preferences no longer broke along state or district lines. Over
time, then, geography became a less sufficient basis for political representation. Key
noted in 1942 that this dilemma encouraged the rise of special interest groups. This had
democratic merit, as he described:
In one respect pressure organizations perform an important representative
function in our politics. Their representative function arose partially because
of the inadequacy of geographical representation in a more and more
diversified society. So long as the people of a particular congressional district,
for example, are engaged in one type of farming and in occupations tributary
to agriculture, the representative from the district can speak for their interests,
but when the interests within his district become highly diversified he must
tread warily lest he antagonize an important segment of his constituency. The
result may be that important elements within his district do not have a voice
in Congress or the state legislature. The constant increase in specialization in
our society has made more and more difficult the task of the representative
selected from a geographical area. Special interests came to be organized so
that, in part, the cheese makers, the laborers, the drys, or others of like views
and interest might have representatives who could state their attitudes
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authoritatively before the government and the public (Key 1964: 202).
Over the past several decades, the special interest sector has developed into a
secondary system of representation based on substantive issue preferences, operating
alongside the primary system of representation based on geographic location. Today,
people can choose to become members of political parties and also choose to become
members of issue-specific organizations. They can donate to the Democratic Party in
order to support its electoral fortunes and also donate to the Sierra Club in order to
bolster its position within the party. Or they can donate to the Republican Party because
they like its fiscal positions, and also donate to the Human Rights Campaign because
they support the legalization of same-sex marriage. Hence, this second tier of
representation can help voters reconcile political preferences that do not align cleanly
with party platforms. A reasonable person could argue this is actually more, not less
democratic than the previous system. And while it might contribute to polarization, it
also helps mitigate some of its negative effects.
At the same time, recent work suggests that polarization may depress
responsiveness to public opinion. For example, over the past twenty years, public
support for LGBT rights has grown significantly—even in states and districts
represented by Republicans. Today, there are public majorities favoring a range of legal
protections for LGBT individuals; yet, this has not translated into a commensurate host
of policy gains. Matching the voting records of members of Congress to policy-specific
opinion in their state or district around the time of each vote reveals a striking amount of
incongruence between members and their constituents (Krimmel, Lax, and Phillips
2013). There is an important partisan dimension to this story. Since 1992, the parties have
staked out increasingly distinct positions on LGBT rights, with the DNC becoming more
supportive and the RNC more opposed. Over this same period, Democratic members of
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Congress have voted in favor of LGBT rights more and more often, as their constituents
have become more supportive. Republicans, however, appear to be following their
party’s conservative position rather than their constituents’ increasingly liberal
preferences on these issues. This is striking, considering the high salience of LGBT
issues, and concerning, given the implications for civil rights gains.
In the end, whether the rise of special interest partisanship is good or bad for
democracy is an open question. APSA’s 1950 Report lamented excessive party similarity;
today, polarization evokes scorn. More research is needed to determine whether or not
there is an ideal level of party difference, or a superior zone on the group-party
continuum. What is certain, however, is that a useful normative evaluation will compare
the contemporary arrangement not only to a hypothetical democratic ideal, but also to
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Right to Privacy and Access to Gov-
ernment Information (includes abor-
tion) (abortion coded by hand from
this category)
See VCF0837 and VCF0838
(N=13,022 - pro-life) (N=14,903 -
pro-choice)
Active military Defense Manpower, Military Personnel and
Dependents (Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marines), Military Courts
Occupation (category: current
member of the armed forces)
(VCF0154a) (N=90)
Air Transportation Air Transport Airports, Airlines, Air Traffic Con-
trol and Safety
Alcohol Beer, Wine & Liquor Alcohol Abuse and Treatment; Drug
and Alcohol or Substance Abust
Treatment
Cars & Trucks Automotive; Truck-
ing
Truck and Automobile Transporta-
tion and Safety
Occupation (categories: mechan-
ics and repair supervisors, me-
chanics and repairers, vehicle and
mobile equipment; motor vehicle
operators) (VCF0154a) (N=716)
Commercial Banks Commercial Banks U.S. Banking System and Financial
Institution Regulation
Computers & Internet Computers/Internet Computer Industry, Computer Se-
curity, & General Issues Related to
the Internet
Occupation (categories: mathe-
matical and computer scientists;
computer equipment operators)
(VCF0154a) (N=213)
Education Education Education Occupation (categories: teach-
ers, postsecondary; teachers, ex-
cept postsecondary) (VCF0154a)
(N=946)
Electric Utilities Electric Utilities Electricity and Hydroelectricity
Entertainment TV/Movies/Music Broadcast Industry Regulation (TV,
Cable, Radio)
Occupation (category: writers,
artists, entertainers, and athletes)
(VCF0154a) (N=346)
Table A.1: Case Selection (Part 1). This chart shows how I matched categories from the
Policy Agendas Project, the Center for Responsive Politics, and the American National
Election Studies for the forty groups in my sample. Each row lists the categories I pulled




Policy Agendas Project American National Election Stud-
ies
Environment Environment Environment See and VCF0842 and VCF9047
(N=9,451)




Farming & Ranching Crop Production &
Basic Processing;
Livestock
Government Subsidies to Farmers
and Ranchers, Agricultural Disaster
Insurance; Animal and Crop Disease
and Pest Control
Occupation (categories: farm




Food Processing & Sales Food Processing &
Sales
Food Inspection and Safety (includ-
ing seafood)
Guns Gun Control; Gun
Rights
Police, Fire, and Weapons Control
Health Insurance Health Services/
HMOs
Insurance reform, availability, and
cost; Provider and Insurer payment
and regulation
Hospitals & Nursing Homes Hospitals/Nursing
Homes
Facilities construction, regulation,
and payments; Long-term care,
home health, terminally ill, and re-
habilitation services
Human Rights Human Rights Human Rights
Immigrants Immigration and Refugee Issues;
Migrant and Seasonal workers,
Farm Labor Issues
Were both your parents born
in this country?) (VCF0143)
(N=6,831)
Insurance Insurance Insurance regulation
Table A.2: Case Selection (Part 2). This chart shows how I matched categories from the
Policy Agendas Project, the Center for Responsive Politics, and the American National
Election Studies for the forty groups in my sample. Each row lists the categories I pulled
















Lawyers & Law Firms Lawyers/Law
Firms
Executive Branch Agencies Dealing
with Law and Crime; Court Admin-
istration; Juvenile Crime and the Ju-
venile Justice System; Criminal and
Civil Code
Occupation (category: lawyers
and judges) (VCF0154a) (N=74)
LGBT Human Rights (in-
cludes subtopic Gay
& Lesbian Rights &
Issues)
Gender and Sexual Orientation Dis-
crimination (LGBT coded by hand
from this category)
See VCF0876a and VCF0877a
(N=3,892)
Low-Income People Education of Underprivileged Stu-
dents; Food Stamps, Food Assis-
tance, and Nutrition Monitoring
Programs
Income percentile (category: bot-
tom 1/3) (VCF0114) (N=14,286)
Mining Mining Coal
Oil & Gas Oil & Gas Natural Gas and Oil (Including Off-
shore Oil and Gas)
Older People Retired Age Discrimination; Elderly Issues
and Elderly Assistance Programs
(Including Social Security Adminis-
tration); Elderly and Handicapped
Housing
Age Group (categories: 65+)
(VCF0102) (N=8,034)
People with Disabilities Handicap or Disease Discrimina-
tion; Assistance to the Disabled and
Handicapped; Elderly and Handi-
capped Housing
Respondent Work Status 16-
category (categories: working
now and permanently disabled—
20 or more hours; permanently
disabled, no current occupa-
tion; permanently disabled and




Regulation of drug industry, med-
ical devices, and clinical labs; Pre-
scription drug coverage and costs
Railroads Railroads Railroad Transportation and Safety
Table A.3: Case Selection (Part 3). This chart shows how I matched categories from the
Policy Agendas Project, the Center for Responsive Politics, and the American National
Election Studies for the forty groups in my sample. Each row lists the categories I pulled




Policy Agendas Project American National Election Stud-
ies
Rural Rural Housing and FMHA Hous-
ing Assistance Programs; Rural Eco-
nomic Development
Urbanism (category: rural, small
towns, outlying and adjacent ar-
eas) (VCF0111) (N=16,187)
Sea Transport Sea Transport Maritime Issues
Securities & Investment Securities & Invest-
ment
Securities and Commodities Regula-
tion







Tobacco Tobacco Tobacco Abuse, Treatment, and Ed-
ucation
Tourism Lodging/Tourism Tourism
Urban Urban Economic Development and
General Urban Issues
Urbanism (category: central cities)
(VCF0111) (N=11,479)
Veterans Defense Veterans Housing Assistance and
Military Housing Programs; VA Is-
sues




Table A.4: Case Selection (Part 4). This chart shows how I matched categories from the
Policy Agendas Project, the Center for Responsive Politics, and the American National
Election Studies for the forty groups in my sample. Each row lists the categories I pulled
from each data set for each group.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
abortion-pc abortion-pl cars & trucks computers & internet education
Year 0.003* -0.008*** 0.008 -0.007 -0.004
(0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005)
Constant -6.052* 16.11*** -14.95 14.85 7.315
(2.935) (4.414) (12.67) (15.99) (9.041)
Observations 15 15 10 10 10
R-squared 0.259 0.502 0.152 0.095 0.072
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
entertainment environment ethnic & racial minorities farming & ranching immigrants
Year 0.006 0.009** -0.002 -0.007** -0.002**
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Constant -11.27 -17.94** 4.094 14.84** 4.793**
(12.60) (6.680) (3.487) (6.129) (2.156)
Observations 10 10 27 10 21
R-squared 0.096 0.482 0.038 0.419 0.188
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
LGBT labor low-income people older people people with disabilities
Year -0.002 -0.003*** 0.001 0.002* -0.016*
(0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
Constant 3.930 6.912*** -1.294 -3.659* 32.56*
(19.53) (1.867) (1.944) (1.888) (14.62)
Observations 5 26 26 27 12
R-squared 0.011 0.336 0.028 0.140 0.325
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18
rural urban women
Year -0.004*** 0.001 -4.64e-04
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 7.074*** -1.707 1.138
(1.763) (2.097) (1.636)
Observations 25 25 27
R-squared 0.400 0.041 0.012
Table A.5: Special Interest Partisanship in the Electorate, by Group. This table displays
results from 18 bivariate regressions of special interest partisanship in the electorate on
year. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
VARIABLES
year 0.0178*** 0.0437*** 0.0429*** 0.0429*** 0.0429***





midterm -0.272*** -0.299*** -0.299*** -0.299***
(0.0752) (0.0764) (0.0764) (0.0764)
age -0.000674 -0.000674 -0.000674
(0.00147) (0.00147) (0.00147)
religion 0.00357 0.00357 0.00357
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156)
church att 0.0147 0.0147 0.0147
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0145)
urbanism -0.232*** -0.232*** -0.232***
(0.0317) (0.0317) (0.0317)
education 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.221***
(0.0298) (0.0298) (0.0298)
race 0.0615** 0.0615** 0.0615**
(0.0277) (0.0277) (0.0277)
female -0.186*** -0.186*** -0.186***
(0.0504) (0.0504) (0.0504)
income pct -0.00492 -0.00492 -0.00492
(0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0198)
partic camp 0.412*** 0.412*** 0.412***
(0.0412) (0.0412) (0.0412)
voted 0.416*** 0.416*** 0.416***
(0.0579) (0.0579) (0.0579)




Constant -0.381*** -2.618*** -2.337*** -2.290*** -3.346***
(0.0306) (0.225) (0.234) (0.228) (0.235)
Observations 27,282 8,224 8,171 8,171 8,171
Table A.6: Basic Party Differences. These models are logit regressions. The dependent
variable measures people’s responses to the question: “Do you think there are any impor-
tant differences in what the Republicans and Democrats stand for?”
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Democrats Republicans Difference
year1 0.0154*** 0.00878*** 0.0362***
(0.00292) (0.00301) (0.00320)
midterm -0.0131 -0.00167 -0.121***
(0.0285) (0.0295) (0.0313)
age -0.0102*** 0.00165* 0.00373***
(0.000867) (0.000895) (0.000951)
religion -0.00824 0.0315*** -0.00621
(0.00838) (0.00866) (0.00917)
church att -0.000113 0.0297*** 0.00790
(0.00813) (0.00841) (0.00890)
urbanism 0.0487*** -0.106*** -0.123***
(0.0182) (0.0188) (0.0200)
education -0.178*** 0.181*** 0.111***
(0.0162) (0.0167) (0.0177)
race 0.0295* 0.0307* -0.0131
(0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0179)
female -0.0125 0.0570** 0.127***
(0.0279) (0.0289) (0.0306)
income pct -0.0199* 0.00230 0.00576
(0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0118)
partic camp -0.0745*** 0.118*** 0.153***
(0.0195) (0.0201) (0.0213)
voted -0.160*** 0.133*** 0.232***
(0.0336) (0.0347) (0.0368)
know horma -0.319*** 0.309*** 0.347***
(0.0311) (0.0321) (0.0341)
pid 7pt -0.140*** 0.0158** 0.0252***
(0.00670) (0.00691) (0.00734)
Constant 4.533*** 3.536*** 0.298**
(0.139) (0.143) (0.152)
Observations 9,624 9,607 9,499
R-squared 0.123 0.056 0.066
Table A.7: Perceived Party Ideologies. These models are OLS regressions. The dependent
variable for Model 1 is perceived Democratic Party ideology, and the dependent variable
for Model 2 is perceived Republican Party ideology. For Model 3, the dependent variable
is the absolute difference between each respondent’s placement of the two parties. Two-
tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Health-D Health-R Health-Diff Jobs-D Jobs-R Jobs-Diff
year1 0.0186*** 0.0357*** 0.0205*** 0.0377*** 0.0396*** -0.0140***
(0.00387) (0.00384) (0.00439) (0.00338) (0.00342) (0.00393)
midterm 0.0899* -0.0404 -0.238*** 0.112*** 0.0655* -0.0583
(0.0481) (0.0486) (0.0552) (0.0343) (0.0351) (0.0400)
age -0.0110*** -0.00268* 0.00727*** -0.00481*** 0.000717 0.00670***
(0.00137) (0.00138) (0.00157) (0.000980) (0.000997) (0.00114)
religion -0.0319** 0.0210 0.0200 -0.00708 0.0126 0.00991
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0155) (0.00966) (0.00986) (0.0112)
church att 0.0239* 0.0275** 0.00120 0.0192** 0.0398*** 0.0151
(0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0147) (0.00931) (0.00950) (0.0108)
urbanism 0.0419 -0.146*** -0.150*** 0.0579*** -0.122*** -0.171***
(0.0279) (0.0280) (0.0318) (0.0205) (0.0209) (0.0239)
education -0.129*** 0.132*** 0.150*** -0.190*** 0.118*** 0.152***
(0.0257) (0.0258) (0.0294) (0.0188) (0.0192) (0.0218)
race -0.0353 0.0727*** 0.171*** -0.0134 0.0274 0.0897***
(0.0269) (0.0270) (0.0306) (0.0189) (0.0192) (0.0220)
female 0.0625 0.0695 0.0855* 0.0111 0.0506 0.0519
(0.0440) (0.0442) (0.0503) (0.0320) (0.0326) (0.0372)
income pct 0.00313 0.00142 -0.0323 0.0199 0.0145 -0.0441***
(0.0178) (0.0179) (0.0204) (0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0143)
partic camp -0.0880*** 0.128*** 0.214*** -0.0762*** 0.107*** 0.223***
(0.0297) (0.0299) (0.0338) (0.0222) (0.0226) (0.0257)
voted -0.107** 0.172*** 0.239*** -0.153*** 0.191*** 0.261***
(0.0522) (0.0526) (0.0598) (0.0387) (0.0394) (0.0451)
know hormaj -0.282*** 0.256*** 0.335*** -0.140*** 0.154*** 0.235***
(0.0506) (0.0509) (0.0580) (0.0358) (0.0365) (0.0418)
pid 7pt -0.0752*** -0.0660*** -0.0130 -0.0670*** -0.101*** -0.0326***
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.0121) (0.00769) (0.00781) (0.00893)
Constant 3.931*** 3.235*** 0.197 2.916*** 3.052*** 1.541***
(0.195) (0.195) (0.222) (0.155) (0.158) (0.180)
Observations 5,123 5,041 4,928 8,245 8,222 8,076
R-squared 0.059 0.078 0.080 0.061 0.065 0.058
Table A.8: Perceived Party Positions on Issues (Part 1). Models 1-18 are OLS regressions.
Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Aidmin-D Aidmin-R Aidmin-Diff Women-D Women-R Women-Diff
year1 0.0185*** 0.0355*** 0.0147*** 0.00304 0.0241*** 0.0379***
(0.00284) (0.00290) (0.00318) (0.00361) (0.00392) (0.00364)
midterm -0.0617* 0.00326 -0.0533 -0.0717** -0.0326 0.00783
(0.0326) (0.0335) (0.0365) (0.0361) (0.0399) (0.0368)
age 0.000681 0.00323*** 0.00480*** 0.000882 0.000554 0.000816
(0.000918) (0.000943) (0.00103) (0.00109) (0.00120) (0.00111)
religion 0.00505 0.0219** 0.0112 0.00263 0.0386*** 0.0240**
(0.00902) (0.00925) (0.0101) (0.0106) (0.0117) (0.0108)
church att -0.00476 0.0322*** 0.0261*** 0.00550 0.0327*** 0.0197*
(0.00862) (0.00885) (0.00965) (0.0103) (0.0114) (0.0105)
urbanism 0.0889*** -0.133*** -0.167*** 0.0483** -0.0469* -0.118***
(0.0190) (0.0195) (0.0213) (0.0227) (0.0251) (0.0231)
education -0.165*** 0.113*** 0.150*** -0.138*** 0.0798*** 0.100***
(0.0176) (0.0180) (0.0197) (0.0208) (0.0228) (0.0211)
race -0.0466*** 0.113*** 0.126*** 0.0213 0.0539** 0.0536**
(0.0173) (0.0179) (0.0195) (0.0214) (0.0237) (0.0219)
female -0.00360 0.103*** 0.0999*** 0.0946*** 0.0679* 0.0521
(0.0297) (0.0305) (0.0333) (0.0355) (0.0391) (0.0361)
income pct -0.00110 -0.0267** -0.0483*** 0.0285** -0.0208 -0.0829***
(0.0117) (0.0120) (0.0131) (0.0138) (0.0153) (0.0141)
partic camp -0.0614*** 0.110*** 0.214*** -0.0835*** 0.0695*** 0.166***
(0.0207) (0.0212) (0.0231) (0.0245) (0.0269) (0.0249)
voted -0.110*** 0.156*** 0.189*** -0.133*** 0.0123 0.0433
(0.0353) (0.0364) (0.0397) (0.0421) (0.0465) (0.0429)
know hormaj -0.241*** 0.0812** 0.156*** -0.242*** -0.00684 0.111***
(0.0329) (0.0338) (0.0370) (0.0399) (0.0440) (0.0407)
pid 7pt -0.0892*** -0.0723*** -0.0357*** -0.0141 -0.135*** -0.0893***
(0.00719) (0.00735) (0.00804) (0.00863) (0.00943) (0.00875)
Constant 3.462*** 2.788*** 0.504*** 3.409*** 2.990*** -0.195
(0.138) (0.142) (0.155) (0.166) (0.182) (0.168)
Observations 9,656 9,574 9,429 6,503 6,407 6,293
R-squared 0.057 0.064 0.057 0.034 0.052 0.066
Table A.9: Perceived Party Positions on Issues (Part 2). Models 1-18 are OLS regressions.
Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18
Defense-D Defense-R Defense-Diff Services-D Services-R Services-Diff
year1 -0.0378*** 0.0117** 0.0172** -0.0305*** 0.0902*** -0.0875***
(0.00620) (0.00579) (0.00686) (0.00903) (0.00935) (0.01060)
midterm -0.166*** 0.113*** 0.186*** 0.126*** 0.0257 0.0424
(0.0358) (0.0331) (0.0394) (0.03930) (0.04060) (0.04610)
age 0.00375*** -0.00138 -0.00263** 0.00238** 0.00179 0.00145
(0.00107) (0.000989) (0.00118) (0.00115) (0.00119) (0.00135)
religion -0.00785 0.0243** 0.00846 0.00301 -0.0089 -0.00248
(0.0102) (0.00950) (0.0112) (0.01110) (0.01140) (0.01300)
church att 0.00872 0.0168* 0.00985 -0.0208* -0.0333*** 0.0118
(0.00999) (0.00929) (0.0110) (0.01080) (0.01110) (0.01260)
urbanism 0.105*** -0.0891*** -0.185*** -0.0855*** 0.134*** -0.197***
(0.0225) (0.0209) (0.0248) (0.02400) (0.02490) (0.02820)
education -0.103*** 0.0651*** 0.0140 0.139*** -0.208*** 0.151***
(0.0200) (0.0185) (0.0220) (0.02140) (0.02200) (0.02500)
race 0.0509*** 0.0174 0.0168 0.0256 0.00296 0.0790***
(0.0180) (0.0167) (0.0198) (0.01880) (0.01940) (0.02200)
female 0.103*** 0.0436 -0.0104 -0.0616* -0.0792** 0.0798*
(0.0340) (0.0316) (0.0375) (0.03660) (0.03780) (0.04290)
income pct -0.0324** 0.0102 -0.0139 0.0265* -0.000413 -0.0242
(0.0133) (0.0124) (0.0147) (0.01430) (0.01480) (0.01680)
partic camp -0.0973*** 0.104*** 0.158*** 0.0795*** -0.135*** 0.232***
(0.0248) (0.0231) (0.0273) (0.02680) (0.02770) (0.03140)
voted -0.121*** 0.0692* 0.183*** 0.189*** -0.108** 0.239***
(0.0407) (0.0377) (0.0449) (0.04330) (0.04470) (0.05080)
know hormaj -0.182*** 0.200*** 0.196*** 0.328*** -0.275*** 0.424***
(0.0378) (0.0350) (0.0417) (0.03990) (0.04120) (0.04670)
pid 7pt -0.140*** -0.0541*** 0.0354*** 0.0538*** 0.116*** -0.0290***
(0.00811) (0.00750) (0.00892) (0.00862) (0.00890) (0.01010)
Constant 5.777*** 4.568*** 1.277*** 5.190*** 0.155 4.840***
(0.260) (0.243) (0.288) (0.37500) (0.38800) (0.44000)
Observations 6,585 6,701 6,494 5569 5623 5511
R-squared 0.093 0.033 0.031 0.069 0.1 0.085
Table A.10: Perceived Party Positions on Issues (Part 3). Models 1-18 are OLS regres-
sions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Ideology-D Ideology-R Ideology-Diff Health-D Health-R Health-Diff
year 0.0306*** 0.0152*** 0.0173*** 0.0182*** 0.0367*** 0.0185***
(0.00355) (0.00345) (0.00361) (0.00453) (0.00444) (0.00524)
age -0.00907*** -0.00121 0.00378*** -0.00872*** -0.00496*** 0.00441*
(0.00120) (0.00117) (0.00123) (0.00194) (0.00189) (0.00226)
religion -0.0140 0.0439*** 0.0193 -0.0485** 0.0194 0.0466**
(0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0122) (0.0196) (0.0192) (0.0227)
church att 0.00483 0.0382*** 0.00482 0.0140 0.0168 0.0107
(0.0114) (0.0112) (0.0117) (0.0183) (0.0179) (0.0213)
urbanism -0.00626 -0.154*** -0.0929*** 0.0633 -0.111*** -0.133***
(0.0255) (0.0249) (0.0261) (0.0397) (0.0389) (0.0461)
education -0.124*** 0.165*** 0.0691*** -0.126*** 0.0836** 0.114***
(0.0227) (0.0221) (0.0231) (0.0358) (0.0349) (0.0414)
race 0.0261 0.0195 0.00727 0.00742 0.0203 0.0560
(0.0223) (0.0218) (0.0230) (0.0344) (0.0340) (0.0397)
female 0.111*** -0.00967 -0.00686 0.0745 -0.0122 0.0370
(0.0392) (0.0383) (0.0400) (0.0625) (0.0614) (0.0725)
income pct -0.00310 -0.00369 -0.0256 0.0138 0.0345 -0.0384
(0.0157) (0.0154) (0.0160) (0.0262) (0.0257) (0.0305)
partic camp -0.127*** 0.125*** 0.192*** -0.174*** 0.131*** 0.232***
(0.0280) (0.0274) (0.0285) (0.0442) (0.0435) (0.0510)
voted -0.213*** 0.334*** 0.260*** -0.140* 0.166** 0.300***
(0.0506) (0.0492) (0.0518) (0.0800) (0.0782) (0.0930)
know hormaj -0.262*** 0.296*** 0.367*** -0.389*** 0.286*** 0.447***
(0.0454) (0.0442) (0.0465) (0.0741) (0.0725) (0.0862)
pid 7pt -0.153*** 0.0137 0.0547*** -0.0893*** -0.0869*** -0.0119
(0.00938) (0.00915) (0.00956) (0.0149) (0.0146) (0.0173)
Constant 3.990*** 3.507*** 0.885*** 3.894*** 3.369*** 0.497*
(0.180) (0.176) (0.184) (0.256) (0.253) (0.297)
Observations 5,651 5,779 5,517 2,746 2,887 2,616
R-squared 0.116 0.074 0.060 0.079 0.067 0.061
Table A.11: Perceived Presidential Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 1). Models 1-21
are OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Jobs-D Jobs-R Jobs-Diff Aidmin-D Aidmin-R Aidmin-D
year 0.0535*** 0.0508*** -0.0218*** 0.0321*** 0.0541*** 0.0192***
(0.00355) (0.00363) (0.00402) (0.00359) (0.00357) (0.00391)
age -0.00412*** 0.00332*** 0.00701*** 0.000833 0.00435*** 0.00549***
(0.00120) (0.00123) (0.00136) (0.00120) (0.00121) (0.00133)
religion -0.0161 0.0295** 0.0246* -0.00528 0.0332*** 0.0385***
(0.0120) (0.0125) (0.0137) (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0131)
church att 0.000271 0.0453*** 0.0222* -0.0167 0.0307*** 0.0261**
(0.0116) (0.0119) (0.0132) (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0126)
urbanism 0.0344 -0.126*** -0.132*** 0.0629** -0.130*** -0.139***
(0.0251) (0.0259) (0.0284) (0.0253) (0.0256) (0.0279)
education -0.134*** 0.111*** 0.0782*** -0.0906*** 0.0475** 0.0230
(0.0231) (0.0236) (0.0260) (0.0232) (0.0233) (0.0253)
race -0.0607*** -0.0159 0.0691*** -0.0259 0.0877*** 0.0947***
(0.0218) (0.0223) (0.0244) (0.0216) (0.0215) (0.0236)
female 0.00998 -0.0146 -0.00411 0.0213 0.0641 0.0419
(0.0393) (0.0404) (0.0445) (0.0395) (0.0398) (0.0434)
income pct 0.0228 0.0177 -0.0396** -0.0158 -0.0400** -0.0562***
(0.0157) (0.0162) (0.0178) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0173)
partic camp -0.125*** 0.161*** 0.299*** -0.120*** 0.155*** 0.239***
(0.0283) (0.0292) (0.0320) (0.0283) (0.0287) (0.0310)
voted -0.150*** 0.251*** 0.238*** -0.0999** 0.144*** 0.180***
(0.0493) (0.0506) (0.0559) (0.0495) (0.0500) (0.0547)
know hormaj -0.194*** 0.160*** 0.266*** -0.185*** 0.177*** 0.304***
(0.0450) (0.0462) (0.0511) (0.0451) (0.0454) (0.0497)
pid 7pt -0.0828*** -0.101*** -0.0131 -0.0892*** -0.0761*** -0.0366***
(0.00945) (0.00970) (0.0107) (0.00952) (0.00956) (0.0104)
Constant 2.528*** 2.495*** 1.852*** 2.942*** 2.221*** 0.564***
(0.177) (0.181) (0.200) (0.177) (0.178) (0.193)
Observations 5,958 6,075 5,736 5,870 6,007 5,643
R-squared 0.075 0.085 0.057 0.051 0.080 0.051
Table A.12: Perceived Presidential Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 2). Models 1-21
are OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18
Women-D Women-R Women-Diff Defense-D Defense-R Defense-Diff
year -0.0143*** 0.0243*** 0.0332*** -0.0530*** -0.0272*** -5.13e-05
(0.00404) (0.00416) (0.00401) (0.00696) (0.00673) (0.00776)
age 0.000517 0.00270* 0.00102 0.00147 -0.00321** -0.00267*
(0.00145) (0.00151) (0.00146) (0.00138) (0.00130) (0.00153)
religion -0.00807 0.0377** 0.0434*** -0.00245 0.0217* 0.0162
(0.0144) (0.0153) (0.0145) (0.0133) (0.0127) (0.0147)
church att -0.00700 0.0396*** 0.0449*** 0.00204 0.0393*** 0.0230
(0.0139) (0.0146) (0.0139) (0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0145)
urbanism 0.0138 -0.0663** -0.0865*** 0.00783 -0.0302 -0.0769**
(0.0301) (0.0319) (0.0302) (0.0296) (0.0282) (0.0327)
education -0.125*** -0.00240 0.0127 -0.0439* 0.0747*** 0.00937
(0.0275) (0.0289) (0.0275) (0.0262) (0.0247) (0.0287)
race 0.00784 0.0168 0.0370 0.0800*** 0.0134 -0.00908
(0.0269) (0.0288) (0.0269) (0.0231) (0.0215) (0.0252)
female 0.0877* 0.0774 0.153*** 0.175*** 0.0229 -0.121**
(0.0475) (0.0501) (0.0475) (0.0445) (0.0422) (0.0491)
income pct 0.0108 -0.0432** -0.0740*** -0.0445** 0.0116 -0.0103
(0.0193) (0.0203) (0.0194) (0.0175) (0.0166) (0.0193)
partic camp -0.151*** 0.0740** 0.213*** -0.107*** 0.156*** 0.199***
(0.0342) (0.0360) (0.0341) (0.0326) (0.0311) (0.0359)
voted -0.158*** -0.0929 -0.0205 -0.0973* 0.130** 0.221***
(0.0591) (0.0626) (0.0596) (0.0565) (0.0536) (0.0627)
know hormaj -0.208*** 0.0926 0.146*** -0.245*** 0.227*** 0.278***
(0.0550) (0.0583) (0.0554) (0.0508) (0.0479) (0.0563)
pid 7pt -0.0125 -0.154*** -0.0755*** -0.162*** -0.0430*** 0.0845***
(0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0116) (0.0107) (0.0101) (0.0118)
Constant 4.175*** 3.251*** -0.0237 6.381*** 5.960*** 1.767***
(0.203) (0.212) (0.202) (0.296) (0.287) (0.331)
Observations 4,159 4,348 3,972 3,897 4,025 3,781
R-squared 0.035 0.061 0.061 0.116 0.044 0.050
Table A.13: Perceived Presidential Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 3). Models 1-21
are OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 19 Model 20 Model 21
Services-D Services-R Services-Diff
year 0.00658 0.178*** -0.122***
(0.0132) (0.0137) (0.0147)
age 0.00207 -0.000500 0.00391**
(0.00172) (0.00176) (0.00191)
religion -0.00265 0.0146 -0.0146
(0.0168) (0.0175) (0.0187)
church att -0.0150 -0.0654*** 0.0377**
(0.0165) (0.0171) (0.0184)
urbanism -0.00252 0.113*** -0.143***
(0.0366) (0.0380) (0.0408)
education 0.0645** -0.214*** 0.0745**
(0.0319) (0.0331) (0.0355)
race 0.0128 0.0250 0.0704**
(0.0257) (0.0264) (0.0284)
female -0.121** -0.113** 0.0433
(0.0546) (0.0565) (0.0606)
income pct 0.0253 0.00110 -0.0598**
(0.0216) (0.0223) (0.0240)
partic camp 0.0765* -0.196*** 0.222***
(0.0397) (0.0413) (0.0441)
voted 0.348*** -0.0559 0.304***
(0.0697) (0.0716) (0.0775)
know hormaj 0.350*** -0.422*** 0.393***
(0.0609) (0.0627) (0.0676)
pid 7pt 0.0766*** 0.119*** 0.0142
(0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0142)
Constant 3.663*** -3.042*** 6.287***
(0.541) (0.558) (0.601)
Observations 2,695 2,821 2,656
R-squared 0.073 0.137 0.078
Table A.14: Perceived Presidential Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 4). Models 1-21
are OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Ideology-D Ideology-R Ideology-Diff Jobs-D Jobs-R Jobs-Diff Aidmin-D Aidmin-R
year -0.00377 0.0245*** 0.0745*** -0.0279* 0.0324* 0.0536** -0.0294 0.0985***
(0.00800) (0.00844) (0.0120) (0.0164) (0.0173) (0.0227) (0.0208) (0.0223)
midterm -0.143** -0.129** 0.165* 0.0382 0.0916 0.340*** -0.222*** -0.116
(0.0653) (0.0645) (0.0894) (0.0743) (0.0790) (0.104) (0.0747) (0.0781)
age -0.00224 0.00101 0.00386* 0.000301 0.00323 0.00628** 0.00419** 0.00575***
(0.00156) (0.00165) (0.00233) (0.00193) (0.00206) (0.00277) (0.00208) (0.00222)
religion -0.0258* 0.0235 -0.00472 0.0135 -0.00711 -0.00286 0.0198 0.00193
(0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0206) (0.0196) (0.0199) (0.0265) (0.0204) (0.0210)
church att -0.0135 -0.0321** -0.0110 0.0137 0.0387** -0.00870 -0.00661 0.0123
(0.0144) (0.0149) (0.0210) (0.0187) (0.0197) (0.0268) (0.0197) (0.0208)
urbanism 0.192*** -0.0260 -0.163*** 0.198*** 0.00681 -0.114** 0.209*** -0.0275
(0.0318) (0.0347) (0.0469) (0.0401) (0.0438) (0.0575) (0.0421) (0.0462)
education -0.179*** 0.140*** 0.251*** -0.0458 0.182*** 0.169*** -0.0891** 0.108**
(0.0287) (0.0300) (0.0415) (0.0381) (0.0395) (0.0533) (0.0399) (0.0425)
race 0.0326 -0.0471 -0.0334 -0.0568 -0.0193 0.158*** -0.0961** 0.0188
(0.0306) (0.0357) (0.0451) (0.0402) (0.0462) (0.0572) (0.0434) (0.0503)
female -0.0853* -0.0186 0.0333 -0.0397 -0.114* -0.0270 -0.131* -0.0464
(0.0499) (0.0514) (0.0722) (0.0647) (0.0673) (0.0909) (0.0675) (0.0713)
income pct -0.00424 -0.000272 -0.0468* 0.00794 0.0241 -0.0578* -0.00190 0.0278
(0.0188) (0.0195) (0.0277) (0.0239) (0.0249) (0.0337) (0.0247) (0.0264)
partic camp -0.0810** 0.113*** 0.139*** -0.0696* 0.140*** 0.188*** -0.109** 0.107**
(0.0323) (0.0325) (0.0446) (0.0410) (0.0417) (0.0555) (0.0428) (0.0439)
voted -0.154*** 0.0869 0.135 -0.229*** 0.276*** 0.453*** -0.162** 0.250***
(0.0593) (0.0617) (0.0886) (0.0781) (0.0835) (0.115) (0.0809) (0.0853)
know hormaj -0.311*** 0.275*** 0.404*** -0.00606 0.101 0.186* -0.183** 0.0178
(0.0561) (0.0582) (0.0823) (0.0734) (0.0785) (0.104) (0.0783) (0.0840)
pid 7pt -0.0732*** 0.0389*** 0.0163 -0.0149 -0.00255 -0.00144 -0.0316* -0.0185
(0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0170) (0.0156) (0.0159) (0.0212) (0.0166) (0.0170)
Constant 4.995*** 3.131*** -1.951*** 4.536*** 2.028*** -1.865** 4.979*** 0.208
(0.323) (0.335) (0.467) (0.608) (0.647) (0.847) (0.717) (0.769)
Observations 2,835 2,217 1,335 2,193 1,720 1,064 1,871 1,429
R-squared 0.083 0.061 0.122 0.030 0.058 0.097 0.047 0.059
Table A.15: Perceived House Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 1). Models 1-15 are
OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
Aidmin-Diff Women-D Women-R Women-Diff Services-D Services-R Services-Diff
year 0.124*** -0.0157 0.0762*** 0.0736** 0.0123 0.0700*** -0.0337
(0.0277) (0.0222) (0.0264) (0.0294) (0.0179) (0.0202) (0.0294)
midterm 0.0658 -0.315*** -0.0980 0.184 -0.0169 -0.125 0.235**
(0.100) (0.0839) (0.0960) (0.113) (0.0735) (0.0782) (0.111)
age 0.00773*** -0.00136 -0.00105 0.00738** 0.00381* 0.00375* -0.000867
(0.00286) (0.00226) (0.00267) (0.00311) (0.00198) (0.00215) (0.00323)
religion -0.00276 0.0375* 0.0607** 0.0185 0.0314 0.0279 0.00585
(0.0266) (0.0222) (0.0249) (0.0285) (0.0194) (0.0208) (0.0302)
church att 0.0126 -0.0354 -0.0390 -0.0326 -0.0111 -0.0208 0.00406
(0.0269) (0.0219) (0.0252) (0.0297) (0.0182) (0.0202) (0.0297)
urbanism -0.224*** 0.186*** 0.0230 -0.0829 -0.0937** -0.00729 -0.111*
(0.0584) (0.0462) (0.0559) (0.0643) (0.0392) (0.0458) (0.0642)
education 0.154*** -0.0956** 0.0398 0.203*** 0.134*** -0.212*** 0.213***
(0.0540) (0.0441) (0.0524) (0.0599) (0.0365) (0.0406) (0.0589)
race 0.0738 0.0142 -0.0103 0.0681 0.0404 0.0816* 0.0226
(0.0579) (0.0489) (0.0612) (0.0638) (0.0337) (0.0442) (0.0621)
female 0.119 -0.0246 0.0944 0.176* 0.0417 0.0733 -0.0733
(0.0906) (0.0741) (0.0867) (0.100) (0.0625) (0.0692) (0.102)
income pct -0.0307 -0.0254 -0.0155 -0.0420 -0.0132 0.0306 -0.0733*
(0.0333) (0.0273) (0.0325) (0.0375) (0.0246) (0.0272) (0.0403)
partic camp 0.206*** -0.0183 0.0318 0.0319 0.127*** -0.0969** 0.152**
(0.0557) (0.0473) (0.0538) (0.0614) (0.0416) (0.0443) (0.0639)
voted 0.180 -0.299*** 0.160 0.0481 0.00477 -0.212** 0.433***
(0.111) (0.0868) (0.103) (0.118) (0.0748) (0.0848) (0.127)
know hormaj 0.258** -0.212** 0.0459 0.189* 0.157** -0.188** 0.472***
(0.107) (0.0856) (0.101) (0.114) (0.0657) (0.0742) (0.107)
pid 7pt 0.00224 -0.0130 -0.0532*** -0.0717*** 0.0386*** 0.0219 -0.0103
(0.0216) (0.0181) (0.0206) (0.0238) (0.0149) (0.0159) (0.0231)
Constant -3.863*** 4.242*** 0.978 -2.094** 3.371*** 1.663** 1.824
(0.949) (0.773) (0.912) (1.017) (0.703) (0.791) (1.149)
Observations 888 1,764 1,323 851 1,800 1,297 826
R-squared 0.118 0.044 0.026 0.064 0.037 0.079 0.115
Table A.16: Perceived House Candidate Positions on Issues (Part 2). Models 1-15 are
OLS regressions. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Likeness Likeness Likeness Cohesion-D Cohesion-D
Congress -0.950*** -0.746*** -0.766*** 1.064*** 1.027***
(0.030) (0.038) (0.035) (0.026) (0.034)
Democratic House 5.109*** 1.031**
(0.565) (0.515)
Election Year 4.534*** 4.510*** 0.066
(0.405) (0.404) (0.369)
Demoratic Seat Share 0.087***
(0.008)
Constant 157.8*** 131.9*** 115.7*** -40.11*** -37.58***
(2.944) (3.943) (4.563) (2.603) (3.598)
Observations 21,216 19,997 19,997 21,216 19,997
R-squared 0.045 0.054 0.056 0.071 0.057
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Cohesion-D Cohesion-R Cohesion-R Cohesion-R
Congress 0.972*** 1.169*** 0.479*** 0.754***
(-0.032) (-0.028) (-0.036) (-0.033)
Democratic House -15.500***
(-0.537)
Election Year 0.115 -1.577*** -1.734***
(-0.369) (-0.385) (-0.388)
Demoratic Seat Share -0.008 -0.155***
(-0.007) (-0.007)
Constant -29.43*** -49.06*** 30.33*** 30.84***
(-4.168) (-2.752) (-3.751) (-4.387)
Observations 19,997 21,216 19,997 19,997
R-squared 0.057 0.076 0.097 0.08
Table A.17: Aggregate Likeness and Cohesion in the House. Models 1-9 are OLS re-
gressions for votes on all non-private, non-commemorative bills in the House. Two-tailed
tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Likeness Likeness Likeness Cohesion-D Cohesion-D
Congress -0.785*** -0.482*** -0.471*** 1.111*** 1.066***
(0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.033)
Democratic Senate 8.062*** -0.367
(0.470) (0.510)
Election Year 3.572*** 3.650*** -2.504***
(0.394) (0.395) (0.428)
Democratic Seat Share 0.519***
(0.032)
Constant 141.0*** 104.9*** 81.30*** -45.99*** -40.31***
(2.654) (3.058) (3.964) (2.787) (3.317)
Observations 19,158 18,483 18,483 19,158 18,483
R-squared 0.040 0.049 0.048 0.071 0.064
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Cohesion-D Cohesion-R Cohesion-R Cohesion-R
Congress 0.978*** 1.132*** 0.759*** 0.756***
(0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.034)
Democratic Senate -10.740***
(0.517)
Election Year -2.481*** -2.628*** -2.736***
(0.427) (0.433) (0.434)
Democratic Seat Share -0.257*** -0.658***
(0.034) (0.035)
Constant -18.16*** -48.09*** -3.861 24.60***
(4.291) (2.857) (3.358) (4.359)
Observations 18,483 19,158 18,483 18,483
R-squared 0.067 0.070 0.076 0.073
Table A.18: Aggregate Likeness and Cohesion in the Senate. Models 1-9 are OLS re-
gressions for votes on all non-private, non-commemorative bills in the Senate. Two-tailed
tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Table A.19: Special Interest Partisanship in the House and Senate. The dependent vari-
able in these regressions is a combination of likeness and cohesion. First, I rescaled like-
ness and cohesion to range from 0 to 1, rather than 0 to 100. Then, I subtracted the likeness
score for each roll call vote from 1, and multiplied the result by the average party cohesion
score for each vote. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
abortion active military air transport alcohol cars/trucks
Congress 0.027*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.023** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.002)
Constant -2.440*** -0.625*** -0.869*** -2.170** -0.850***
(0.063) (0.048) (0.134) (0.882) (0.179)
Observations 136 204 182 18 44
R-squared 0.933 0.563 0.264 0.310 0.431
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
comm banks computers/int education electric util entertain
Congress 0.004*** 0.002 0.013*** -0.011*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.012) (4.42e-04) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant -0.210** 0.078 -1.063*** 1.276*** -0.506***
(0.091) (1.267) (0.044) (0.302) (0.171)
Observations 151 25 610 51 83
R-squared 0.115 0.001 0.597 0.190 0.178
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
environment eth/rac minorities farm/ranch food proc/sales guns
Congress 0.013*** 0.019*** -0.008*** 0.014*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Constant -1.063*** -1.624*** 0.931*** -1.164*** -1.159***
(0.053) (0.312) (0.087) (0.265) (0.130)
Observations 631 69 255 42 119
R-squared 0.470 0.328 0.239 0.400 0.471
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20
health ins hospitals/nurs homes human rights immigrants insurance
Congress 0.034*** 0.001 -0.002** 0.010*** 0.023
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (4.78e-04) (0.014)
Constant -2.992*** 0.069 0.316*** -0.800*** -2.073
(0.280) (0.302) (0.110) (0.047) (1.453)
Observations 104 62 73 225 9
R-squared 0.609 0.002 0.054 0.666 0.267
Table A.20: Special Interest Partisanship in the House, by Group (Part 1). This table
displays results from 40 bivariate regressions of special interest partisanship on session
of Congress. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25
labor lawyers/firms LGBT low-income mining
Congress 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.037*** 0.009*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004)
Constant -1.236*** -1.108*** -3.555*** -0.627*** -1.803***
(0.146) (0.073) (0.423) (0.067) (0.418)
Observations 152 400 10 377 33
R-squared 0.429 0.481 0.910 0.331 0.410
Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30
oil/gas older ppl w/ disabilities pharmaceuticals railroads
Congress 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.006** 0.017***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant -0.612*** -0.985*** -0.635** -0.429* -1.452***
(0.097) (0.135) (0.281) (0.235) (0.156)
Observations 219 161 75 40 123
R-squared 0.249 0.333 0.104 0.144 0.464
Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35
rural sea transport securities/invest small business own telecomm
Congress 0.001 0.002* 0.004 0.015*** -0.006**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.195 -0.063 -0.217 -1.243*** 0.841***
(0.193) (0.113) (0.259) (0.267) (0.292)
Observations 82 158 77 108 42
R-squared 0.002 0.018 0.032 0.232 0.109
Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 Model 39 Model 40
tobacco tourism urban veterans women
Congress 0.013*** 4.67e-04 0.007** 0.001 0.013***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)
Constant -1.167*** 0.044 -0.479* -0.015 -1.110***
(0.248) (0.266) (0.273) (0.083) (0.153)
Observations 7 12 37 168 20
R-squared 0.848 0.003 0.154 0.009 0.787
Table A.21: Special Interest Partisanship in the House, by Group (Part 2). This table
displays results from 40 bivariate regressions of special interest partisanship on session
of Congress. Two-tailed tests are used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
abortion active military air transport alcohol cars/trucks
Congress 0.038*** 2.26e-04 0.006*** 0.049* 0.005**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) (0.003)
Constant -3.588*** 0.111* -0.342*** -4.623 -0.361
(0.106) (0.060) (0.119) (1.699) (0.243)
Observations 114 196 162 4 43
R-squared 0.920 0.001 0.112 0.815 0.100
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
comm banks computers/int education electric util entertain
Congress 0.003*** -0.118*** 0.021*** 0.001 0.015***
(0.001) (0.021) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Constant -0.165* 12.910*** -1.768*** 0.168 -1.339***
(0.097) (2.223) (0.061) (0.241) (0.112)
Observations 117 23 554 35 80
R-squared 0.095 0.602 0.683 0.003 0.703
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
environment eth/rac minorities farm/ranch food proc/sales guns
Congress 0.010*** -0.002 -0.002*** 0.014*** 0.026***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001)
Constant -0.799*** 0.289* 0.381*** -1.210*** -2.260***
(0.091) (0.150) (0.053) (0.249) (0.126)
Observations 390 192 437 45 138
R-squared 0.237 0.008 0.028 0.422 0.751
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20
health ins hospitals/nurs homes human rights immigrants insurance
Congress 0.026*** 0.024** 0.005* 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant -2.249*** -1.980* -0.422 -0.689*** -0.664***
(0.245) (0.942) (0.319) (0.067) (0.131)
Observations 124 18 46 217 26
R-squared 0.488 0.261 0.063 0.432 0.596
Table A.22: Special Interest Partisanship in the Senate, by Group (Part 1). This table
displays results from 39 bivariate regressions of special interest partisanship on session
of Congress (tourism dropped due to lack of observations). Two-tailed tests are used: * <
.10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25
labor lawyers/firms LGBT low-income mining
Congress 0.010*** 0.022*** 0.026*** 0.011*** -0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.006)
Constant -0.700*** -1.941*** -2.375*** -0.787*** 1.862***
(0.103) (0.080) (0.484) (0.084) (0.538)
Observations 214 289 23 468 18
R-squared 0.283 0.711 0.594 0.247 0.389
Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30
oil/gas older ppl w/ disabilities pharmaceuticals railroads
Congress 0.010*** 0.022*** 0.008*** 0.018*** 0.020***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Constant -0.793*** -1.823*** -0.580** -1.522*** -1.765***
(0.050) (0.136) (0.253) (0.403) (0.196)
Observations 475 227 55 21 91
R-squared 0.445 0.514 0.143 0.505 0.520
Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35
rural sea transport securities/invest small business own telecomm
Congress -0.008*** 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.005** 0.013***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.986*** -0.159 -0.641** -0.256 -1.061***
(0.232) (0.105) (0.283) (0.206) (0.198)
Observations 60 115 53 95 28
R-squared 0.140 0.064 0.162 0.060 0.597
Model 36 Model 37 Model 38 Model 39
tobacco urban veterans women
Congress 0.019*** -0.006*** 0.008*** 0.004
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Constant -1.636*** 0.649*** -0.548*** -0.161
(0.289) (0.179) (0.192) (0.576)
Observations 27 57 119 24
R-squared 0.653 0.141 0.126 0.015
Table A.23: Special Interest Partisanship in the Senate, by Group (Part 2). This table
displays results from 39 bivariate regressions of special interest partisanship on session
of Congress (tourism dropped due to lack of observations). Two-tailed tests are used: * <
.10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
active military air transport cars/trucks comm banks computers/int
Year -9.85e-05 8.46e-07 -8.43e-07 4.39e-05 9.50e-05***
(8.48e-05) (9.82e-06) (7.80e-06) (4.01e-05) (2.84e-05)
Republican 0.003 -3.27e-04 8.67e-05 0.001 -0.003***
(0.003) (3.41e-04) (2.71e-04) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.011*** 0.001 2.35e-04 -0.001 -3.45e-04
(0.003) (3.59e-04) (2.85e-04) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.031 0.016 0.002 0.031 0.218
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
education electric util entertain environment eth/rac minorities
Year 0.001*** -8.72e-05*** -1.55e-06 -2.38e-05 2.23e-05
(2.50e-04) (2.69e-05) (5.54e-06) (1.96e-04) (1.20e-04)
Republican -0.015* -2.88e-04 -1.89e-04 0.006 -0.004
(0.009) (0.001) (1.92e-04) (0.007) (0.004)
Constant 0.012 0.004*** 2.42e-04 0.013* 0.010**
(0.009) (0.001) (2.02e-04) (0.007) (0.004)
Observations 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.202 0.168 0.021 0.012 0.019
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
farm/ranch food proc/sales guns health ins hospitals/nurs homes
Year -3.13e-04*** -2.95e-06 3.76e-04*** 4.06e-04*** -7.33e-06
(7.12e-05) (9.97e-06) (7.73e-05) (1.42e-04) (3.86e-05)
Republican -0.003 -0.001** -0.011*** -0.010** -0.003*
(0.002) (3.46e-04) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)
Constant 0.018*** 0.001** 4.98e-04 0.003 0.003**
(0.003) (3.64e-04) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)
Observations 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.296 0.087 0.378 0.154 0.064
Table A.24: Attention to Issues in State of the Union Addresses (Part 1). These tables
display the results of 35 separate regressions of attention to each of 35 issues in State of the
Union Addresses (measured as the percentage of quasi-statements regarding each issue
in each address) on the year of the address and the president’s party. Two-tailed tests are
used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20
human rights immigrants labor lawyers/firms LGBT
Year 2.31e-05 2.77e-05 -0.001*** 2.71e-04*** 4.69e-05**
(3.38e-05) (5.81e-05) (2.28e-04) (7.63e-05) (2.16e-05)
Republican -0.003** -0.002 -0.006 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 0.002* 0.005** 0.033*** -0.003 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.003) (0.001)
Observations 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.105 0.025 0.160 0.195 0.096
Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 Model 25
low-income mining oil/gas older ppl w/ disabilities
Year 4.02e-04*** 7.59e-06 2.26e-05 0.001** -1.47e-06
(1.47e-04) (2.62e-05) (1.83e-04) (2.73e-04) (1.85e-05)
Republican -0.006 0.001 0.002 0.005 3.53e-04
(0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.010) (0.001)
Constant 0.010* 2.49e-04 0.005 -0.008 0.001
(0.005) (0.001) (0.007) (0.010) (0.001)
Observations 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.123 0.010 0.002 0.090 0.005
Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30
pharmaceuticals railroads rural sea transport securities/invest
Year 6.61e-06 5.68e-06 -2.36e-05 -2.13e-05 2.14e-06
(5.16e-06) (1.36e-05) (2.10e-05) (2.39e-05) (8.42e-06)
Republican -2.13e-04 -4.74e-04 -0.001 -4.37e-05 -1.35e-06
(1.79e-04) (4.72e-04) (0.001) (0.001) (2.92e-04)
Constant 5.35e-05 0.001 0.002** 0.002* 1.35e-04
(1.89e-04) (4.97e-04) (0.001) (0.001) (3.07e-04)
60 60 60 60 60
0.043 0.018 0.037 0.015 0.001
Table A.25: Attention to Issues in State of the Union Addresses (Part 2). These tables
display the results of 35 separate regressions of attention to each of 35 issues in State of the
Union Addresses (measured as the percentage of quasi-statements regarding each issue
in each address) on the year of the address and the president’s party. Two-tailed tests are
used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35
small business own tobacco urban veterans women
Year 9.23e-06 6.19e-05*** -2.28e-05 -1.76e-04** 7.05e-05**
(3.33e-05) (1.98e-05) (6.84e-05) (6.63e-05) (2.96e-05)
Republican -0.001 -0.002*** -0.003 -0.003 -4.88e-04
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Constant 0.003** -1.85e-04 0.007*** 0.010*** -2.93e-04
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Observations 60 60 60 60 60
R-squared 0.015 0.204 0.027 0.161 0.091
Table A.26: Attention to Issues in State of the Union Addresses (Part 3). These tables
display the results of 35 separate regressions of attention to each of 35 issues in State of the
Union Addresses (measured as the percentage of quasi-statements regarding each issue
in each address) on the year of the address and the president’s party. Two-tailed tests are
used: * < .10, ** < .05, *** < .001.
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Year DNC Paid Staff RNC Paid Staff Source
1935 11 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1952 251 386 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1953 59 98 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1954 77 107 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1955 59 108 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1956 201 250 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1957 74 85 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1958 100 80 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1959 75 Encyclopedia of Associations, V. 2
1960 375 352 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1961 75 89 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1962 107 100 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1963 70 124 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1964 302 618 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1965 85 117 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1966 92 116 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1967 85 138 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1968 317 484 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1969 87 191 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1970 75 100 Encyclopedia of Associations, V. 6
1972 50 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1976 200 Klinkner 1994: 144
1977 40 220 Cotter and Bibby 1980 (see p. 5, Table 1 for original source)
1980 350 Klinkner 1994: 144
1982 90 Klinkner 1994: 165 (staff cut from 90 to 75 this year)
1997 80 250 Encyclopedia of Associations, V. 32
1998 80 250 Encyclopedia of Associations, V. 33
1999 80 250 Encyclopedia of Associations, V. 34
Table A.27: RNC and DNC Staff Size. This table uses data from various sources to track
RNC and DNC staff size over time.
